

JPRS-UMA-94-004
26 January 1994



JPRS Report

Central Eurasia

Military Affairs

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ARMED FORCES

Prospects of Russian National Security in Year 2000

Post-Economic Boom—Balanced Conservative Image

94UM0164A Moscow *SEGODNYA* in Russian No 1,
4 Jan 94 p 7

[Article by Sergey Karaganov, deputy director, Russian Academy of Sciences IYe, member, Presidential Council: "The Russian Concept of Security in the Year 2005"]

[Text]

Prediction

People familiar with strategic planning know that predictions may be made a year, a year and a half, or two or three years into the future. Beyond that, science ends and art begins. At this moment intuition and imagination should begin to play a greater role than a knowledge of facts and trends, and the ability to analyze them.

This almost axiomatic premise would seem to be more applicable to Russia than anywhere else, because in Russia, everything is moving, collapsing, growing, and serious political scientists are extremely reluctant to make predictions even a month into the future. However, it is in the present that we can predict the policies of Russia relatively far into the future with much greater confidence than has ever been possible in the last several decades. Fifteen or so years ago this would have been impossible because it was obvious that the system was rolling downhill, and things were about to explode. But as for how many explosions there would be, and what would follow them, this was unclear. Three and even two years ago the old system was undergoing decomposition and disintegration, but it was still hanging on, and no one was sure when development would begin.

Many things have become clearer this year, 1993. A superimposition of a large number of phenomena and events—dramatic expansion of the property-owning class, of the stratum of people working in the private sector (they now represent over a third of the employed), growth of the "gray," unregulated and unaccountable economy, which was nonetheless feeding millions, and B. Yeltsin's victory in the spring referendum—transformed quantity into quality. There appeared in the politically and economically active and competitive part of the population a certainty, a latent feeling that Russia "will break out," and become a mighty country of prosperous and free people. Russia crossed over the mountains dividing its totalitarian past from a normal future. The descent into the valley of normalcy is perilous. A misstep could still mean disaster. But it's even harder to go back.

New elites whose interests are predictable and are already rather clearly discernible began forming quickly.

These were the new bourgeoisie, moving from trade, essentially military, to production. These were the directors of state enterprises undergoing privatization, who were becoming capitalists. These were the political elites, coming together with the first two and quickly gaining strength. And finally, these were the military, whose influence was visibly growing in a time of weakness of state power and political instability at the borders.

The main vector of the interests of these elites is already clear—moderate state nationalism, economic reintegration of a significant part of the former USSR while avoiding brutal and costly actions of political reintegration, and a desire for cooperation, especially economic, with the outside world. In this case the failed hopes of aid from the West are visibly intensifying neo-isolationist sentiments and self-reliance. A course of rapprochement with Europe, with the West, remains a priority, but internal and external limits imposed upon this rapprochement, as well as the economic ties of regions of southern Russia, Siberia and the Far East are partially reorienting interests in the direction of Asia and the Far East. The need for settling conflicts and preventing their spread is generating a habit of relying on military force—albeit at lower levels. The main interests are now focused on internal survival, on keeping instability at Russia's borders from encroaching. But despite the fact that such a focus makes Russia not even a continental but just a regional power in terms of its present interests, the elite does not perceive Russia to be as such, and it is certain that it will once again become a mighty continental power. At the same time hardly anyone is ready for serious sacrifices in behalf of greatness, and all the more so on behalf of Russia's return to the status of a global superpower, which had been imposed on it by the vagaries of history—the postwar vacuum in Europe, superimposed over possession of nuclear weapons and residual communist messianism.

This is the group of interests that will determine Russian policy over the course of the next decade. The country will go through a time of crisis, which will last another year or two. Then stabilization will begin, and then an ascent. After 5-6 years, if political disintegration, which is extremely improbable, or a catastrophic social explosion does not occur, an economic boom will begin in Russia.

By 2005 Russia will more likely be a dominant economic center and a leading political force in a fraternity of states consisting of Belarus, Ukraine (or the states that form on its territory if it falls apart as a result of the economic disaster that has begun there), Kazakhstan, and possibly Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzia. The fate of the Transcaucasian countries is unclear. Most likely if they are able to quench the flames of open conflicts in the foreseeable future, they will have extremely close political and economic relations with Russia as well.

But this time Russia will be pursuing a relatively equal policy in all directions. However, cultural and spiritual traditions, the ongoing instability in Asia, and mighty, and possibly already unstable China will prod it toward alliances with the West.

The strategy of the national security of the newly ascending capitalist Russia of the year 2005 will depend to a certain degree on what happens in the 12 years separating us from that moment. If in this time Russia becomes a part of a military-political association or strategic alliance extending from Vancouver to Tokyo, if it comes closer to Europe politically, if it comes closer to or even enters the European free trade zone forming around the expanding European Community, and if it is able to achieve real membership in the European market, and become an object of massive capital investments, Russia's strategy will be European, oriented on maintaining the status quo of world development. Imperial impulses, unavoidable for such a mighty country that is additionally undergoing an era of early capitalism, will be easily contained by the advantages of membership in a Euro-Atlantic-Pacific strategic association.

Moscow will be forced to pursue another strategy, even in terms of Russia's security. But it is becoming a normal country, and it will be forced to pursue a normal policy. And this means that it will strive to change, which is inconsistent with its national interests.

Strongest Army in Europe by Year 2000

94UM0164B Moscow *SEGODNYA* in Russian No 1,
4 Jan 94 p 7

[Article by Pavel Felgengauer: "Moscow's Ultima Ratio (Final Argument): Volunteer Peacemakers"]

Fantasy

When in the early 1980's the Russian government first had to resort to the "final argument of kings", to arms, it suddenly became evident that the emperor had no clothes. That is, while the country had an obvious excess of weapons, it did not have an army capable of quickly and effectively pacifying the country.

On 31 October 1992 there were 2.5 million servicemen in the Russian Army. There were over 600,000 in the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs], but when 5,000 paratroopers, motorized riflemen and other such men were needed for the operation in Ossetia-Ingushetia, the General Staff and the MVD scraped them up with tremendous difficulty, company by company and platoon by platoon, from Russia's cities and garrisons. Still earlier, by the way, in January 1990, partial mobilization had to be carried out in the Northern Caucasian Military District for the operation in Baku. The former Soviet Army found itself totally unsuited to lightning-fast peacemaking operations.

The military reform, which was planned to pursue a leisurely course until the year 2000, was seen more and

more clearly as being inconsistent with the requirements of the times. Circumstances forced Russia's military leadership to improvise as the events unfolded, as one peacemaking operation blended into the next. But in general, the plan for reform by the year 2000 was in a certain sense completed: The Russian Army became a mixed army, consisting of both conscripts and professionals. Even numerical strength corresponded approximately to what had been planned—1.5 million persons. By the way, this is not counting the highly expanded forces of the MVD, as well as the local national-tribal auxiliary formations in the outlying areas (in Central Asia, in the Caucasus, in Ukraine etc.).

Professional mobile combat units became the Russian Army's main strike force in the year 2000. The first such combined units (then still experimental) were formed in 1993-1994 out of soldiers serving on a contract basis. But the first complement of contract soldiers was generally unsuccessful: Common ill-disciplined people, often with a criminal past. Elite combat units could be hammered together out of such rabble only through merciless disciplinary measures. This required professional, highly paid junior officers, but there were none in the Russian Army then.

However, the army was almost perpetually at its business, and these random people were gradually sifted out. In Russia, as we know, improvisation often produces better results than planned measures. By the year 2000 the army's strike forces consisted of five "old" airborne divisions, 20 brigades and 15 separate helicopter regiments. By the end of the century the tactics of intervention had been fully worked out: Peacetime generals managed to gain some experience. The operation to pacify the Northern Caucasus is still considered to be one of the best examples of a total air-land operation. In it, by the way, the Russian Army made its first use of "invisible" ground-attack aircraft, built according to "stealth" technology to penetrate the air defense system armed with S300 surface-to-air missiles, which the Confederation of Nations of the Northern Caucasus had purchased from Ukraine earlier. (The first flying prototypes of Russian "stealth" aircraft were tested back in the late 1980's, but because of insufficient funds the aircraft could not be introduced into series production until the mid-1990's, with the support of France's Dassault and Israel's military-technical assistance. After this, "stealth" technology began spreading successfully through the world arms market.)

Mobile peacemaking strike forces didn't usually stay in one place very long. An effort was made to replace them in regions of operations as quickly as possible with "conventional" brigades and divisions of ground forces and MVD, consisting mostly of conscripts, as well as with volunteer formations made up of local proponents of integration of the former USSR into the "new" Federation. Thus the General Staff almost always had a reserve at its disposal for unforeseen complications. By the way, mobile peacemaking forces were used extremely rarely in the territory of the Russian Federation itself

(with the exception of the Northern Caucasus). The unity of the Russian Federation was fully ensured by special MVD units by the year 2000.

As in 1993-1994, the unemployed, adventurers, vagrants, mercenaries who had managed to make war in various hot spots, and other unreliable persons sought the opportunity to enlist in the prestigious mobile forces. Special units were created for this contingent under the principle of the French Foreign Legion, which accepted all physically healthy men who were citizens of any independent country. The mobile peacemaking forces protected the enlistee from prosecution by the law, and provided him with "clean" documents. However, during the contract period professional junior officers maintained the strictest possible discipline in the special units, essentially having uncontrolled life and death power over their soldiers. Also, a sizeable number of women were serving on a contract basis in "conventional" combined units of the mobile forces.

By the year 2000, pacification of the former USSR was practically complete, and the now-stronger Russian Armed Forces had once again become the strongest army in Eurasia.

Isolationism, Local (Nuclear) Conflict

94UM0164C Moscow *SEGODNYA* in Russian No 1,
4 Jan 94 p 7

[Article by Pavel Flegengauer: "Caucasian War at Center of World Policy in the Year 2000"]

Nightmare

In the beginning of the new millennium the Caucasus transformed into what it had been throughout the entire 19th century, into a region of continual armed conflict between Turkey and Russia. In almost all local Caucasian conflicts (Ossetia, Chechnya, Abkhazia, Adzharia, Imeretia, Lezgistan, Karabakh etc.), Turkey supported one side with money and weapons, and Russia the other.

In the latter half of the 1990's Iran (the third regional great power) was too preoccupied with its war in southern Iraq and with support of Shi-ite factions of Islamic mujahadin fundamentalists opposing mujahadin Suni-ites in former Soviet Central Asia, and it had neither the resources nor the political will to participate seriously in the Caucasian wars. In addition, Iran still depended on Russia for its supply of modern weapons, which forced Iran to direct military-political expansion more southward, into the Persian Gulf region, and further in the direction of Israel, in order to avoid serious collision of interests with Russia.

By the year 2000 the peacemaking enthusiasm of the early 1990's died away in Western Europe and the USA as a result of a number of extremely unsuccessful long-distance military expeditions. Following the ignominious evacuation from Mogadishu and the heavy Anglo-French losses in the appalling cauldron of Sarajevo (the new Dien Bien

Phu), in 1994 France, Great Britain and Germany reduced military expenditures and armed forces even more. In accordance with the Maastricht agreements a Unified European Army was created, intended for demonstration of European unity but totally unsuited to the real war in the hostile environment of the Caucasus Mountains.

The slump and inflation in the country and foreign policy failures (Somali, Bosnia, Ukraine, Estonia, the Caucasus) led to the dominance of American society by isolationist sentiments almost as deep as those of the 1920's. In 1996, Ross Perot was elected U.S. president under the slogan "America First."

The time of active intervention of the UN Security Council in regional conflicts (1990-1994) was over. In the Caucasus, Turkey and Russia opposed one another, and there wasn't a third force that could serve as a serious referee and somehow stabilize the unstable bipolar confrontation.

In 1993-1995 the Armenian Army became ever stronger. It kept Nagornyy Karabakh and contiguous regions of Azerbaijan under dependable control. The government in Baku changed frequently, and every government was weaker than the one preceding it.

An Armenian-Azeri peace treaty was signed in 1993, and demilitarized zones under the supervision of the European Community Security Council were established. The peace endured through all of 1994 without serious violations.

In fall 1994 Lezgistan partisans intensified their combat activities on the Azeri-Russian border. Rail communication between Azerbaijan and Russia became totally unreliable. The weak central government was incapable of safeguarding cargo and maintaining at least some kind of order in other regions of Azerbaijan. In Georgia, the central government controlled only the Tbilisi vicinity. Armenia found itself in a blockade of worse proportions than in 1992. In the unexpectedly cold winter of 1994-1995 people in Yerevan died not so much from outright starvation (international humanitarian aid was delivered via an air bridge) as from cold.

In spring 1995 tens of thousands of irate demonstrators led by activists from the Dashnak Party seized the parliament building. The parliament deposed President Ter-Petrosyan in the face of assault rifle muzzles, after which it announced its own self-dissolution. The victorious opposition formed a new government. The Armenian Army began a decisive offensive to break the blockade and to establish a friendly regime in Baku, with which a peace could be signed.

It became clear in Ankara that in a few days Azerbaijan was going to become an Armenian-Russian protectorate. Turkey demanded immediate cessation of Armenian aggression, but the ultimatum was ignored in Yerevan, where it was declared that "the combat activities are being pursued not by the Armenian Army but by self-defense forces of the independent Karabakh Republic."

P. Felgengauer's War With Turkey (1995-2000)



Key: 1—Russia; 2—Sukhumi; 3—Black Sea; 4—Kabardino-Balkaria; 5—Northern Ossetia; 6—Southern Ossetia; 7—Georgia; 8—Tbilisi; 9—Islamic Mountain Republic; 10—Dagestan; 11—Caspian Sea; 12—Azerbaijan; 13—Baku; 14—Stepanakert; 15—Iran; 16—Nakhichevan; 17—Yerevan; 18—Armenia; 19—Kumayri (Gyumri) [Leninabad]; 20—Kars; 21—Turkey; 22—Karabakh (annexed to Armenia) and main strikes of Karabakh forces of liberation; 23—region of operations of Lezgistan partisans, with inroads as far as the Makhachkala-Baku railroad; 24—direction of tank strike by Turkish armies; 25—nuclear strike on the Kars radar station; 26—nonnuclear missile strikes against tank forces.

Then occurred the inevitable—the Turkish Army intervened directly into the war. At first, subunits of the Turkish forces were transferred to the Nakhichevan enclave. And then, in May 1995, tanks of the IX Army Corps of the 3d Field Army began an offensive from the vicinity of Kars with the support of combat aviation.

Almost immediately Russian motorized rifle and armored forces located at the Turkish-Armenian border in the vicinity of Gyumri entered into combat, but they had almost no air cover, because the nearest Russian air bases were hundreds of kilometers away in the Northern Caucasus. Turkish aviation dominated the skies over the battlefield. Joint defense by the Armenians and Russians was hacked to pieces in 48 hours. Russian forces withdrew to the north, to the Georgian border, while Turkish tanks turned to the south, toward Yerevan. Armenian forces offered fierce resistance, but it was clear that the city would be taken in a few days.

At this time mobile formations of the Russian Army were participating in peacemaking operations in Central Asia, in northeastern Estonia, in some oblasts of eastern Ukraine, in the Crimea, and in the Northern Caucasus.

The Russian Army had no reserves to draw from to stop the Turkish offensive. But Moscow couldn't cede the Transcaucasus to Turkey, because this would have destabilized the Northern Caucasus totally. It was believed in Moscow that a victory in Armenia would result in further penetration by Turks into Turkic-language Central Asia, and that it would fortify the positions of extreme nationalists in Ukraine. Moscow felt a mortal threat, and decided upon extreme measures.

Russian frontal Su-24 Fencer bombers made a number of bomb strikes on bases and airfields of the Turkish 3d Army, but they suffered losses. Russian strategic bombers flying over the Black Sea launched several dozen cruise missiles carrying conventional warheads

against a number of objectives in the vicinity of Bosphorus, as well as in Ankara, the capital of Turkey. Eighty percent of the missiles struck their targets precisely, but the Turkish invasion of Armenia continued. In addition, Turkey closed the Strait of Bosphorus to Russian merchant vessels. The Russian Supreme Military Council announced an ultimatum to Turkey: To cease the offensive in 24 hours and begin an immediate troop withdrawal, or "Russia would use all means at its disposal to stop the aggression." Turkey said that it would not yield to nuclear blackmail, obviously figuring that Russia would never opt for nuclear weapons against a nonnuclear power that was also member of NATO. In the meantime, Turkish tanks had encircled Yerevan and were fighting in the southern suburbs.

Then President General ***, chairman of the Russian Supreme Military Council, decided to make a preemptory demonstrative nuclear strike on Turkey. A radar station in the vicinity of Kars was targeted. The 100 kiloton air burst, after which there was no noticeable radioactive fallout, destroyed the station. The civilian population practically didn't suffer. Of course, three American servicemen observing the course of the conflict were located at the station at the moment of the nuclear strike.

However, Washington's reaction was sluggish. No one wanted to begin a world nuclear war because of some half-destroyed villages in the Caucasus Mountains. And especially the weak and unpopular Clinton administration. The world community as a whole did not react to the war in the Transcaucasus in any serious way. That is, there were many midnight emergency meetings in New York, Brussels, Washington, Paris and London, but no real actions were taken either during the Armenian offensive or during the Turkish offensive, or after the first nuclear strike since 1945. Only pro-Turkish and anti-Turkish demonstrations in Germany led to new outbreaks of violence: Dormitories were torched, and stores were looted. The Russian president general announced that another, more powerful nuclear strike would be made on Turkey in 24 hours. But as a result of many hours of negotiations via the "hot line," a joint Russian-American settlement was developed that Turkey would have to accept. The Armenian forces were once again withdrawn from Azeri territory, while Turkish forces drew back from Armenian territory. However, Karabakh remained under Armenian control, and Nakhichevan under Turkish control.

With Russia's help Armenia soon replenished its losses in armaments, and continued to build up its military potential, gradually transforming into an enclave armed to the teeth—a "new Israel," with which the Armenians like to compare their tiny war-ready country. Azerbaijan and Georgia disintegrated into zones controlled by different local field commanders, some of whom were pro-Turkey, while others were pro-Moscow. (By the way, most simply plundered everything that others hadn't yet managed to take).

In Turkey, the "National Unity" government, allied with Muslim fundamentalists and extreme nationalists, came into power. Turkey drifted ever further away from the West, all the more so because its entry into the European Community was blocked insurmountably by Greece. Using pro-Turkish field commanders in Azerbaijan and Georgia, Ankara supported anti-Russian partisan actions by mujahadin in the Islamic Mountain Republic in the Northern Caucasus.

But by the year 2000 the situation began to change fundamentally. Russia and its army were clearly emerging from the crisis. Elite mobile brigades and regiments of helicopter gunships were transferred to the Caucasus. The last centers of organized resistance in Chechnya were suppressed. It was becoming increasingly more obvious that the Russian peacemaking army was preparing, as in 1921, to conduct a lightning campaign in the Transcaucasus, and to annex republics exhausted by a 10-year war to the "Union"—the Unified Russian Federation. All the more so because by this time 80 percent of the territory of the former USSR was already pacified, and the Transcaucasus was the last major center of instability.

In 2000 the main problem absorbing the analysts was whether Turkey would be satisfied with the annexation of Nakhichevan, and would recognize all of the rest of the former Soviet Transcaucasus to be a zone of Russian interests, or decide upon a new war the moment mobile forces of the Federation landed in Baku. In the meantime, secret negotiations were proceeding between Moscow and Ankara. In the year 2000 Russia was clearly stronger than in 1995. It was hoped in Moscow that this time Turkey would be more sensible. Of course after the humiliation of 1995 the national fundamentalist government of Turkey embarked upon accelerated creation of its own nuclear weapons, but in the year 2000 the Muslim bomb was not yet ready. The Caucasian War did prove one thing, by the way: Local wars were going to be local nuclear wars more often in the 21st century.

Volga MD Draft 'Proceeding Normally'

*PM1401101194 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 13 Jan 94 p 2*

[Interview with Colonel-General A. Sergeyev, Commander of the Volga Military District, by Oleg Bedula, date and place not given, under the general heading "The Army and Society" and the rubric "Draft 93-94": "If You Haven't Served in the Army You Are Not Fit to Get Married"—first paragraph is introduction]

[Text] Over 100,000 young men will be sent to Russian Armed Forces military districts and fleets from the Volga and Urals region during the present draft. Our correspondent asked Colonel-General A. Sergeyev, commander of the Volga Military District, to describe how the draft is going.

[Bedula] Anatoliy Ipatovich, your speech at the end of the year to the scientific and practical conference at the assembly of leading Russian Defense Ministry personnel

had a great impact. Specifically, the statement that Volga Military District commissariats in conjunction with Internal Affairs Ministry and Prosecutor's Office structural subdivisions are taking additional measures to ensure that all deserters, "draft dodgers," and "refuseniks" are brought into line. Is the draft situation really worse than six months ago?

[Sergeyev] That is a realistic assessment of the actual situation at a specific moment. I am convinced that draft problems can be resolved more effectively if the local authorities and law and order bodies work in constant and close cooperation with the military commissariats. It is precisely in those republics and oblasts where the internal affairs organs and prosecutor's office have been paying less attention to the draft that there is a "short-fall." Specifically, I am talking about Tatarstan, the Komi Republic, and Samara and Kirov Oblasts.

[Bedula] I recall how two years ago you invited leaders of the representative and executive bodies in all the Volga and Urals region republics and oblasts to an enlarged Military Council. Judging by the officials' speeches, close cooperation and collaboration were established at that time on all questions affecting day-to-day Army activity in the territories.

[Sergeyev] It is not all straightforward here. The majority of leaders have kept their word, we have established good working contacts with them, and we have mutual understanding and mutual assistance. It is a different matter that in some republics public movements which take a negative view of military service as a whole have gained in strength. When these anti-Army feelings are expressed in legal form by local authority decision, you have the beginnings of overt or covert resistance to federal laws. For example, the Tatarstan parliament recently "amended" a Russian presidential edict by adopting a decree "On the Performance of Military Service by Citizens of the Republic of Tatarstan." According to this document young men studying in day-time study departments of elementary and secondary general education institutions and students who have not completed their studies cannot be drafted into military service. Likewise, young men whose immediate relatives have died or been disabled during military service are also exempt from military service. As a result, we cannot call up close to 9,000 potential draftees. It seems to bother no one in the republic that the parliament's decree contravenes not only a separate provision of the Constitution and the laws of Tatarstan itself but also the federal law which says that defense questions are delegated by the republics to the center.

[Bedula] Incidentally, neighboring Bashkortostan, whose population is close to that of Tatarstan in ethnic composition, outlook, and way of life, takes a completely different view of military service. Why is that?

[Sergeyev] Yes, Bashkortostan has virtually always fulfilled the General Staff's order 100 percent. But the whole point, it seems, is that on the state, social, and family levels Army service is regarded there as a form of

schooling which a physically fit young man has no moral right to shirk. Furthermore, in the countryside a girl's parents still question whether they should let their daughter marry someone who has not done military service.

The current draft is also proceeding well in Bashkortostan. The republic's government has allocated the necessary money—500 million rubles [R]. All the relevant questions are being resolved promptly and without undue drama. It has been decided that students at technical colleges and vocational and technical schools can complete their studies, take their diplomas, and in January-February we will draft them.

We are being actively helped by the Bashkortostan committee for the social protection of servicemen and their families. The committee staged the second congress of parents of soldiers and sailors in an interesting way. The Orthodox cathedral and the main mosque in Ufa held ceremonial services to bless the fatherland's defenders and honor the memory of those who have died discharging their military duty. District representatives and military lawyers answered questions from servicemen, their parents, and the public. The work of the congress was widely covered by the mass media.

The committee members' principled approach is shown by the fact that out of 3,214 requests for draft deferral, 451 were rejected as unjustified. Nevertheless, there are "draft dodgers" in Bashkortostan: A total of 389 people failed to attend the draft centers. That number would have been considerably smaller if the Prosecutor's Office had taken a more principled line. The number of citizens charged by the Prosecutor's Office with avoidance of military service is minimal.

[Bedula] What is life like generally for a deserter from the moment that he leaves the unit?

[Sergeyev] Bad. In Tatarstan, for instance, there were quite a few people who succumbed to All-Tatarstan Public Center propaganda and stole back into the republic to march under national banners. But it turns out that no one was expecting them here. As a result, the "returners" were left to face some serious problems by themselves: There was no possibility of drafting them into a unit on the republic's territory to complete their service here and there was no legal justification for discharging them into the reserve. No one offered them a job. Who needs a man with no documents? Consequently, many went back to their units and made amends...

[Bedula] It is no secret that one reason for desertion is the collapse of the system of military-patriotic education which existed in schools, vocational and technical schools, technical colleges, and social organizations. No worthwhile alternative has been found yet. Is it really inevitable that we will squander the considerable potential of young people's preparation for service?

[Sergeyev] Much has indeed been lost. But some things have been gained. Recently I learned that in Bashkortostan boys virtually from junior class age dream of serving in the "Mosfilm" Movie Studio's cavalry regiment. Recruits to this unusual military unit traditionally come from draftees from Bashkiria. The current draft is no exception—15 young men have already been sent to Golitsyno, near Moscow, where the cavalry regiment is stationed. There is just as much competition for the right to serve on the submarine Komsomolets Bashkirii. Similarly people from Samara and Penza maintain their right to serve in the "president's" regiment. Recently the General Staff received a letter from the Chuvashia leadership requesting that this year young men be drafted to serve on the submarine Chuvashskiy Komsomolets. The Dzerzhinskiy internal troops division is very popular with future draftees from Saratov Oblast. Requests from local authorities and the public to send draftees there are granted whenever possible.

When draftees are sent specifically to "their" division, regiment, or category of troops it is not only the Army which gains. Traditions are established in schools, at enterprises, in cities, and in whole republics. Pride will not allow a young man to do service that is inferior to that of his older friends or his neighbors in the apartment block or on his street.

Can people fail to be moved by the tradition which has been revived in Orenburg Oblast's Pervomayskiy Rayon: When draftees are being given a send-off, each one receives a small bag containing a handful of his native soil. There has not yet been a single case of desertion by a soldier who has been given such a sacred gift.

[Bedula] Nevertheless, increasingly frequently it is being said that this year's draftees are the "wrong sort," that completely different approaches are needed with them because the traditional methods of education are not working....

[Sergeyev] The directorate for work with personnel has studied this problem and come up with some surprising conclusions. The nature of the inner conflicts that draftees are suffering from is due not to national interests, as used to be the case, but to their social status before joining the Army. There are quite a few soldiers in service now who have engaged in no socially useful activity. There is another section consisting of draftees from families with wealthy parents, sometimes commercial traders, and some of the draftees were engaged in trade themselves. A third group—the most numerous—comes from the families of workers and peasants. Finally there is a fourth group—soldiers with less than perfect health but passed as fit by the medical commissions. If we manage to correctly assess the different forms of relationships that develop among soldiers in all four groups and elaborate forms of work with them, we will keep potential "runaways" in military formation. That is why many officers now sit on republic draft commissions. They have a specific task: To study, analyze, and systematize all problems relating to the draft and give specific recommendations on work with young

people. Not just to the troops but also to the organs of public education, social organizations, and committees of soldiers' mothers.

Of course, the "anti-desertion" campaign will be as productive as possible if all society becomes really interested in it. The forms of work with young people of draft age are most diverse. In Udmurtia, for example, draftees are subject to a fine of one-half the minimum wage the first time that they fail to appear before the military commissariat. The total fine is increased for failure to turn up a second time. With the introduction of financial sanctions the number of "draft dodgers" in the republic fell noticeably. I know that in the Volga region and Urals republics they are studying the question of making deserters repay the cost of the investigation. After all, it costs the Armed Forces between R70,000 and R100,000 to find and bring back one deserter. But given that some Komi Republic enterprise leaders are inciting young men to refuse to serve "for peanuts" by promising them wages of half a million, we will still be tackling the problem of desertion for a long time to come.

[Bedula] Anatoliy Ipatovich, reports are coming in from local level about a lack of coordination in the military department's work and mistakes in organizing the draft.

[Sergeyev] Indeed, there have been mistakes. The Defense Ministry Central Directorate of Military Transport Communications and the Central Finance Directorate took too long to resolve the question of allocating money for the transport of young draftees to the Far East and the Transbaykal region by civil aircraft.

There have been occasions when induction officers from the District fail to arrive to meet new recruits at the prescribed time. But there have been far more instances of a different kind—of well organized work by commissariats. To assess the situation here in general terms, the present draft has been complex but is proceeding normally. The Army and the Navy will receive a worthy batch of new recruits.

POLICY

Reflections on Russian Relations with NATO

94UM0156A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
6 Jan 94 p 3

[Article by Lieutenant General Dmitriy Kharchenko in the column "On the Eve of the Event": "What to Expect from the Brussels Meeting"]

[Text] Opening on the 10th of January in Brussels, the capital of Belgium, is a NATO Council summit of heads of states and governments of countries that are members of this military and political organization. It is expected that the focus of attention will be on two major issues: How to resolve problems of international peace, and what to do about a request made by a number of Central

and Eastern European states for inclusion into the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance. In essence, the discussions will boil down to the future of this Alliance in the contemporary world.

On this eve of the NATO summit meeting, it would be advantageous to examine the question of the relationship existing between Russia and NATO. However, before we attempt to find an answer to this question, it seems to me that certain remarks are in order.

A truly paradoxical situation has come about. Virtually everyone in the West is of the opinion that the NATO Alliance has emerged from the Cold War as the victor. At the same time, in no time in the past has the Alliance faced problems that are so pressing and difficult of resolution as it does now. It is also said that NATO is undergoing its own crisis.

This statement of the bloc's crisis situation is all the more surprising, since it came directly on the heels of the explosion of euphoria which in the West was accompanied by the fall of the Berlin Wall, self-dissolution of the Warsaw Pact Organization, and disintegration of the Soviet Union. Leaders of states and governments of Alliance countries in a London meeting held in the summer of 1990 were triumphant in their welcoming the changes occurring in Europe, even calling them historical. Then suddenly the crisis. What went wrong?

The fact is that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, in the form which it was at the end of the 1940's, has virtually ceased to exist. The "threat from the East" has disappeared. So has the enemy. The point here is that they were essential to the bloc's organizers not only to set a course of "containment and repulsion" of communism, but more importantly to consolidate the leading role played by the USA in the post-war world. Serving as an instrument of Washington's politics and pulling into this political channel other Western countries was for many years the major function of the bloc.

And something else. NATO, after having rid itself of real or imaginary fears concerning a "massed assault from the East," came to face new and this time real dangers. These were the unstable situation in Russia (let us recall how much someone in the West suffered over the parliamentary election results in our country) and in other states which sprang up on the territory of the former USSR; the possibility of uncontrolled proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; and, finally, the inter-ethnic and ethnic conflicts occurring on the periphery of the bloc that turned into fierce armed conflicts, such as those in Yugoslavia, Moldova, and the Caucasus. How to react to all these dangers? What could and should NATO do under these conditions?

The above questions should be answered at the NATO summit.

All of the above bears a direct relationship to Russia. All the more since this raises full-force the question of expansion of NATO's limits by virtue of including a

number of Eastern European countries into the organization. One cannot fail to respect the sovereign right of every state of selecting those forms and means of insuring the security it deems most suitable. However, NATO's leading circles are aware of Moscow's negative attitude toward possible forced expansion of the Alliance. This could lead to new problems rather than to the resolution of existing ones. For example, this could disrupt the legally formalized system existing on our continent, primarily the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. Instead of strengthening of trust and stability, this would sow new seeds of distrust, which undoubtedly would lead to destabilization of the entire situation.

Expansion of NATO's zone of responsibility would directly impinge upon the interests of Russia in the geopolitical, military, and home policy areas. Expansion of the Alliance of the world's largest military bloc would push out its boundaries, which would then be located close to the Russian borders. This would necessitate a fundamental rethinking of all our defensive concepts, restructuring of the Armed Forces, reviewing of the operational configuration of the theater of military operations, developing an additional infrastructure, relocation of large military contingents, and changing of operational plans and the nature of combat training.

One can easily imagine that the expansion of NATO's circle of members would be perceived by both the leadership and public of Russia as attempts to set up isolation, creating a "sanitary cordon" at our western borders. One would not be out of line if he were to point out that that could lead to xenophobia in our society and an intensification of the influence of radical-right nationalistic parties and organizations.

Incidentally, the above opinion is not solely that of Russians. It is no accident that the influential German newspaper WELT recently wrote that the driving force behind all of NATO's attempts to expand eastward is an intent of erecting another "Iron Curtain" that would constitute a barrier against an unstable neighbor: Russia.

NATO's leading circles do understand the nuances of this situation. It appears that the latter are in no hurry to accept new members, in spite of insistent requests made by Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, the Baltic states, and a number of other Eastern European countries. As an alternative, the US President has presented an idea that has come to be known as the "Partnership for Peace." It seems to me that Russia could support this idea, to the extent that it incorporates the security interests of all states without exception. Of course, this partnership should be based on the drafting of universal standards of security applicable to the entire North Atlantic area. A genuine partnership would include priority development of political dialogue, constant consultations, agreement on positions, and, in the future, coordinated actions.

Ministers of foreign affairs and defense of NATO countries in their sessions held in the beginning of December affirmed their support of the "Partnership for Peace" plan advanced by Washington. However, the nature of the plan and the methods of its implementation are not yet clear. These problems will obviously be objects of close examination at the forthcoming session of the NATO Council, and it would be very desirable if the participants would take into consideration the Russian point of view relative to the given problem. Of course, the decisions made in Brussels will be discussed by the Presidents of Russia and the United States during their meeting to take place in the next few days.

All of the above does not mean that Russia and NATO are separated by an unbridgeable gulf. This was evidenced at the recent meeting of Russian President Boris Yeltsin and NATO Secretary-General Manfred Woerner. On that occasion, it was pointed out that an objective evaluation of Russia's role relative to the assurance of international security and stability requires that Russia's relationships with the NATO Alliance be accorded priority, with respect to rate of progress, scope, and depth, over relations between the latter and countries of Central and Eastern Europe.

Noteworthy in this regard is that there already exists compatibility in a number of fundamental views in military and political concepts held by Russia and NATO member countries. This is a beneficial result of the de-ideologization of international relations on the one hand, and a coincidence of views held by both sides relative to basic problems of security assurance on the other.

In this regard, both sides accord political methods a position of priority. The use of military force is looked upon as an exceptional measure, one permissible only in the interests of self-defense and in peacekeeping operations. Both the "new strategic NATO concept" adopted in 1991 and the recently approved "Basic Military Doctrine Principles of the Russian Federation" contain extremely important provisions asserting that neither the North Atlantic Alliance nor Russia will consider any state or coalition to be an enemy. Both documents acknowledge that the limitation and reduction of armaments are in agreement with the national interests of all states and promote strengthening of general security. It may be said that this opens up a real possibility of eliminating the remaining elements of military confrontation in Europe.

And the above kind of elements do still exist. Russia is carrying out a deep restructuring of her Armed Forces, has already effected considerable manpower reduction, and intends to proceed in this direction, while the NATO countries are slow in abating their military activity. In a recent session of the bloc's Military Planning Committee, it was pointed out that the last few years have seen a mere 15% reduction in manpower of member countries, while military expenditures still amount to 3.2% of the gross national product. And this in the absence of a real enemy!

But this raises another question. If Russia considers expansion of the NATO structure disadvantageous, so to speak, and if the details of the "Partnership for Peace" are still unclear, can there be a solution to the existing situation? It appears that there can be, and, possibly, more than one. For example, one can point to further improvement in the role and significant activity of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC). Even now it unites 38 states, being NATO members on the one hand, and former members of the WFO (Warsaw Pact Organization), including of course the Russian Federation, on the other. Russia participates actively in sessions of the NACC at the level of ministers of foreign affairs, while representatives of her Ministry of Defense take part in the work of various commissions, seminars, and courses, within the framework of this organization.

However, the above framework is still limited. The time has obviously come to effect a considerable expansion in this area. There are real possibilities for transforming the NACC into a collective security organization in Europe. This would be associated with diminishing the role of the CSCE (Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe), but due to the fact that the work of the CSCE involves a much smaller number of states compared with the NACC, it would be easier to arrive at mutually-acceptable solutions and render the latter more effective and responsive to pressing tasks and requirements related to the situation.

One would not be out of line here to point out that the above is understood by all NACC members. Issued at a recent meeting of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council was a statement discussing the measures advanced for improving interrelationships within the framework of this organization. The latter has identified for itself the task of continuing and activating consultations related to political problems and problems associated with security assurance and to the development of cooperation in the military area. For example, this served as the purpose for approving a new working plan of dialogue, partnership, and cooperation for 1994.

Why the selection of organizations such as North Atlantic Cooperation Council? Why not charge NATO with the function of assuring regional security? The answer is that the NATO Alliance was set up as a specific organization of leading Western countries under definite conditions to accomplish definite goals. But the conditions have changed radically.

There can be no doubt that any attempts made to transform NATO will effect virtually no change in its nature. The NATO Alliance is an organization of the past. Occupying its agenda should be not its modernization, but instead a move away from bloc thinking and toward an efficient and effective system of European and international security. The time has obviously come to infuse with vitality the fruitful idea of creating a security system stretching "from Vancouver to Vladivostok," to prepare and implement the necessary machinery.

The above are the considerations I would like to share on the eve of the NATO summit relative to a problem as serious as relations between Russia and the NATO Alliance.

AIR, AIR DEFENSE FORCES

Specifications, Performance Improvements to SU-25 Variants

94UM0154A Moscow KRYLYA RODINY in Russian No 9, Sep 93 pp 17-19

[Conclusion of article by Mikhail Levin: "For Rough Work"; previous parts in KRYLYA RODINY, Nos 7 and 8, 1993]

[Text] In Afghanistan in 1982 a pilot was unable to pull out from an attack and the Su-25 "disappeared" into the ground although it had not come under fire. The onboard recorder showed a control system jam caused by high flight speed. The attack aircraft usually attacks from a dive at a 35-40 degree angle, which takes a rather long time since it is necessary not only to impose the sight's center dot on the target, but also get the device to "calm down." Thus, if the attack is entered at a speed of 550-600 km/hr, the aircraft may have accelerated to 850-900 km/hr at the end of the attack. There was not enough aileron at high speeds.

In an attack, in order to prevent the roll which arises with one-sided separation of a bomb (from one wing), the requirement was introduced for a symmetrical drop of the load in pairs from underwing points (simultaneously from the second and ninth points, third and eighth points and so on). But in Afghanistan every bomb was worth its weight in gold and was expended very economically. The dead pilot also dropped just one. He tried to parry the roll that arose by moving the ailerons, but at high speed they went to the stops because the balancing tabs operated.

After this crash, hydraulic boosters were placed in the transverse channel. Despite fears, it was learned that aircraft survivability essentially did not suffer: When the wing with booster was fired on at the range, it took 23 23-mm rounds to disable the hydraulic booster.

Boosters began to be installed on newly built series attack aircraft in 1984, which permitted increasing maximum permissible flight speed.

In addition, the brake flaps on wingtip pods were modified to stabilize a high-angle dive without exceeding a speed of 700 km/hr. Additional deflectable surfaces were installed on them that were kinematically connected with their main surface. This considerably increased the effectiveness of these flaps (by 60 percent) without increasing their area, and speed was stabilized at the level of 650-680 km/hr.

The Su-25T variant (Su-34) intended for operations against moving targets, above all tanks, is equipped with

the I-251 aiming system developed by the Krasnogorsk Zenit OMZ [Optical Equipment Plant]. According to some assessments, the system is 5-6 years ahead of similar ones abroad.

The system is intended for automatic identification and tracking of small mobile targets (tanks, motor vehicles, small craft and so on), target designation, automatic missile guidance, and also for supporting the fire of free-flight rockets and the gun. The system includes the Shkval day opto-electronic system, which is accommodated in the aircraft nose and which includes a television channel with wide field of view (27x36 degrees), a television channel with narrow ("needle") field of view (0.7x0.9 degrees) and 23X magnification, and a laser rangefinder/target designator. Shkval system sensors are mounted on a unified platform stabilized in pitch, yaw and roll and can be deflected in the range from +15 degrees "over themselves" to -80 degrees "beneath themselves" and from +35 to -35 degrees in heading. The day-channel target acquisition and lockon range is 12 km. Its video data are sent to a monochromatic CRT mounted in the upper right of the cockpit instrument panel.

A basic element of the Shkval system is a target image tracking unit with accuracy to 0.5 m. Operation of the automatic telecontrol was checked by tracking the flight of birds such as crows, which change their flight path in a random manner, and the movement of real targets. High accuracy permitted selecting even specific areas of a tracked target for tracking.

In control tracking of a Tu-16 on the range, the marker was placed on the bomber engine area; the automatic telecontrol reliably "held" this image and the guided missile "stuck" precisely into the engine from a distance of 4 km.

Range tests during operations against ground targets using the Vikhr ATGM also produced high results: A tank turret was "blown off" from a distance of 10 km.

The Shkval system's high characteristics were confirmed in 1989 during a tactical exercise near Lvov in which 96 pieces of armored equipment and 10 Tor SAM systems took part.

For night operations the I-251 system can be supplemented by the Merkuriy thermal imaging system mounted in a suspended pod installed on a belly station. The pod cross-section is nearly rectangular and its front part is closed by a cover which protects the optics during takeoff and landing. The television system has a lens with broad and narrow (5.5x7.3 degrees) fields of view. The night-channel optical system is not stabilized. Target acquisition and lockon range by the thermal imaging system is somewhat less than 10 km. Night-channel video data with narrow field of view are displayed on a monochromatic CRT also connected with the day television channel, and the image from the night channel with wide field of view is sent to the instrument landing system.

It is common knowledge that peak losses of military pilots fall in their first several dozen combat sorties. Only after flying 30-40 of them do they gain necessary experience permitting them to get their bearings rapidly and confidently and find the optimum way out of difficult situations. To help in adaptation, in 1987 designers developed the SAU-8, an automated control system for the Su-25T. It operates together with the aircraft aiming and navigation system, simplifies pilot actions to the maximum, and supports an automatic target approach with high accuracy.

The presumed target coordinates and coordinates to 12 enroute waypoints are loaded into the system on the ground before takeoff. After the pilot takes off and presses the "Navigation-SAU [Automated Control System]" button, the aircraft proceeds in an automatic mode. The scanning mode of the optical-television system's narrow channel switches on in the presumed target area 12 km from the target. On detecting the target, the pilot frames the target image on the CRT and presses the "Fix" button. After this it is as if aircraft and target are linked by an invisible thread; the target is tracked automatically even in inverted flight and there is no break off even if the target has stopped or briefly entered a shadow. The system automatically turns the aircraft toward the target and launches missiles or releases bombs after the ordnance release button is pressed.

Bombing accuracy usually is 35-40 m on strike aircraft, but it is 2-5 m on the Su-25T. After the first pass the aircraft can make a repeat pass in the automatic mode at the pilot's command.

The pilot takes over control only just before landing.

Over 500 Su-25 attack aircraft had been produced by the fall of 1992, including over 250 delivered [to] CIS countries and the rest to other countries. The Su-25T is the most advanced of presently developed versions. It has not been placed into series production and prospects for its production are problematical. Talks have been held with 60 agents from 25 countries, but no specific agreements have been reached. Nevertheless, the OKB [Special Design Bureau] is working to perfect the aircraft. It is planned to increase operating altitude from 7 to 10 km and range by 30 percent. One potential client (Philippine Air Force) took an interest in a multipurpose version of the aircraft with an air-to-air combat capability. The OKB is studying that project, assuming that because of the basic Su-25 aircraft's high maneuver characteristics (limit load factor 6.5, unit wing load with normal takeoff weight 433 kg/m², thrust-to-weight ratio with normal takeoff weight 0.62), its multipurpose version will be able to fight on equal terms with many modern fighters. Demonstration flights of the "Sky Hussars" aerobatics team serve to confirm this.

The Su-25 was created with a small displacement in time periods relative to the U.S. A-10 attack aircraft, design studies on which began in 1966 (Su-25 in 1968) and the first flight of the first experimental aircraft was in May 1972 (Su-25 in February 1975). U.S. and Russian

designers proceeded from experience of the very same conflicts (Vietnam, Korea and the Near East), which predetermined approximately the very same missions (a low-altitude, subsonic, highly maneuverable, low-vulnerability aircraft for direct support of ground troops) and in a number of cases similar design solutions such as the armored "tub" for the pilot (which, by the way, was realized for the first time in the Il-2 attack aircraft) and the almost straight wing. But the OKB imeni P. Sukhoi took its own path in shaping the Su-25's appearance. Originality of appearance is apparent not only in the already noted fundamental configurational and dimensional distinctions of the Su-25 and A-10, but also in characteristics. The A-10, for example, has a lower thrust-to-weight ratio (0.54 compared with 0.62 in the Su-25 with normal takeoff weight), which degrades the A-10's maneuverability in the vertical plane. The A-10 also has less unit wing load (322 kg/m² as against 433, also with normal takeoff weight). This indicates somewhat better horizontal maneuverability of the A-10, but also lesser accuracy of fire as a result of the aircraft's increased buffeting under conditions of turbulent atmosphere near the earth. The A-10's flight speed is substantially lower (maximum near the ground 706 km/hr as against 950-975 for the Su-25). This has been the cause of serious criticism of the A-10 abroad of late, since speed is one element for reducing aircraft vulnerability, and with a slow flight speed even the A-10's increased armoring does not save it (overall weight of means of protection exceeds 8.5 percent of normal takeoff weight compared with 7.5 percent for the Su-25).

One more fundamental difference of the A-10 and Su-25 lies in a different approach to onboard gear and munitions to be expended. The Americans adopted the concept of cheap onboard gear and complex, expensive missiles; the pilot aims through the homing head of the AGM-65 Maverick missile using an instrument panel indicator. It is the reverse approach on the Su-25: Powerful onboard gear in combination with "obtuse" missiles, which appears considerably more rational under the cost-effectiveness criterion.

The emphasis on different kinds of weapons also is important. In developing the A-10 it was assumed that the GAU-8/A cannon "around" which it was designed would be the basic means of combating tanks, but according to the U.S. Air Force, use of Maverick missiles and not the cannon turned out to be more successful during the 1991 Persian Gulf war. Su-25 designers departed from the doctrine of operating against tanks with cannon fire back in the stage when the aircraft's appearance was being shaped. It was then they concluded that the cannon was becoming a "historical relic," for it is effective only at short ranges, while in a relatively high-speed jet aircraft the pilot already has to pull back on the stick to recover about 800 meters from the target. This leaves him little time for aimed fire and it is too far for unequivocal destruction of a target with powerful armor. On the Su-25 the cannon is used basically for engaging weakly armored targets of the APC type.

A 45-mm cannon of nontraditional design based on a rocket-assisted principle with a rate of fire of 1,250 rounds per minute was studied for the Su-25T version. The length of the projectile fitted with a rocket motor was 250 mm and it had a shaped-charge warhead with 200 mm of armor penetration. The idea of employing such a cannon arose when the task was assigned to increase hit probability with the first pass, for a situation often takes shape where the target is detected too late and a repeat pass must be made. The rocket-assisted cannon had to be fired backward after passing over the target. In tests it succeeded in "sticking" up to 6-8 rounds into a tank, and at an angle up to 60 degrees, which increased armor penetration. But development of this cannon was suspended for reasons of a nontechnical nature.

Su-25TK armament includes Kh-29T air to surface missiles with TV [not further expanded, possibly thermal imaging] or Kh-29L laser-guided air to surface missiles intended for engaging relatively invulnerable ground targets (reinforced concrete shelters, concrete runways, large railroad and highway bridges). They are equipped with a high-explosive penetrating warhead weighing 320 kg. Kh-58 antiradar guided missiles also are mounted, and outfitting with the more powerful Kh-31P antiradar missile is proposed in the future. This is connected with the desire to improve the attack aircraft's autonomy in operations. In an actual combat situation it is difficult to count on receiving required support from interworking aircraft in time. Therefore, in V. P. Babak's opinion, as a front line aircraft the attack aircraft should be capable of "punching" a road for itself extending up to 150 km beyond the front line.

Comparative Performance Characteristics of Su-25 Variants

Variant	Su-25/R95Sh	Su-25/R-195	Su-25TK
Dimensions			
Wingspan, m	14.36	14.36	14.36
Aircraft length with pitot tube, m	15.36	15.36	15.33
Aircraft height, m	4.80	4.80	5.20
Wing area, m ²	30.1	30.1	30.1
Crew	1	1	1
Engines			
Number and make	2xR95Sh	2xR-195	2xR-195
Thrust, kg	2x4,100	2x4,500	2x4,500
Maximum takeoff weight, kg	17,530	17,600	19,500
Empty aircraft	9,430	9,500	No data
Maximum combat payload, kg	4,340	4,340	4,340
Internal fuel, kg	3,000	3,000	3,840
Maximum flight speed near ground, km/hr	950	975	950
Maximum Mach	0.82	0.82	0.82
Maximum range, km			
At high altitude		1,250	
Near ground	750		
Ferry range	1,850		2,500
Length of takeoff roll, m			
Concrete runway	550-600	600	No data
Dirt runway	900-950	1,200	600-700
Length of landing roll with brake chute, m			
Concrete runway	550-600	400	No data
Dirt runway	650-750		600-700
Limit load factor	6.5	6.5	6.5

The foreign press reports that the new Su-37 strike aircraft being designed under Babak's direction has even more difficult missions to perform. Its appearance is determined by the assigned task of ensuring full autonomy, also including the capability of successfully conducting defensive air-to-air combat against modern

fighters. In addition to high combat survivability, it also must possess increased flight speed (1,400-1,500 km/hr).

Babak believes that advanced cluster weapons with individually guided submunitions intended to be launched from multirole aircraft at a great distance from targets do

not represent a serious alternative to attack aircraft. In his opinion, there are two basic premises for successful performance of strike operations: First of all, the target must be visible; and secondly, low-powered submunitions ("peas") are not suited for engaging heavily armored targets—a "serious weapon" is needed here, which can be carried only by a battlefield aircraft optimized for strike operations.

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NAVAL FORCES

'Navy and Russian National Security'

94UM0147C Moscow MORSKOY SBORNIK in Russian
No 10, Oct 93 (signed to press 8 Oct 93) pp 3-6

[Article by Captain 1st Rank Yu. Gavrya, candidate of technical sciences; Rear Admiral A. Rudometkin; Captain 1st Rank Yu. Sinchenko, candidate of military sciences; and Captain 1st Rank (Retired) V. Khyaninen, candidate of military sciences, under rubric "Time and the Navy"]

[Text] A navy is a specific "attribute" of a state's political, economic and military activity. History provides many examples of its deciding effect on the course and outcome of wars which Russia fought. And in quite recent times, in 1967, the Navy's presence in the Mediterranean helped stabilize the situation in the Near East and deterred the United States from intervening in the conflict on Israel's side. In addition, the constant presence of our naval forces in politically tense ocean areas permitted deterring the aggressive aspirations of individual states (disruption of the attack on Libya and Angola, prevention of a coup d'état in Guinea and so on). And the involvement of ships to ensure security of Persian Gulf shipping during Iran's war against Iraq permitted us to avoid vessel losses.

Despite the general trend toward a reduction in the threat of initiation of a world war, the danger of the outbreak of military conflicts and local wars presently is preserved, especially for territorial, economic, ethnic and similar motives. Preconditions existing in individual regions for the outbreak of military conflicts and even local wars may be realized under certain conditions, which is fraught with their escalation into a large-scale war and with a large number of states, including those such as the United States and Russia, being drawn into its orbit.

Unquestionably, the immediate threat of nuclear war has been minimized, but there remains the danger of its outbreak because of the presence of considerable arsenals of these weapons in the hands of a number of leading states and the trend which has appeared toward their proliferation in third world countries. It is impossible not to take this into account. The possibility of a large-scale conventional war escalating into a nuclear war also is not precluded as a measure which a country

subjected to attack takes in order to respond to actions of an aggressor who is disrupting the functioning of its strategic deterrence forces.

Russia has no grounds to regard any country or coalition of states as probable enemies in the international situation which has taken shape today. Russia also threatens no one: It is sharply reducing the makeup and changing the structure and stationing of its Armed Forces and, in accordance with its defensive military doctrine, is limiting them to the framework of necessary defense sufficiency.

As applied to the Navy, we take such sufficiency to mean the makeup, structure and stationing of fleet forces as well as that status of all kinds of support, command and control and training systems which meet the level of possible military threat from maritime sectors. They should guarantee the country's reliable defense against aggression on the part of possible groupings of naval forces and of other states in zones from where their offensive precision weapons can hit important targets in the depth of our territory.

The buildup by any state (or coalition of states) of groupings of its forces on the territory of states contiguous with Russia or of groupings of its naval forces in the aforementioned zones, as well as the exceeding of an agreed upon time period for the presence of aircraft carriers and missile ships in these zones and certain other reasons may become grounds for categorizing any state (or coalition of states) as a potential enemy. In our opinion, it must be reflected in Russian Federation naval strategy that in such situations Russia retains for itself the right to retaliatory (including also adequate) operations.

It should be borne in mind that militarily strong foreign states, above all the United States, are in no hurry to give up the term "potential enemy." And no small number of examples from their practical activity today indicates that the direction of their policy toward force remains unchanged. Thus, new NATO military strategy does not preclude the option of war over the Baltic countries against Russia.

It is also impossible not to take note of the fact that according to a book well known in naval circles, "...From the Sea. New Direction for the Navy," written by a group of prominent U.S. naval figures and published in 1992, U.S. national security strategy openly, and even with clear pride in its Navy, emphasizes that "national interests require of the Navy not only performance of the long-range mission of ensuring strategic deterrence, a powerful military presence on forward lines, sea control, and reaction to crises in remote areas, but also conduct of large-scale offensive operations." Moreover: "To meet national security requirements with the shift in emphasis to regional problems, construction of new naval forces is oriented toward increasing their flexibility and might."

Along with external factors which introduce an element of uncertainty and unpredictability to the Navy reform process, considerable difficulties also are caused by internal factors, above all economic and financial. Their

influence is felt not in the last instance in building the fleet—one of the most mobile, versatile and consequently costly branches of the Armed Forces.

What kind of Russian Navy do we see and what kind of navy must it become?

It is difficult to overestimate the importance of doctrinal aims for orienting the direction of naval reform. What kind of navy the Russian Navy will become and whether or not Russia will retain the status of a great naval power depends on them. Unfortunately, a careful study of the published draft "Osnovy voyennoy doktriny RF" [Fundamentals of Russian Federation Military Doctrine]¹ shows that despite recognition of the fact that an invasion most probably may begin from the sea, the role of the Navy in repelling it essentially is not covered; somewhat more attention is given to the involvement of naval infantry as part of mobile forces, to whom priority is given in development of arms. But functions of other components of naval forces are limited to the defense of sea lines of communication and support of mobile forces. An underestimation of experience of the last wars and local conflicts such as in the Persian Gulf, which demonstrated the helplessness of a defending country without sufficient naval forces to repel an attack from the sea, clearly tells here.

Such disparagement of the Navy's role as a tool of Russian foreign policy can undermine the status of a great naval power. It is apropos here to take another look at the aforementioned book in order to see the attitude toward the Navy on the part of the U.S. Navy leadership. The Navy, "operating on forward lines, supports America's positive image, creates foundations for forming coalitions, . . . raises the spirit of allies and demonstrates American might and resolve." Take note: Not the might of the Navy, but the might of America. And further: "Operating on forward lines, naval forces inspire friends and serve as a warning to potential enemies, . . . they deter crises. . . . We will take advantage of the Navy's unique capabilities in coastal operations from sea sectors."

The Russian Federation Navy also is a unique, versatile branch of the Armed Forces, possessing essentially all means of warfare and their support systems which other branches of the Armed Forces possess. This permits it to effectively defend a broad spectrum of Russia's national interests. The high mobility and combat readiness of naval forces and assets permit employing it both in peacetime as well as wartime.

According to rules of international law, naval forces are not bound by the need to obtain permission from governments of any state for making a transit to arrive at a destination. They also are guaranteed access to coastal waters of any country right up to the limit of its territorial waters. This gives the Navy an exceptional opportunity to perform its functions, including peacekeeping functions, in dangerously explosive zones to keep a crisis from deepening and to stop armed conflict.

The concept of "showing the flag" entered the political dictionary from naval practice. Frequently this is the sole method for the legal presence of states' force (usually with UN sanction) in regions remote from one's own territory. It is more difficult to introduce tanks and, as experience has shown, even more difficult to remove them. Only the Navy can perform the function of defending Russian citizens abroad. It appears to us that few people will be found in all the world who condemn America for decisive actions to defend its citizens abroad, when an entire squadron of ships is sent for the sake of a few persons to the shores of a country encroaching on their freedom. True, for this a state must possess corresponding naval might.

Russia's adoption of international obligations for involvement together with other countries in humanitarian and police actions and in local conflicts under UN aegis logically leads to the need to have as part of the Navy (along with naval forces intended for deterrence and repulse of possible aggression from the sea) sufficiently large, oceangoing ships capable of deploying rapidly even to remote tasking areas and there performing missions with high intensity, often for a lengthy time. A need also may arise for the capability of replacing these forces. Therefore, not only naval infantry units, but also rather large ship forces with means of their logistic support must be included in the makeup of mobile forces.

It is also impossible not to take account of the fact that Russia's maritime border is double that of the land border and that world naval powers continue to build up capabilities of their naval forces. One would like to believe that the peace and cooperation of leading states will continue forever, but in case the situation is exacerbated we must have guaranteed protection against strikes from sea directions. And only the Navy is capable of this mission (with appropriate attention to its construction).

In addition to the above, it should be noted that developing the Navy as the most complex system of armament saturated with the most modern equipment lends powerful impetus to technical progress. Thus, results from special-purpose developments for the Navy were introduced to the national economy in the area of heat engineering, radio engineering, radio communications, atomic power engineering, and underwater equipment and devices for developing the ocean, including natural resources of the continental shelf.

Thus it can be asserted that the sphere of Navy activity in the scheme of ensuring Russia's national security literally consists of 13 seas and three oceans washing its shores, and from the standpoint of protecting its interests it consists of the entire world ocean. It appears the Navy should perform the following missions:

- guaranteed deterrence of potential enemies (as part of strategic nuclear forces) from initiating combat operations by maintaining combat readiness of strategic naval nuclear forces and ensuring reliability and safety of their functioning;

- guaranteed repulse and disruption of aggression from sea and ocean directions under any situation conditions;
- maintaining a favorable operational regime in contiguous and inland seas;
- assistance to naval units of border guard troops in performing their assigned missions of protecting the state border and the maritime economic zone;
- ensuring security of our shipping in various ocean areas and protecting fisheries (animal industries) and other industrial activity, above all on our continental shelf;
- participation in joint humanitarian and police actions with other states;
- participation of specially formed expedition groupings of naval forces (as part of mobile forces) in local conflicts under the aegis of the United Nations or other international organizations to keep conflicts from escalating to large-scale wars.

Summing up what has been said, the conclusion can be drawn that the Navy's role in the scheme of ensuring Russia's national security is determined by its contribution to performance of missions facing the state's Armed Forces, and it must possess a potential that in peacetime is capable of ensuring Russian Federation security and protection of its national interests and citizens in ocean areas by deterring any state or coalition of states from using force against Russia and its allies. In case war is initiated against Russia, the Navy must be ready to repel aggression from sea and ocean directions and deprive enemy naval forces of the opportunity to conduct offensive operations (actions) in seas adjoining our territory and in other vital ocean areas.

Footnotes

1. VOYENNAYA MYSL, Special Edition, 1992.

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Arctic Transit to Pacific Fleet of Sub 'Kasatka'

94UM0147B Moscow MORSKOY SBORNIK in Russian
No 10, Oct 93 (signed to press 8 Oct 93) p 17

[Unattributed article: "Despite Difficulties"]

[Text] Combat training continues in the Navy despite the economic and political crisis being experienced in the country. Thus, the nuclear powered submarine Kasatka commanded by Captain 1st Rank A. Yefanov made a transit from the Northern Fleet to the Pacific Fleet in the period from 16 August through 12 September. After covering thousands of nautical miles in the watery depths of two oceans and beneath Arctic ices, the Kasatka moored safely at a berth in Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy. In the opinion of Rear Admiral M. Motsak, senior officer of the deployment, the submariners demonstrated a high training level and the ship showed the reliability of equipment. The traditions of Arctic under-ice deployments, which you can read about on pp 91-94 of this journal issue, continue.

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Navy's Shortened Reach

94UM0148A Moscow MORSKOY SBORNIK in Russian
No 10, Oct 93 (signed to press 8 Oct 93) pp 33-35

[Article by military journalist Captain 2nd Rank V. Pasyakin under rubric "Deployments and Flights": "And Again in the Mediterranean..."]

[Text] No matter how difficult the conditions in which the Russian Navy now finds itself, it lives and is performing assigned missions. This is indicated by the recent deployment of a group of ships of the Northern, Baltic and Black Sea fleets as well as of Leningrad Naval Base into the Mediterranean Sea. Military journalist Captain 2nd Rank V. Pasyakin acquaints readers with its details.

It was the typical working atmosphere in the operations room of the flagship, the large ASW ship Kerch. Rear Admiral A. Grinko, chief of the deployment staff, and his closest assistants captains 1st rank N. Mikheyev and G. Ukhanov were bending over a chart with a colorful abundance of symbols. A hunt was under way for a conditional enemy submarine by the ship detachment made up of the Kerch, patrol ships Ladnyy and Razitelnyy and hydrographic vessel Liman (Black Sea Fleet); the patrol ship Legkiy (Northern Fleet); and the patrol ship Druzhnyy (Baltic Fleet), divided into two interworking groups. A submarine and the oceanographic vessel Polyus of Leningrad Naval Base also were in the exercise area.

What is typical is that all ships and vessels began search operations in an organized fashion without preliminary joint drills. Later, while the Liman was maneuvering in the area in an attempt to detect the submarine, crews replenished fuel and water stores from the large ocean oiler Ivan Bubnov.

It was eight years ago in the Mediterranean that I had occasion to observe the Ivan Bubnov in the simultaneous underway replenishment of three ships, including the air-capable cruiser Kiev, by the abeam-astern method. A guided missile cruiser, destroyers, large ASW ships and patrol ships of the Northern and Black Sea fleets were waiting their turn. We were paid more than one visit by NATO aircraft and helicopters, which trained television, camera, and movie lenses on the floating "city."

Unfortunately, the Russian Navy now cannot boast of such a scale. Ships of the once great naval power put onto the oceans more and more rarely. Our Navy has been a rather rare guest in these regions since squadrons in the Mediterranean and South China seas and in the Indian Ocean were abolished. Is it surprising that instances of seizure of our merchant vessels have become more frequent of late? This time, too, one other ship of the Northern Fleet, the patrol ship Bessmennyy, was supposed to take part in the joint exercise, but she was sent to the Suez Canal, where a Russian tug was being detained for unknown reasons. It was well that our forces were in the Mediterranean and reacted promptly to the incident. But if they had not been?

Yes, the Russian Navy must be present constantly in areas of active shipping and fishing, not "vegetating" in bases. But evidently not everyone understands this. Or perhaps they give the appearance that they do not understand? Our air-capable ships are not seen at sea. By the way, Russia has been left with just one, the heavy air-capable cruiser Kuznetsov, and she has to be brought up to snuff. But the cradle of these ships, the Black Sea Shipyard, went over to sovereign Ukraine. Ukraine, however, is incapable of having such giants and so they cut up the heavy air-capable cruiser Ulyanovsk—our first air-capable ship with a "normal" configuration for aircraft takeoff and with a nuclear power plant—for scrap just when she was being born. The almost ready heavy air-capable cruiser Varyag "got caught between heaven and earth." The air-capable cruisers Kiev, Minsk and Novorossiysk were decommissioned because of the absence of funds and a repair facility.

Now our Navy's ships and auxiliary vessels rarely go beyond the Bosphorus. True, the oiler Ivan Bubnov is there somewhat more often than others, in the words of her captain, A. Danilenko, but his crew today also has a large number of problems.

"The captain of our enormous oiler has a salary of only 18,000 karbovantsy," said S. Sukharevich, chairman of the vessel's trade union committee, seething with just indignation. "And what does that say about seamen, when the subsistence wage in Ukraine long ago topped 22,000? How can a family be clothed, provided with shoes and fed on such money?! It was not without reason that above all the low pay and a desire to draw attention of authorities to our beggarly situation forced the seamen of Black Sea Fleet auxiliary vessels to hoist the St. Andrew's ensign."

Problems of the Black Sea Fleet's status, unresolved through the fault of the leadership of Russia and Ukraine, often creates extreme situations. For example, the Ivan Bubnov was forced to put to sea from Sevastopol... without necessary fuel for refueling, and it was not so much because of its scarcity.

"We were detained in Sevastopol by Ukrainian customs for two days," I was told by first mate V. Zadorozhnikov. "They let us go only after seeing that we had no fuel for refueling ships (!—Ed.), but only necessary minimum fuel for the transit, and this despite the fact that it is Russia that completely supplies the Black Sea Fleet with all fuels and lubricants. So our Bubnov had to proceed across the Mediterranean to replenish stores from her Northern Fleet colleague, the oiler Dnestr, near the Strait of Gibraltar. She received another 2,300 tonnes of fuel from the Baltic oiler Lena, and only after that were we able to begin refueling ships."

It was here in the Mediterranean that it was clear how much we need not only combatant ships, but also auxiliary vessels, without which the Navy risks becoming only a coastal fleet.

After refueling, the search group continued the "hunt" for the submarine, especially as they were not forced to wait for information on her—Captain 2nd Rank V. Borisenko's subordinates from the hydrographic vessel Liman had worked professionally. After studying the data received, the deployment staff adjusted the maneuvering scheme and places for laying the antisubmarine barriers which ASW aviators were supposed to put out. After some time a Ka-25 helicopter (a Saber-Toothed Tiger, as it was dubbed on the ship because of the emblem on its sides) piloted by Lieutenant Colonel I. Chernenko and navigator Major I. Sinigovets soared upward into the sky. Although it was not the first time ever for them to perform such an assignment (the two Ivans already had been flying together for six years and had learned to understand each other with hardly a word spoken), each hunt for a submarine conceals surprises.

"Arrived in area, beginning placement," was the report the flagship received from the crew of the rotary wing craft.

After laying two antisubmarine barriers, the helicopter personnel departed for the observation area. They did not have long to wait. Soon a report went to the flagship about contact with a submarine. Chernenko and Sinigovets immediately received the command to drop a series of "clarifying" buoys. It became clear from the information soon received from the Ka-25 crew that contact with a submarine had been established. This also was confirmed by listening to the sea using a dipping sonar. So the "long arm," as those in the Navy often call Naval Aviation aircraft and helicopters, proved its advantage this time as well, but it is becoming more and more difficult for that same Chernenko and Sinigovets to do this. I have to admit I was surprised to learn that their "tiger" has an even more venerable age than the twenty-year-old Kerch. The Ka-25 already was removed from production long ago and spare parts, instruments and accessories are not being produced for it. Senior technicians captains A. Mezentsev, V. Bakhtin and N. Maksimov have to work a great deal to see that their "little old man" does not let people down in flight, which is why the "Saber-Toothed Tiger" still retains sharp "claws" and "fangs" despite its venerable age.

When the area in which the conditional underwater enemy was located became known for certain thanks to the helicopter personnel, the deployment staff developed a precise tactical plan of action: Each ship was assigned a specific mission by Chief of Staff and First Deputy CinC Black Sea Fleet Vice Admiral P. Svyatashov, the exercise director, and the helicopter was brought back to the ship. By the way, a half-hour after its return the "tiger" again took off into the evening sky: a multiton "little fish" already was heading into the "net"...

Much more could be written about actions of ASW personnel on this deployment and about the people whom I met in the Mediterranean, but another issue worries all sailors today. Many crew members, even those who have served more than a single year in the

Black Sea Fleet, were in the Mediterranean for the first time. Will they have occasion to be here in the future? Will not our navymen soon be navymen in uniform only, going on coastal cruises only rarely, and will not the appearance of the St. Andrew's ensign over expanses of oceans and distant seas become something exotic? By the way, it is not the Fleet which has to be asked this question...

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Continuing Decline in Capabilities Predicted

94UM0148B Moscow MORSKOY SBORNIK in Russian
No 10, Oct 93 (signed to press 8 Oct 93) pp 36-39

[Article by Captain 1st Rank Yu. Koshelev under rubric "Discussion Rostrum": "Organization of Combat Training (Problems of Improving Its Effectiveness)"]

[Text] It is common knowledge that combat training is conducted on ships to train their crews to perform combat missions and keep ships in constant combat readiness, and it is the most important and determining thing in the life and activity of naval formations and units. But today, when the number of ships performing missions on long deployments has dropped considerably, the opinion has appeared that preventing a reduction in the personnel's level of training and in cohesiveness and combat readiness of ship crews and staffs has become the primary combat training mission.¹ Such an approach to determining combat training goals appears too oversimplified to me. We know that the level of preparedness of any ship crew inevitably has inherent ups and downs, and there are many reasons for this: The commander was replaced, some of the personnel were discharged to the reserve, there was a significant interruption in operation because of repairs or a difficult ice situation, and so on. Consequently, it is more proper to consider the primary combat training mission to be to ensure a level of preparedness corresponding to the assigned combat readiness of the ship, unit or formation.

Is it possible to perform this primary mission effectively today with the increasing understrength in personnel and the considerable scarcity of fuel, spare parts and other supplies? We will attempt to analyze the state of affairs in terms of certain fundamental requirements placed on the organization of combat training.

First of all, high effectiveness of combat training is possible only when its organization is scientifically substantiated. The question arises: Why have there been no practical results to this day from work done by military academies and institutes on such a pressing problem? Finally, where is it possible to turn for training aids and theoretical recommendations for improving the effectiveness of combat training?

New officers coming onto the Navy Combat Training staff and into local entities for directing combat training learn from their predecessors and, along with positive

experience, also adopt their shortcomings. Neither military schools nor the Naval Academy train specialists along that line. This is difficult to do independently because of an absence of sufficiently developed methods aids. And the main normative document, the "Rukovodstvo po boyevoy podgotovke VMF" [Navy Combat Training Manual], developed in the early 1980's, declares only certain basic provisions and clearly is out of date.

The very organization of the combat training process has stagnated and progress in improving it is very slight. Formation base exercises probably are the only innovation in recent years. Accounts and reports going to the Combat Training staff often remain ungeneralized as they return to the fleet in recommendations; moreover, they are not even reviewed. Then why are our accounts required?

In 1988, who scientifically substantiated the need for setting up staffs of main specialists in combat training directorates and helped in their very difficult formation only to have this same staff planned for elimination five years later? As a result, dozens of first-rate officers, organizers of specialized training in the fleets, will be out of a job...

For what reasons was the network of fleet training detachments resubordinated to the combat training directorate if other directorates will handle specialized training of navymen when the staff of main specialists is eliminated? The fact is we now do not even have such specialists as communicators, chemical warfare personnel, motor transport personnel, and so on who must organize basic military training.

For example, who proved theoretically that a submarine needs 20-30 days to rehearse and pass a ship-type training task? Why not 10-40? But if this is substantiated, then how is one to explain the absence of new standards in connection with transition to a two-year term of service for draftees, the high personnel turnover caused by this, deterioration of their overall preparedness, problems in manning crews, the freeze on development of training facilities and so on?

Of course, it is impossible to have rules for all instances in life, but fundamental, scientifically substantiated recommendations determining the organization of the system of personnel training measures in the fleets must be worked out regularly.

Secondly, combat training effectiveness is achieved by high quality of planning, i.e., by compiling realistic, materially substantiated plans that are coordinated with plans for ship repairs and trials and with capabilities of assets for supporting combat training.

To be sure, planning quality depends directly on the professional training, industriousness and initiative of staff officers of formations, large strategic formations and directorates. Nevertheless, it seems to us the reality of our plans is far from perfect often for entirely other

reasons. Thus, annual plans for training command and control entities and fleet forces for each new training year are drawn up and approved during October-November of the preceding year, but the actual plan of execution for ship repair goes to the fleet only during March-April, the practice missile ordnance limit during February-March, the plan for trials during January-February, and documents changing the fleet table of organization structure throughout the year. All this forces the leadership to regularly adjust already approved combat training plans, usually in the direction of their reduction, which dampens the ardor of staffs and crews and allows insufficiently responsible commanders to fulfill them incompletely or not on time. For example, 125 activities for the record (over 15 percent of the plan) were excluded from the Pacific fleet combat training plan or postponed to later dates in the winter period of the current training year. The entire training system suffers from this. If there is no thoughtfulness and constancy in it, there also will be no good results.

We see a solution only in comprehensive planning of all fleet activity, but this does not appear possible at the present time above all because of unstable financing, uneven deliveries of fuel and other supplies, and problems connected with the call-up of young replacements.

Thirdly, effectiveness of combat training is achieved because of constant monitoring of its course and of the quality with which missions are rehearsed and because of commanders' firm knowledge of methodologies determining the conduct of combat training measures. In my view, this thesis requires no special commentary. Everything depends only on ourselves, on personal organizational work of commanders in chief, commanders and staff officers at all levels. Behind each combat training violation stands a specific person and he must bear personal responsibility for this. But now as a rule responsibility is placed only on combat training directorate officers for omissions in combat training. And what is the level of leadership in combat training of the subordinates, for example, of the commander of a Pacific Fleet ship formation if neither he nor his deputies put to sea a single time in the winter training period? It turns out that directing the housekeeping activity of subordinates and organization of their everyday routine and so on is more in view than performance of combat training missions, which means that defining it as the principal form of fleet activity in peacetime is only a declaration.

Fourthly, effectiveness of combat training measures depends on availability of modern means of supporting them and proper use of what is available. This too is a sore subject. We now lack not only modern guided surface and airborne (high-speed, small-size, low-flying) targets, but even a sufficient number of the old ones. The shortage of funds keeps us not only from producing new ones, but also from repairing damaged targets. To a certain extent it is possible to find a solution to the situation (and we are finding one) in additionally equipping written-off craft and vessels as naval targets, which is considerably cheaper than building new ones. But

special financing is not provided even for these purposes, and using what are even at that miserly funds intended for ship repair hardly is advisable.

Seventy percent of missile firings in the fleet were carried out against simulated targets in the winter training period, which inevitably leads to a drop in the training level of the fleet's ship crews and shore-based missile units. This problem cannot be resolved without special financing, otherwise it will be necessary to change criteria of personnel preparedness.

Fifthly, combat training effectiveness cannot be raised without high quality of base training and full-fledged use of training facilities.

In the last two years this matter has been given very careful attention both on the Navy Combat Training staff and in fleet directorates. Conduct of formation base exercises has become a system; they allow preparing ships and staffs for comprehensive performance of missions at sea and rehearsing interworking with ship, air and shore-based formations and units without expending materiel at authorized control stations, battle stations, and simulators.

Positive examples of the effectiveness of formation base exercises are cited by Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Navy and Chief of Navy Combat Training Directorate Vice Admiral A. V. Gorbunov in the article "And Still We Go To Sea."² And if at times the return from exercises is not up to expectations, evidently this is above all the direct fault of the corresponding commander and staff. There are conditions for conducting formation base exercises in all formations; it is only a matter of the organizing abilities and personal preparedness of formation commanders.

To improve the methodology and quality of formation base exercises, at the beginning of each winter and summer training period they are planned and conducted as demonstration exercises under the direction of commanders in chief of large strategic formations ("teachers also have to be taught"). But base training is not only and not so much formation base exercises; it is the training of each individual specialist, battle station, combat team and crew as a whole. It is impossible to organize it qualitatively without a modern training facility. Again the question rests on financing. Construction of a network of fleet training centers essentially has been frozen: Insignificant funds are allocated only for creating or renovating individual simulators. At the same time even the existing training facility is not being used effectively enough. It is difficult to change commanders' psychology with respect to full-fledged base training, which is the only thing capable of even partially compensating for the constant reduction in training of personnel at sea (although everyone understands that no base training will fully replace practice at sea). There are objective difficulties in organizing base training itself: The low personnel strength level of crews and the related need for constantly using them for fatigue duties, numerous

details, searches for deserters and so on to the detriment of training; the lowered overall training level of draftees in connection with adoption of laws halting the call-up of students for military service; transition to a two-year term of service; and the unsatisfactory state of health of young replacements (every third draftee of the last levy is underweight, every fifth one is unfit for service afloat and so on). All these problems evidently can be solved by a transition to contract service, but for now this system of training has not been properly worked out, and generally this is a separate discussion.

Sixthly and finally, combat training effectiveness depends on keeping weapons and technical equipment of ships in exemplary condition and on their timely, quality servicing and maintenance. This probably is the most difficult problem for the fleet. Financing of ship repairs is constantly being reduced. There is a growing number of ships whose operation is hampered and at the same time there is an increased likelihood of equipment breakdowns because of the expiration of time periods between repairs and between drydockings. There is also a growing number of ships being removed from the fleet order of battle exclusively because of the absence of funds for ship repair or modernization. The destruction of economic ties with many enterprises manufacturing arms and equipment which ended up in "nearby foreign countries" led to a restriction on or cessation of warranty servicing and repair of equipment and deliveries of spare parts, instruments and accessories. On the other hand, the drop in the personnel's level of specialized training leads to a growth in equipment breakdowns, which in turn leads to the need for additional repair expenditures.

As a result, the reduction in the number of combat-ready ships and in their sorties to sea has a negative influence on morale in collectives: Discipline drops and criminal activities grow.

Summing up what has been said, it is possible to dwell on two main, although possibly not indisputable, conclusions:

1. The level of preparedness of a significant number of ship crews to perform missions in accordance with their immediate purpose is steadily dropping. We can only slow this process by various organizational measures and by toughening demands and increasing responsibility at all levels, but the Navy is incapable of stopping it on its own.

2. Personnel proficiency will not correspond even to necessary combat training of fleet forces without capital investments in the creation of new naval assets and in the development of a system of basing, ship repair, training facilities and means of supporting combat training. But changing, simplifying or reducing preparedness criteria only creates an appearance of sufficiency of combat readiness, and it will be necessary to expend enormously more funds subsequently for its actual restoration as a result of this.

From the editors: We invite officers to take part in the discussion and express their opinion on the components of combat training examined by the author.

Footnotes

1. "Combat Training Today," *MORSKOY SBORNIK*, No 3, 1992, p 3.
2. *MORSKOY SBORNIK*, No 11, 1992, pp 3-6.

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Modern Problems of Naval Ship Construction

94UM0147A Moscow *MORSKOY SBORNIK in Russian*
No 10, Oct 93 (signed to press 8 Oct 93) pp 61-64

[Article by Vice Admiral L. Golovko, deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Navy for shipbuilding and armament, under rubric "Armament and Equipment"]

[Text] Since olden times Russian people have been connected with naval affairs and have been famed for the art of navigation. The Russian Navy always proudly sailed the waters of all the planet's seas and oceans. And the fact that we had an entire galaxy of innovative scientists who achieved major successes in naval shipbuilding and in creating naval ordnance largely contributed to this. The work of many of them—Ye. Nikonov, S. Dzhhevetskiy, V. Yershov, A. Popov, P. Titov, E. Gulyayev, S. Makarov, M. Naletov, I. Bubnov, V. Pyatov—was known far beyond Russia's confines.

Russians were pioneers in the development and combat employment of mine and torpedo ordnance. Our scientists also performed great services in the area of radio communications, hydrology, meteorology, cartography, oceanography, piloting and dead reckoning, nautical astronomy, deviation and so on.

The traditions of Russian scientists, designers, and creators of combat equipment and naval ordnance were continued in Soviet times. Realization of the latest discoveries in the area of nuclear power engineering, electronics and rocket building permitted the Navy to become truly oceangoing and capable of combating a strong naval enemy. It was in this period the Navy acquired qualities of a long-range Navy and the capability of exerting substantial influence on the course and outcome of warfare in enormous ocean and even continental theaters of military operations.

Any state's navy is intended for protecting its interests through naval warfare. Based on this, construction of the home fleet in all historical stages was dictated by an aggregate of factors determined by the disposition of military-political forces in the international arena, the nature and degree of the military threat, missions of ensuring state security stemming from this and, in addition, by established views on the Navy's role and place in the system of the country's Armed Forces and by the country's economic capacities. A scientific-technical

direction of creating ships formed with consideration of the growth in combat capabilities of the probable enemy's naval forces and with consideration of conditions for Navy employment in light of general patterns of development of means and methods of naval warfare.

A combatant ship is a concentration of complex, inter-related machinery, i.e., a unified system created on the basis of latest achievements of science and technology. Participants in its many-sided, complex process of creation are hundreds on thousands of scientists of different specialties, designers, and personnel of various types of enterprises, and they are navymen and organizers of shipbuilding production and of shipbuilding as a whole.

The improvement in naval shipbuilding based on the latest scientific-technical achievements and foremost technologies has acquired especially great importance at the present time, when we began making reasonable sufficiency for defense and not the principle of a competition of strength the basis of Armed Forces organizational development. Therefore the nature of Russia's military doctrine of today envisages a substantial increase in qualitative parameters of armament and military equipment ensuring high combat readiness of our Armed Forces, including the Navy.

USSR shipbuilding in the postwar period represented a powerful, involved complex of enterprises for scientific research, planning and design, shipbuilding, instrument making and machinebuilding that were capable of creating any classes of ships, vessels and naval facilities in close cooperation with enterprises of other sectors of industry. With full readiness of its capacities, the sector was capable of supporting an annual output as follows:

- ships for the Navy as well as vessels and floating facilities for the national economy with an overall displacement up to 900,000-1,000,000 tonnes, including for export;
- consumer goods amounting to around two billion rubles (1991 prices) overall.

The status of Soviet shipbuilding basically corresponded to the world level with the exception of the production of electronics and individual set-making articles for vessels, which resulted from our lag in the area of an element base and in production of nonmetallic materials. It gave the USSR an opportunity to have a Navy with an overall tonnage of around four million (the United States now also has around four million) and a civilian fleet (not counting river transport vessels) with an overall deadweight of 24.3 million tonnes (the United States has 23.3 million).

In connection with the USSR's disintegration and the political and economic reorganization going on in the Russian Federation, conditions have changed significantly for development and series deliveries of armament and military equipment. A need has arisen to shift production and development of their individual models, including also of set-making assemblies for their manufacture, from former

USSR republics to Russian Federation territory. Cooperation of enterprises of defense sectors of industry continues to collapse due to the absence of a precise conversion program and nonallocation of sufficient funds to support production activity of remaining defense enterprises. The sharp limitation of their financing is leading to a reduction in military orders, curtailment of production, a drain of skilled cadres, and a changing specialization of enterprises. And where there still are military orders, the workers' pay is considerably below that of civilian production enterprises.

For the very same reason, many Navy ranges and scientific research experimental bases created to support weapon test programs ended up outside the Russian Federation, while those on its territory need additional outfitting with ships and equipment for making path measurements (airborne, underwater) and performing capital construction (shops, berths, storage areas, laboratories, hotels, barracks).

Around two-thirds of the overall potential of the former USSR shipbuilding industry now is concentrated on Russian territory. At the same time, the potential is substantially lower for individual kinds of production such as construction of large-tonnage ships and vessels; production of mines, torpedoes, antimine weapons, rolled plate and particularly special sections for shipbuilding; and production of ship gas-turbine plants and radar and sonar equipment.

It should be noted that in order to retain the sector's vital capacity Russia requires a transition period lasting a minimum of 5-7 years, during which problems of cooperation must be resolved either by continuing mutual deliveries within the framework of the CIS or by bringing in exports from other countries or by creating Russia's own industries. A possible form of solving the problem seems to us to be bilateral and multilateral government agreements regulating mutual deliveries and the procedure for joint work within the CIS framework.

As of today warships which require allocation of significant resources for a period up to 5-6 years for fitting out and which can support the employment in Russia alone of approximately 150,000 workers, including 60,000 highly skilled workers, are on the ways and at the outfitting quays of shipyards in varying degrees of readiness.

Cutting up incomplete ships, especially among those on the ways, also requires great expenditures (including moral!) and cannot be performed quickly enough. In case of a refusal to complete the construction of ships, funds will be required for their recycling in amounts exceeding expenditures for fabrication. The situation at hand must be regarded as an emergency and a way out should be found in the shortest possible time.

Before the beginning of the 1990's the USSR Navy included two ocean fleets (Northern and Pacific) and two fleets on inland seas (Baltic and Black Sea), as well as the Caspian Flotilla. The Navy order of battle included nuclear powered missile submarines, nuclear powered multipurpose submarines, diesel powered submarines, air-capable ships, cruisers, destroyers, large ASW ships,

large patrol ships, small combatant ships, combatant craft of various design projects and support vessels for various purposes. At the present time its ship order of battle essentially has shifted completely to Russia's jurisdiction and now is the basis of the Russian Navy. At the same time the present Navy infrastructure differs substantially from the previous one. Above all this is caused by loss of a number of naval bases in the Baltic, Black and Caspian Sea. But problems facing the Russian Navy and its naval shipbuilding basically were inherited from previous times; moreover, they were exacerbated considerably as a result of the USSR's elimination.

All these problems can be grouped along two lines. The first group of problems is insufficient development of fleet systems of basing, servicing and repair and the shortage of support ships and a floating logistic establishment. This is especially characteristic of the North and Far East in connection with difficulties of capital construction in these regions. The second group of problems is the high proportion of obsolete ships with reduced combat effectiveness in the Navy makeup, but which require the very same and in a number of cases even greater expenditures for keeping them in formation than for new ships.

In examining the status of naval shipbuilding it is also necessary to consider the status of the civilian maritime and river fleet inasmuch as they are interrelated, since they are determined by activity of the country's unified shipbuilding complex. Therefore, it also seems advisable to make brief mention here of problems facing civilian shipbuilding, as the naval and civilian fleets are created in the same national economic sector.

The USSR civilian fleet represented an involved complex, including vessels of various classes and for various purposes as well as ship repair yards, establishments and rather developed port facilities. As a result of partitioning of the civilian fleet, Russia was left with approximately 55 percent of cumulative deadweight tonnage of maritime transport vessels, a little over 60 percent of fishing industry fleet vessels, 30 percent of offshore oil and gas field supply vessels, and 12 of the 27 floating drilling units that were in the USSR. Russia's share of the overall number of former USSR ports today is 53 percent, but it is around 40 percent in cargo volume.

This situation on the one hand demanded either conclusion of appropriate agreements on leasing or on joint use of ports or government decisions on constructing new ones, above all in the Baltic and Black Sea. On the other hand, an acute need arose for an accelerated buildup of Russia's civilian fleet tonnage. There is no other way to get out of the existing situation than on the basis of conversion of the shipbuilding industry.

Thus, in building a concept for developing the Russian Navy under present conditions it is necessary to take into account such factors as quantitative and structural makeup of the now existing naval fleet; reality of a sharp reduction in appropriations for its construction and

upkeep; a change in the world situation as a whole and in the Baltic and Black Sea in particular; the obviousness of the need for Russia to preserve the status of a naval power; and the insistent need for increasing civilian fleet construction rates.

In considering the concept of the development of shipbuilding in Russia, one also should bear in mind that shipbuilding is capable of playing the role of a leading sector supporting progress of other sectors of industry and of the country's economy as a whole, as occurred in Japan and South Korea. In addition, Russia's shipbuilding has good chances to be one of the leaders in the world shipbuilding market since, first of all, its level of development in Russia is rather high; secondly, market capacity is sufficient and is around \$300 billion for the near term (8-10 years); thirdly, shipbuilding today is shifting to third world countries, and competition with them is within Russia's capability even under today's conditions. An additional argument in this regard is the competitiveness of many of our ship classes with the possibility of their sale on the world market, as demonstrated recently at the IDEX-93 international exposition in Abu Dhabi.

Thus, it should be stated that a reduction in the proportion of naval shipbuilding within the overall volume of Russian shipbuilding is a real fact, but it must be emphasized that maximum permissible replacement rates of military products with civilian products at yards of the shipbuilding sector should not exceed 15 percent per year. Otherwise this will lead to "locking up" ways with ships being built on them and to disintegration of labor collectives at these yards. Another question of state importance under present conditions is recycling of written-off ships, especially ships with nuclear power plants, which also requires appropriate capacities.

Based on everything that has been said, the concept of development of Russian shipbuilding and arms under present conditions should, in our opinion, provide for the following: Mandatory fitting out of ships and vessels which are in a high degree of readiness, if only to free up capacities for civilian products, i.e., receiving permanent credits for financing their fitting out; licenses for selling a portion of fitted-out ships and vessels on the world market and for sale of secondary resources to direct the proceeds toward renovating shipbuilding and ship repair bases and support sectors; and financing of the program for recycling written-off ships and vessels. For its realization, in the first stage (over the next 3-5 years) we propose to fit out combatant ships and auxiliary vessels which are in various degrees of readiness. At the same time, work must be done to upgrade and renovate the fleet basing and repair infrastructure. In parallel, it is necessary to accomplish work of inspecting the available ship order of battle in order to clarify the status of each specific ship and determine prospects for her further use: Keep some in the order of battle, prepare others for modernization and support such modernization, and mothball still others or send them for recycling (to be written off).

At the same time, within the scope of the new military doctrine and new missions facing the Russian Navy, we must not reduce rates of RDT&E and planning work to determine basic directions of Navy development for the future and to form a permanent sliding program of naval shipbuilding for the next 10-15 years. It is quite clear from the studies conducted that we cannot get by without creating new strategic missile submarine cruisers, nuclear and non-nuclear powered multipurpose submarines, aircraft carriers (or air-capable ships), multipurpose surface combatants of the destroyer, frigate and corvette types and mine countermeasures ships, as well as small combatants and new-generation floating logistic support ships and vessels.

Today it is premature to speak of a specific appearance and standard types of the above ships. It is enormously more important to emphasize the problem of the need for intensifying test-design work to create weapons, armament and equipment of the future with an optimum combination of high specifications and performance characteristics and with resolution of problems of their standardization, unification, modernization capability, and maintainability. This means that the scale of research and test-design work should not be reduced. Moreover, under present conditions this must be given even more attention than before.

Prospects of domestic naval shipbuilding are linked closely with successes and achievements of S&T progress. Its interests lie not only in the area of solving applied S&T problems, but extend to a wide range of basic research in various directions. Therefore naval shipbuilding plans must rely on results of fulfillment of major comprehensive and specific state research and scientific, planning and technological work.

The history of domestic naval shipbuilding has shown repeatedly that "ups" and "downs" in the process of constructing ships and vessels had a pernicious effect on the Navy's status for decades. To the contrary, construction of the Fleet requires "monotonous continuity," and this is possible in part with observance of a number of basic conditions, the principal ones of which are long-range (for 10-15 years), specific program planning and stable (with consideration of inflation), continuous financing of the fulfillment of this program. But loss of achievements of our naval shipbuilding may bring broader and deeper consequences than simply a temporary loss of existing military-strategic or political-economic parities in naval armaments.

Thus, on the eve of its tricentennial, Russian naval shipbuilding is faced with solving serious new problems. The difficulty of this solution is determined by many political, economic and social factors. But we always must remember our forefathers' behest—"let there be maritime vessels"—and in the situation that is taking shape find real ways to maintain Russia's naval might at a level worthy of a Great Sea Power.

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Kokoshin: Russia Needs Reliable Fleet

94UM0151A Moscow MORSKOY SBORNIK in Russian No 11, Nov 93 (signed to press 5 Nov 93) pp 3-7

[Interview with Andrey Afanasyevich Kokoshin, first deputy minister of defense of the Russian Federation, by Capt 2d Rank Ye. Vodopyanov: "Russia Needs a Worthy Fleet"]

[Text] *During the course of preparations for celebrating the 300th anniversary of the Russian Fleet, besides pride in its glorious centuries-old history, military seamen are also experiencing well-founded concern for the future of the Russian Navy. People devoted to the sea are bitter about the fact that for the first time in many decades, not a single ship was laid down at Russia's shipyards last year, and completion of those under construction was suspended or is being done at an extremely slow pace against the background of the massive decommissioning of ships and vessels, both obsolete ones and ones that could be preserved with the proper repair and modernization. What is the reason for this situation—is it merely economic difficulties, or is it an aggregate of other reasons? It is with this question that we began our interview with Andrey Afanasyevich Kokoshin, first deputy minister of defense of the Russian Federation.*

[Kokoshin] The difficult situation of the Russian Navy is explained not only by the difficulties of the present situation in Russia and the political and economic consequences of the breakup of the USSR, but also by the past mistakes in organizational development of the Navy, when warships were being created, and basing and ground support and servicing systems, that is, all that we call infrastructure, were not properly developed. The same can be said about fleet armament, as well as reconnaissance and target designation assets. There is another aspect. Ships, even after being adopted into operational service, took a very long time to complete and, naturally, could not fully accomplish combat missions. What is more, today at the Baltic Shipyards the guided-missile cruiser Peter the Great is being completed. Only now is this ship, the fourth of this project, getting all the weapons that were to be on the first one. Huge delays in creating assemblies, individual components, and weapons systems of the warships also have an effect. So, the Navy is a victim both of the most difficult crisis situation of our economy and, simultaneously, of those problems of shipbuilding that built up over several decades.

[Vodopyanov] Apparently, we can also include here the difficult situation with housing and other problems of social security which have taken shape in the fleets?

[Kokoshin] Unquestionably. The trouble is that we created ships, including outstanding ones, but essentially forgot about people. This concerns not only officer personnel but also enlisted personnel. It seems that the large number of incidents in the Navy, including cases of suicide, are associated with the fact that crews are

located in the secluded space of ship compartments for too long a time, and the conditions have not been created for them for real rest and relaxation on shore.

[Vodopyanov] Andrey Afanasyevich, if the conversation turns to development of the Navy's infrastructure, a logical question arises: What is being done today to solve the problems you mentioned?

[Kokoshin] Development of a system of basing and life support is a long-term program which must be planned for 15-20 years. In doing so, we must proceed from the fact that the idea of dispersing the infrastructure facilities for basing ship groupings intended to operate in one or several closely located operational areas is outdated. You see, a massive strike, not even nuclear but conventional, but with high-precision weapons, will destroy practically all the facilities no matter how we try to move them apart. Therefore, I consider justified the viewpoint of those experts who propose to position the fleets at several bases unified in technology of supporting the vital activities of the ships, weapons, and use of forces and weapons at sea. Such a concentration of forces give a tremendous advantage both for the development of the Navy's infrastructure and for creating normal living conditions for servicemen and their families.

[Vodopyanov] In doing so, obviously, we must proceed from the real conditions and capabilities of our state?

[Kokoshin] Undoubtedly. Unfortunately, we are just now beginning to really count our money, to say nothing of the Americans, Germans, and British. They will not invest their money unless they are convinced that every dollar, mark, or pound will provide the maximum return. In Russia's history, the great Prince Konstantin Nikolayevich—general-admiral of the Russian Fleet—and his fellow reformers devoted much attention during the reform period to what is now called "cost effectiveness." Today, every commander must become an economist. The general customer of the Navy's arms in the person of commanders of higher echelons, headquarters, and other command and control bodies must be able to analyze what is more beneficial to the Navy: For example, purchase five new destroyers or modernize 10 that are in service. Lay a new nuclear-powered submarine or modernize that which has proven itself well. Order a new cruiser or invest money in development of the infrastructure and life support of existing ships...

Of course, to do this, we in the armed forces must have strong economic services, and one of our most important tasks is to instill in commanders of all levels a taste for careful analysis of the monetary resources which we possess and the combat effectiveness of those arms which we purchase for this money.

[Vodopyanov] To do this, however, commanders must clearly know what the Russia's Ministry of Defense and you, as first deputy minister of defense, see as the Navy's role today. What is its concept of organizational development? It is no secret that in Russia's past and, the impression is

forming, the present military doctrine, insufficient attention was and is being devoted to the Navy.

[Kokoshin] There always was a double attitude towards the Navy. On the one hand, it was loved in a special way. And Russians, I would say, have a certain subconscious craving for the sea. It is no wonder that the periods of Russia's isolation concluded with departure for the seas that wash the present-day Russia, initially in the west and south (Baltic, Black, and Caspian seas) and then in the east (Pacific Ocean). On the other hand, due to our geostrategic position, we have traditionally been more of a land power than a sea power, and Russia's military fate was usually determined on land. Of course, there were critical moments and sea battles, such as Tsushima, which also determined the future foreign policy and the domestic situation of the Russian state. Nevertheless, the outcome of wars—the Patriotic War of 1812, World War I and II—were predetermined deep in Russian territory. This happened not only due to Russia's natural geographic position but also, it seems to me, due to the ambivalent attitude towards the Navy. It experienced periods of a great upsurge and deep crises. And such alternation was repeated over and over in Russia's history—we must not forget this. Remember that after Peter the Great, the Navy was very quickly brought to a deep decline by his successors. Then things were corrected somewhat under Elizabeth Petrovna, but it still cannot be said that the Navy was in a magnificent position. During the rule of Catherine the Great, the Navy flourished. It was during this period that the entire world heard the names Senyavin, Greig, and Ushakov, whose glory was comparable to that of Rumyantsev and Suvorov. Under Paul I the Navy still held its place, but under Alexander I it again ended up in a difficult situation and was not used very much. Paradoxical as it may seem, the most hated name for seamen of that time was the name of the naval minister, Marquis de Traverse. However, he did not decide everything; he merely acted as an instrument of the top. Although the role of personality in the Navy was always great, its revival, at least of the Black Sea Fleet, in the first half of the 19th century was associated primarily with the name Admiral Lazarev. Later came the Crimean War, when the Navy was powerless against the enemy's armored steam-powered ships, and the Russian admirals, officers, and sailors became heroes of the land defense of Sevastopol. We also remember the already mentioned Tsushima and 1918, when a large part of the Black Sea Fleet was actually sunk... Overall, the Russian Navy had a majestic and sometimes tragic history, one that was more complex than that of the armed forces as a whole. In the recent past, at the turn of the 1960's, the Navy was subjected to a severe blow when nearly new ships that were far from exhausting their combat capabilities were scrapped.

[Vodopyanov] Andrey Afanasyevich, you absolutely justly noted that we must not forget history, including that of the Navy. Is this taken into account in the new shipbuilding program?

[Kokoshin] I would not say that we have a new shipbuilding program in the traditional sense. I think there

should be a program of developing arms as a whole, of which the Navy would be a component. And this would include not only ships but also shore-based missile systems, naval aviation, and naval infantry... But the most important thing, I repeat, is to improve the basing system and the repair system. It is precisely such a program that we need—without a one-sided slant towards shipbuilding. This is especially dictated by the situation, resulting from the breakup of the Soviet Union, in the Black, Baltic, and Caspian Seas. As far as ships are concerned, I believe the idea of creating a relatively small number of aircraft-carrying ships merits very close attention. Overall, we need new inspiring ideas whose implementation can help us keep what we have for years. The young people of the Navy will have their say here...

[Vodopyanov] But in order to advance, as you say, "ideas," those young people of the Navy need to know what criteria will determine the quantitative and qualitative composition of the Navy.

[Kokoshin] Absolutely, Russia needs a powerful, modern navy without quantitative excesses, but with high indicators of combat and operational effectiveness; a navy which would blend in with an integrated military doctrine. Today it is especially important for all the armed services and combat arms to coordinate precisely with one another. Now, of course, there is no optimum in this sphere. As far as the missions to be carried out by the Navy are concerned, I think they primarily associated with safeguarding Russia's security in certain areas and zones adjacent to its territory and ensuring, along with the Strategic Missile Troops and strategic Long-Range Aviation, reliable nuclear deterrence. One of the Navy's most important missions will be to preserve according to specific parameters its oceanic functions, above all, in the context of reconnaissance, collecting data, and studying the hydrological situation. Among the combat missions, the primary one is to maintain the stability of strategic nuclear-powered submarines and create such conditions of combat duty that would enable us in the event of political crises and military operations to prevail in the near-ocean zones most vulnerable for safeguarding Russia's security and also in certain key areas of the world oceans.

[Vodopyanov] But what is the basis for carrying out what is planned? After all, it seems to us that today much is justifiably being said about the insufficient thought given to the policy of conversion of the defense industry, which led to the collapse of our military-industrial complex and its loss of advanced positions.

[Kokoshin] It must be recognized that we really did not have a conversion policy, although efforts were made to convert the military-industrial complex to producing peacetime products. But such a program should have been implemented over the course of 10-15 years and certainly on the condition of the stability of state administration. The conversion program proposed within the framework of the old system can only be considered a

conversion palliative. When weakened "civilian" plants "hooked onto" enterprises of the military-industrial complex, it was able to work only in the presence of a directive force. And, of course, the conversion policy had to have powerful market stimuli and be built into an overall strategy of reformation of the economy and independent of directions from above.

[Vodopyanov] Andrey Afanasyevich, how can you now characterize the condition of the industrial complex meeting the needs of the Navy?

[Kokoshin] It is very difficult. Essentially, we are now fighting for the survival of the armed forces, including the Navy, and for the preservation of industry, if only in those volumes which would ensure maintaining the Army and Navy at the necessary combat readiness. This is an extremely difficult task. The director corps of defense enterprises agrees when you say that it is necessary to reduce military orders and the number of plants. But as soon as it affects the directors directly, they begin to take it back: They say, let us reduce others' orders, but not mine. Incidentally, we were also forced to curtail many developments to the limit and, figuratively speaking, will have to cut to the quick.

For example, we determined Severodvinsk and the Sev-mashpredpriyatiye [Severodvinsk Machine Building Enterprise] to be the center of nuclear-powered submarine building. Now all orders will go only there. But we must bring to readiness those submarines which we have in the Far East. Some are being completed at Nizhnyi Novgorod, and large surface ships at Kaliningrad and St. Petersburg...

[Vodopyanov] Again, it turns out that it is the Navy that is suffering the greatest damage of all the armed services?

[Kokoshin] This is taking place due to its specific nature: The duration of the shipbuilding cycle, the fact that they are entire floating cities which combine much of what the Air Force, Missile Troops, and Air Defense Troops have... Therefore, such super powerful weapons systems are now suffering the most. The specific nature of today's industrial production and the fact that there are no strict rules governing behavior of first and second-level cooperating enterprises, which are very quickly switching to the production of civilian products that are in demand. Military orders have become unprofitable due to not being provided financial resources...

[Vodopyanov] ...As a result, whereas before seamen often complained about a number of low tactical and technical parameters of newly built ships and the insufficient standardization of weapons and combat equipment with which they were equipped, today the Navy is more concerned about the discontinuance of deliveries not only of new and modern weapons but even series-produced weapons. Will it not turn out that the Russian Navy will celebrate its 300th anniversary not only without new ships but also with armament from "the Ochakov times and the conquest of Crimea?"

[Kokoshin] You pose an absolutely valid question. I believe that we need to maintain the course of keeping a small number of warships in commission, but the most modern and really combat-ready, as they say, first-line ships. Such requirements, of course, also pertain to both aviation and to the other armed services, but especially to the Navy. We must be sure that if a ship flies the flag of the Navy and is in commission, it can be counted upon. In addition, there should be reserve ships with lower levels of combat readiness and a lower level of manning than first-line ships. Of course, both must be equipped with modern weapons. But there are a mass of obstacles here.

[Vodopyanov] Can you dwell on this important aspect in more detail?

[Kokoshin] In the former USSR, the expenditure mechanism of the entire life cycle of armament was dominant—from development to utilization. Often, reporting on the development of a project, say, for a new ship was the main thing, for which they handed out awards and prizes. Ships, weapons systems, life-support systems, and rescue and survival equipment, as it later turned out, were far from perfect in a number of cases due to such "reporting mania." Moreover, the vast majority of armament models were created without expectation of modernization. We are suffering from this to this day, since it is impossible to place new electronics, sonar equipment, and modern types of antennas on ship of most projects.

But the main shortcoming in domestic shipbuilding, it seems, was the lack of a macro-system approach to construction and development of the Navy, including basing infrastructure, when the drive for quantitative and qualitative composition of the Navy under obviously overstated requirements of naval strategy (let us recall the "ocean strategy" of Admiral Gorshkov) was accomplished by painful decisions often dictated not by the Navy but by the military-industrial complex. There was nothing that defined the strategy of military shipbuilding—a state program coordinated by objectives, deadlines, and engineering tasks and unified for all scientific research institutes and design bureaus, shipyards, and docks. But those same Americans and Germans, far richer than us, built ships with a long-range sight. The Iowa-class battleships are a classic example of a proprietary attitude toward ships. But where are our Project 68-bis gun cruisers today, which were distinguished by outstanding naval architecture and fair seagoing qualities?!

[Vodopyanov] Today the Navy has also lost (basically due to a poorly developed shore-basing infrastructure) newer ships; for example, the heavy aircraft-carrying cruisers Kiev, Minsk, and Novorossiysk, each of which served less than 20 years...

[Kokoshin] That is because, as I already said above, we always pursued quantity, ignoring the qualitative characteristics of the Fleet and paying no attention to costs, which especially increase when operating less-than-perfect ships and basing points. Today we are forced to count every ruble; funds are catastrophically short. How in such

conditions to optimize expenditures for the purchase of equipment and armament, shipbuilding and repair, and scientific research and experimental design work? Therefore, in the immediate future we must not count on any new grandiose projects, but we must solve more practical problems in order to preserve the maximum of what we have in the Fleet today. The Navy's main task for the next 2-3 years is survival. I will note that it is not vegetation, but survival with the evolutionary accumulation of combat might, structural and operational reorganization, being inspired by the lofty idea of the historical greatness of the homeland, and realization of its need for armed forces, and the Navy in particular. We must not forget that the Navy is still a special instrument of the state which can be used not only for purely military but also political tasks. I have in mind showing the Russian flag. I am convinced that we must accomplish the latter constantly, and there is no room for a bookkeeping approach here. A warship, especially a beautiful one (and Soviet, now Russian, ships are famous for their architecture), evokes admiration and respect. We must work out a kind of philosophy of using the Fleet, when it serves as a powerful factor of deterring an aggressor, without entering into combat operations but simply cruising back and forth off the coast or even beyond the horizon, and influences political "solitaire" along with other means and measures.

[Vodopyanov] Especially since the Russian and Soviet Navy has such experience...

[Kokoshin] I have talked a lot with veterans of the Navy who have more than once sailed the Mediterranean Sea, Indian Ocean, and Pacific Ocean. In a number of cases, our Navy played a very important role, when the situation was stabilized at a comparatively low level of escalation of some or other conflict by the sending of a detachment of our ships. No one guarantees that military threats in the world to the security of Russia will come to naught completely. So, we must be realists—we cannot get along without a Navy worthy of Russia.

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Commentary on 1975 U.S. Operation to Raise Submarine PL-574

94UM0157A Moscow *KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA*
in Russian 30 Dec 93 p 7

[Article by Anatoliy Dokuchayev: "The Secret of the Loss of PL-574: Only Now Have We Learned That a CIA Deep-Sea Operation Was Completed"]

[Text]

The CIA Finds Our Submarine

In the spring of 1975, the mass media of the United States and other Western countries unleashed a rapid stream of articles and reports that the CIA had salvaged a portion of a Soviet submarine with nuclear missiles. Super-secret details of the operation were cited. Let's turn to those articles and reports.

THE WASHINGTON POST, March 20, 1975

"The wreckage of a Soviet submarine that sank in the Pacific Ocean has been detected on the ocean bottom. The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency salvaged one third of the submarine in the summer of 1974. A ship with drilling equipment that was built by Billionaire Howard Hughes was used to do that."

DPA Agency, March 21 1975

"The U.S. CIA discovered two torpedoes with nuclear warheads on board the Soviet submarine that sank in 1968. 'Remarkable material' was obtained as a result of operation conducted to salvage the submarine. Both torpedoes were raised to the surface and were loaded into a specially equipped barge to conceal it from foreign ships. The operation that was undertaken to salvage the submarine will be continued in the future. If it is successfully completed, the CIA will have all of the codes, ciphers and diagrams of submarine command and control machines."

And everything began with a tragedy.

"Your Son Has Been Declared Dead..."

On February 24, 1968, the submarine with conning tower number 574 went out on combat patrol from the Mogila basing facility on Kamchatka. It was a diesel with three underwater-launch ballistic missiles with high-power nuclear warheads and also with two nuclear torpedoes. Captain 1st Rank Vladimir Kobzar, whom the command authorities characterized as an experienced, competent and strong-willed submariner, commanded the submarine.

For 12 days, the crew carried out the assigned missions of undetected patrolling (the submarine planned to return to base on 5 May 1968) but it did not establish communications on March 8. On that day, PL-574 should have transmitted a radio test message—a short signal, but...

Retired Rear Admiral Viktor Dygalo, who in 1968 commanded the large unit to which PL-574 was assigned, recalls what happened:

"In accordance with the combat order, Vladimir Kobzar regularly sent reports to headquarters on the course of the cruise. But on March 8 we were all alarmed—the submarine did not respond to the radio test message that was transmitted by Pacific Ocean Fleet Headquarters as a communications check. Indeed, this did not provide grounds to suggest a tragic outcome of the cruise—rarely did those kinds of reasons prevent a commander from establishing communications.

"But the message did not arrive. This was serious grounds for alarm. All the more so that, according to intelligence information, the American submarine Swordfish, which had sustained damage, had arrived at the Japanese port of Yokosuka at approximately the

same time. During this submarine's entry into Yokosuka, the Americans had taken unusual security measures and only American personnel were involved with the repair work. The thought arose about a collision underwater. We began to urgently prepare a search and rescue operation.

"Aircraft, surface combatants and auxiliary ships were sent out into the ocean. The depth in the search area was 5,000-6,000 meters and the distance from Kamchatka was approximately 1,230 miles. However, a two-month search in the area where we assumed the submarine could have sunk ended unsuccessfully. An analysis of the oil spot that was found indicated that it was solar oil and diesel oil. Consequently, the submarine had sunk."

Several versions on the loss of PL-574 were advanced and exist until the present time. The most well-founded version is the one that Admiral Viktor Dygalo has described. The American nuclear submarine Swordfish, which was tracking PL-574, had unintentionally rammed it. At the time of the collision, PL-574 was traveling at periscope depth in the "diesel operations underwater mode," under RDP as the experts say it, and was "deaf" due to the diesel's noise. Swordfish maneuvered to a close distance and presumably struck the upper portion of PL-574's conning tower when PL-574 was turning to a new course. PL-574, with a flooded central compartment, went to the bottom.

PL-574 took the lives of 98 Soviet seamen to the ocean depths. Moscow was silent about the catastrophe. Killed in action notices were sent to the relatives which stated: "Your son, husband, or father has been declared dead."

They were silent about the catastrophe. Nevertheless, the United States had learned about it, and not only about the fact itself, but about the precise location of the submarine's loss. They had photographed the sunken submarine. The photographs showed: The submarine was lying on the ground on an even keel and practically without a list. The Americans had a real opportunity to obtain many of the Soviet Navy's secrets—the United States Navy's primary enemy at sea.

The cipher machine was of special interest. U.S. intelligence personnel almost always experienced difficulties with Soviet codes and even a seven-year-old machine could be utilized to decipher thousands of Soviet messages that had been transmitted when the Cold War was in full swing in the 1960's.

Project "Jennifer"

Practical realization of the idea to salvage the lost Soviet submarine took the form of a CIA operation code named "Project Jennifer" which was frequently designated "Project J" at the CIA. The operation began to be conducted at the beginning of the 1970's with the full support of President Richard Nixon and was a deep secret. Billionaire Howard Hughes, owner of airlines,

electronics companies, and oil drilling enterprises, was assigned an important role. He partially financed the operation.

The technical executors designed two special ships to raise PL-574: The Glomar-Explorer ship-platform and the N V-1 pontoon-floating dock. A characteristic detail: Even during the final assembly of the ships, the engineers-builders could not understand their function.

In October 1970, Soviet intelligence in the United States managed to establish that the U.S. intelligence services had taken steps to look for the sunken Soviet submarine and had sent a special ship to the area where the submarine had been lost.

A Secret Ship

Surveillance established that the ship had dropped anchor and had lowered pipes to a depth of approximately 5,000 meters.

The ship, which was being painstakingly observed by Soviet seamen, belonged to the firm Glomar and was one of its nine specialized ships that were designed to drill shelves in coastal areas of the World Ocean. It had been leased by the CIA for decoy maneuvering and the firm's managers and crew did not have any idea about the true nature of Operation Jennifer.

Direct implementation of Project Jennifer began later. The Glomar Explorer left the shipyard in July 1973 for ocean tests. It was sighted off the coast of Nicaragua, where it was assumed Howard Hughes lived at that time, in the autumn of that same year. Opinions were expressed in the Western press that the "secret ship" was conducting a search for manganese at depths from 10,000 to 16,000 feet. And already in the summer of 1974 the ship was sighted near the Hawaiian Islands in the area where the Soviet submarine had been lost. The "secret ship's" crew totaled 170 people. All crew members were CIA employees-contractors.

In June 1974, the crew of the Glomar Explorer undertook the first attempt to raise the Soviet submarine. This was witnessed by crew members of a Soviet intelligence ship.

The "Chazhma" ship measurement system was sent to the Hawaiian Islands at the beginning of March 1975. It shadowed the Explorer for a week. According to the commander's report, the ship was screwing and threading pipes.

The fleet intelligence directorate obtained authorization from the fleet commander to send the MV-136 Ocean Rescue Tug with a surveillance team from Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy to organize uninterrupted shadowing of the "secret ship". They "observed" the Explorer for ten days—as before, it was involved with "screwing pipes".

And suddenly... A sensational explosion in the foreign press: "The U.S. CIA had raised a sunken Soviet submarine from the bottom of the Pacific Ocean".

Using the pipes that had been extended to a length of five kilometers, the dock-pontoon with claw-shaped underwater gripping devices was dropped to the very bottom of the ocean. The television cameras that had been installed on it permitted the operators to see in detail everything that was occurring in the ocean's depths. Soon the most important moment arrived for the specialists—the seizure of the Soviet submarine. It occurred successfully. The salvage began, but...

When the dock-pontoon had completed 99% of the journey, the submarine broke into two parts at the point of the puncture. The stern section slipped out of the gripping devices and rushed to the bottom of the ocean with the bodies of the majority of those who had perished and with the ballistic missiles.

The missiles with the nuclear warheads floated away from the CIA, however. On that day the agency's experts considered the goal to be half-attained. In their hands was the first compartment with the torpedoes and the second, commander's compartment with the cipher room.

The Explorer and the dock-pontoon left the area and headed for Honolulu. They planned to raise the stern section with the missile compartment later. Near Honolulu, in a range that had been closed to ship navigation, the deceased seamen, who had not been affected by decay for seven years—there is no oxygen at great depths—were extracted from the nose section of the submarine.

As the Project Jennifer plan had stipulated, the submariners from PL-574 were reburied in the ocean according to the ritual that was accepted in the Soviet Navy.

They delivered the hull of the submarine, from which the dead had been removed, to carefully guarded Redwood City Bay (near San Francisco). The two nuclear torpedoes, surviving documents and other equipment were extracted from it there. The American press reported that the submarine's design features were painstakingly studied and were assessed as "quite interesting".

The Kremlin and White House Were Silent

However, the U.S. intelligence service's primary goal was not achieved—there were no ciphers. That's how it turned out. Let's turn once again to the recollections of Retired Rear Admiral Anatoliy Shtyrov:

The reason was unexpected both for the Americans and for us too: During plant repair and modernization at Dalzavod (Vladivostok) in 1967, PL-574 Commander Vladimir Kobzar "displayed rational initiative"—for the appropriate "reward", more precisely, for spirits and an awl, as they say it in the navy—and transferred the

organic cipher room from the second to the fourth compartment, having thereby widened his commander's cabin.

The press prevented the future continuation of the operation. The CIA couldn't keep the operation secret. A curious incident prevented that.

A band of gangsters from Los Angeles learned that there were documents in the office of Billionaire Howard Hughes, the possession of which would yield millions of dollars. The police recorded the raid on the office. A sea of reporters arrived with the police. One of the documents ultimately ended up in the press.

The White House and the Kremlin simply did not react to the reports about the Soviet submarine for a long time. The White House's silence was understandable. The attempt to salvage the Soviet submarine would have involved consequences similar to those that had occurred during the incident with the U-2 aircraft piloted by Powers.

As for the Kremlin, the Soviet government never publicly reported the submarine's loss.

In fulfillment of a CPSU Central Committee decree, the commander-in-chief of the Soviet Navy issued an order: Ships would conduct combat alert duty in the area of the loss of PL-574 and would prevent salvaging of its remaining portion from the bottom of the ocean, even if they had to bomb the area. That type of combat alert duty was conducted for six months.

The measures undertaken played their role. To avoid complicating relations with Moscow, Washington rejected further submarine salvage operations and the appropriate instructions were issued to the CIA leadership. Operation Project Jennifer, an operation which still has many secrets, came to an end.

REAR SERVICES, SUPPORT ISSUES

State of Military Trade Directorate Under Market Conditions

94UM0149A Moscow *ARMIYA* in Russian No 18, 1993
(signed to press 25 Aug 93) pp 36-40

[Interview with Major-General Viktor Ivanovich Tsarkov, chief of the Main Military Trade Directorate of the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense, by Colonel V. Ukolov: "Better Times Will also Come for Military Trade..."]

[Text] The chief of the Main Military Trade Directorate of the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense answers questions from readers and the editorial staff of the journal *ARMIYA*.

[Ukolov] Viktor Ivanovich, will military trade really survive in market conditions?

[Tsarkov] It is obvious to me that the future of military trade is directly dependent on the very existence of the armed forces themselves. Officers, warrant officers, and representatives of other categories of servicemen serve in the troops, and their families live in military camps—which means military trade is to provide people with all the necessities.

About the ability to survive... According to forecasts of the Ministry of Economics of the Russian Federation, a further reduction in the production of consumer goods is expected, food products in particular—products from animal husbandry, sugar, tea, vegetable oil. The same goes for nonfood consumer items. Wholesale trade fairs held recently have shown that compared to the average level of 1992, it is still possible to purchase the following: Sewn goods—40 percent; knitted wear and hosiery—70 percent; leather footwear—65 percent; fabric—50 percent; and household goods—80 percent. Nevertheless, today military trade must not only survive but must also become a system of guaranteed trade and consumer support for service members. And I am convinced that during the course of reforming the armed forces, better times will also come for military trade.

[Ukolov] I would like to share your optimism. But judging from the letters to the editor, military trade, especially recently, is the object of constant criticism and people's dissatisfaction. How did you yourself assess the work of military trade prior to your appointment and how do you assess it now, having plunged directly into the maelstrom of its problems?

[Tsarkov] Of course, before I was involved with military trade as a consumer; nevertheless, I felt its difficulties and problems. But having plunged into the maelstrom, as you say, I certainly should begin my work in the new field of endeavor not with a simple assessment of excellent, good, or bad, but, I am confident, with the fact that I am obligated to understand the situation and find ways of solving the numerous problems and improving this important and necessary matter. The consumers of the numerous garrisons will grade us.

[Ukolov] Readers write to us, and this is noticeable in Moscow, that with each day the showcases and shelves of military trade stores are becoming increasingly empty. Okay, one can buy something in the cities and large populated areas, turning to merchants. But what are the families of servicemen to do in remote garrisons, where military trade is the only supplier of goods and products?

[Tsarkov] I understand it is particularly difficult in remote areas now... But what can you say here? Today the commercial work of the military trade stores (like in the country's trade as a whole) is being impeded by their unsatisfactory financial condition. It is associated with the shortage of their own working capital, the extremely long time it takes money to pass through banks, and the limited nature of credit resources compared to the

incredibly high interest rates. Here there are constant demands from suppliers for prepayment of deliveries and many other things.

Nevertheless, not everything is so miserably bad. In just four months of this year, military trade bodies sold goods amounting to more than 79 billion rubles [R]. But the most important thing is that the main task of military trade to supply servicemen and their family members in closed and remote garrisons and "hot spots," in general and on the whole, is being accomplished positively. Naturally, this did not come about simply. The leadership of the Ministry of Defense was forced to ask the government of Russia to allocate manufactured goods from the country's federal reserves.

[Ukolov] What is the situation in military trade with furniture, televisions, and refrigerators? For example, prices for them have risen considerably, but the demand has not decreased...

[Tsarkov] In conditions of a market economy, many enterprises that are manufacturers of furniture, televisions, and refrigerators prefer to sell their products through company trade or commercial structures. And they place almost enslaving delivery terms on military trade bodies. However, thanks to long-term economic ties with suppliers and the persistence of our commercial workers, already in the first quarter of this year military trade bodies received furniture amounting to more than R1.9 billion, 15,000 televisions, and 9,000 refrigerators. Of course, this does not fully satisfy consumers' needs, but I can assure you that we are constantly working to find resources for these goods.

[Ukolov] Judging from letters to the editor, the prices for certain food products are higher in military trade stores than in civilian stores. What is the reason for this?

[Tsarkov] You correctly noted that they are for certain products. This concerns confectionery products (candy, chocolate, caramels, cookies), alcoholic beverages, and other goods that are not primary necessities, purchased by military trade, as a rule, not from federal reserves, but through commercial and other structures. Naturally, the remoteness of the regions (the Far North, the Arctic) and additional expenditures associated with this are taken into account when forming retail prices for these goods.

Primary necessities received from the state's federal reserves in volumes approved by the government of the Russian Federation are sold by military trade enterprises at prices below those in civilian trade.

[Ukolov] Our readers also complain that despite the price increases, as before, many goods at military trade stores remain under the counters and in warehouses. Before, bodies of people's and public control fought this, and shop commissions were sort of regulators of social justice. How are distribution and control accomplished now?

[Tsarkov] The work of military trade enterprises at military camps and garrisons, as before, is monitored by commissions (groups) of public control created according to the April 1990 Minister of Defense Order No 135 "On Workers' Control of Trade Unions and Public Control of the Work of Military Trade Enterprises in the Soviet Army and Navy" that is still in force today. Distribution of goods coming into military trade stores is also done by public control commissions.

[Ukolov] "There are frequent instances of military trade having no products and goods, but the plan is fulfilled from month to month." These lines are from a letter from a serviceman's wife (Kartaly, Strategic Missile Troops). How would you comment on this fact, considering that it is far from isolated?

[Tsarkov] In conditions of market relations, the "plan" concept, for known reasons (to be discussed later), has lost its former importance. Today, trade enterprises independently compile forecasts of retail trade turnover volumes and increase or decrease these volumes themselves.

Still, there exists some kind of plan in military trade stores which is fulfilled even in the absence of goods. How do you account for this? On the one hand, if the plan is fulfilled, this indicates the volume of services provided to military consumers in the form of some kind of goods sold. But here is the other side... Here there is a mirror reflection of the real results of the financial and economic activity of military trade enterprises.

I will use figures to clarify this somewhat. During the period January-April of this year, military trade turnover was R86.3 billion and increased 6.7-fold compared to the corresponding period last year. But this is only appearance. For if a shirt, let's say, costs 25-35 times more now, this in no way means that more of these shirts were sold in the period January-April 1993.

[Ukolov] I would like to single out a question about the Western Group of Forces, from where many letters are received asking to tell in detail about the cheating of the Military Trade Directorate "abroad," headed by its chief. What can you say about the abuses here?

[Tsarkov] Recently, articles have appeared in the German and Russian press about negative activities of the military trade directorate of the Western Group of Forces. It must be noted that individual miscalculations and oversights, at times bordering on criminally punishable acts, indeed took place in the work of the Military Trade Directorate of the Western Group of Forces. In particular, in conditions of a market economy, in the pursuit for cheap goods by specialists of this directorate, the volumes of goods being purchased were incorrectly defined, and many of the firms selected for cooperation later proved to be unreliable suppliers. "Reliable" suppliers, including foreign firms, trying to line their pockets, offered goods that were not in demand and were of low quality, but...at fairly high prices. Some managers of the Trade Directorate of the Western Group of Forces,

in contacts with the latter, and these are the first "Rekond," "Inova," "Moseniko-Invest" (incidentally, as an investigation showed, at one time they were recommended to the leadership of the Trade Directorate of the Western Group of Forces by higher chief—former leaders of the Main Military Trade Directorate from Moscow), violations and abuses were committed, for which they were held liable. Thus, 10 managers from military trade bodies of this group of forces have already been discharged, including four servicemen.

In 1992, work was terminated with these firms. By order of the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation, the chief of the Military Trade Directorate of the Western Group of Forces, Colonel F. Rezyapov, was removed from the position and discharged into the reserve. The chief of the trade office of this directorate, B. Yenenkov, was also fired. Details of all these abuses and violations of the law will be discussed only after completion of the investigation being conducted by the General Procuracy of the Russian Federation.

[Ukolov] Another thing about this group of forces. In garrison military trade stores, prices for many goods, including vodka, confectionery products, and tobacco products, are lower than in German stores. As a result, military trade workers make deals with the local population, sometimes emptying the shelves of their stores, selling off goods in whole batches. How will your directorate fight this?

[Tsarkov] In accordance with the agreement concluded between the command of the Western Group of Forces and the Federal Ministry for Economics of the FRG "On Supplying the Soviet Forces and Organizing Cooperation," goods purchased by the Trade Directorate of the Western Group of Forces from foreign firms are exempt from the turnover tax and also from duty. This is the first reason for the lower prices for goods at military trade enterprises of the Western Group of Forces. The second reason for the comparatively low prices for goods at military trade stores is that the Military Trade Directorate has an economic incentive to establish prices that are more accessible for all categories of purchasers. That is because the main contingent of these purchasers is compulsory-service soldiers and sergeants, warrant officers, and lieutenants, whose wages are considerably lower than those of the lowest-paid German civilians, and this does not enable them to purchase goods in the German trade network, where prices for foodstuffs and manufactured goods are considerably higher.

Goods being sold in military trade stores at lower prices do not lie around unsold. Their trade turnover rate is accelerated, and the profit received increases accordingly—a direct advantage to both the purchasers and trade.

Of course, there are infringements of the law here. But they are isolated, because there is strict monitoring of the purchase volumes of tobacco products and alcoholic beverages. In addition, a limit has been set on purchases of

these goods, taking into account the buyer demand in our garrisons and camps. Where access to the camps is possible for persons not belonging to the Western Group of Forces, trade in tobacco products and alcoholic beverages is forbidden.

[Ukolov] How is military trade set up in Russian Army units located on the territory of former republics of the USSR? What problems are arising there, and how are they being resolved?

[Tsarkov] Military trade enterprises have been deployed to service military contingents located in the former republics of the USSR. Goods are delivered to these regions, as a rule, in a centralized manner. Some of them, especially perishables such as fruits and vegetables, are acquired locally or obtained from reserves of the corresponding CIS countries.

A few words in this context. In accordance with a bilateral agreement (Russia-Kazakhstan), Baykonur with all its infrastructure has been transferred to the jurisdiction of Russia. It has a trade directorate with military trade stores subordinate to it, which provide trade and consumer services to the garrisons.

The most critical problems have emerged in Tajikistan and in the countries of Transcaucasia. As a result of the unstable political situation, the absence of order, and the presence of armed groupings, the system of supply and delivery of goods is constantly disrupted, and there are instances of robbery and attacks... In short, military trade is suffering large losses, but the most important thing is that sometimes people suffer without goods and food products.

[Ukolov] Will traveling trade develop, including mobile post exchanges visiting remote garrisons? The same for the system of orders—will it expand?

[Tsarkov] Traveling trade and visits by mobile post exchanges to remote and small garrisons, primarily to border guard outposts and air defense subunits—all this will continue. But...on the condition (after all, this is a market!) that this work will not be unprofitable for military trade enterprises.

As far as the sale of foodstuffs by orders is concerned, it will be expanded, primarily for privileged categories of buyers—veterans of war and labor, large families...

[Ukolov] What do you think about the development of new, progressive forms and methods of military trade? What prospects do you see here?

[Tsarkov] Unfortunately, recently the pace of development of progressive forms and methods of trade has decreased somewhat. I consider this a temporary phenomenon. Progressive methods and forms of trade in military trade stores will develop and improve with stabilization of a market in the country. This primarily concerns self-service, sale of goods by sample, and introduction of forward commodity movement using containers and equipment.

[Ukolov] Much hope is being placed on marketing today. Does it apply to military trade?

[Tsarkov] The demand of military contingents being serviced by military trade is constantly being studied. In parallel, we are taking steps to supply the necessary goods and services. In conditions of the transition to market relations and their stabilization, marketing will develop further, which will make it possible to conduct more systematically measures for studying the market and to influence consumer demand in a systematic manner in order both to speed up trade turnover and increase the volume of trade turnover.

[Ukolov] In your view, what must be done to put an end to the cheating in weighing and shortchanging in stores that exists in military trade and the rudeness and boorishness of salesmen?

[Tsarkov] As in any other system, say, the house-maintenance office, militia, or public catering, military trade also has its own moral canons, which some people will always want to violate. Here it must be said that this is not widespread. We do not ignore those same isolated cases that still take place. We also are breaking the stereotype among buyers: They say, if there is trade, there are all kinds of cheating in weighing, short-changing, and deception. That is not so! Because most of our personnel are honest and conscientious workers who take pride in their vocation. In short, we are working both with our contingent and with purchasers. We are educating people... Yes, even if someone can say that this is not entirely our job.

[Ukolov] There is much talk concerning the fact that, beginning with Moscow, there exists a separate trade service for higher authorities. Does this still exist?

[Tsarkov] A straightforward question... I will also give you a straightforward answer. It does not!

[Ukolov] Has the practice of having open military trade stores in cities and populated areas proved to be worthwhile? After all, the vast majority of purchasers in them are people who have nothing to do with the Army.

[Tsarkov] There are virtually no stores located on open territory and trading in foodstuffs and manufactured goods, more precisely, primary necessities in our system. However, we must have a base, or more precisely so-called base enterprises, for trade and domestic support of remote and small garrisons, where the trade network is poorly developed or lacking entirely, by the method of traveling trade to service field measures and accomplish other tasks. And we have them. They include trade and purchasing bases, refrigerators, district and garrison military general-purpose stores, military book stores, cafes and cafeterias at officer's clubs and hotels, tailor shops, barbershops... I do not think I need to say how important

this network of enterprises is to servicemen, war veterans, soldier-internationalists, and military commissariat workers. Thus, the circle of people coming to them is expanding considerably, which, as we understand it, is not hurting anyone.

[Ukolov] What are you personally most concerned about in military trade now?

[Tsarkov] As was already stated, we are most concerned about the problem of providing enterprises in military trade with working capital. I will develop this thought somewhat. In conditions of the economic reform being conducted, as a result of price and rate increases, the change in the procedure for forming working capital, crediting and the increase in interest rates for credit, and high taxation, military trade enterprises have essentially found themselves without working capital. Can this situation be corrected using our own profit? Alas... It is not so significant. Then what about bank credits? Here, too, everything is not the way I would like it to be. Using commercial bank credits is not possible due to high interest rates and again the shortage of profit at our enterprises to repay them.

This most critical problem reflects on the development of military trade enterprises, worsens trade and consumer support for servicemen and their family members, and evokes justified complaints. Something must be done... We are striving to use more effective forms and methods of selling that promote an increase in trade turnover, and we are taking steps toward effective specific-purpose use of working capital. Enterprises accomplishing advance delivery of foodstuffs and goods into areas of the Far North and equivalent areas by decision of the government of the Russian Federation also must do their part here. They receive preferential credits from the government for this. In response, efficiency and obligatoriness must follow.

[Ukolov] How do you feel about the directorate personnel you "inherited?" Do you plan to make some changes?

[Tsarkov] Most in our directorate are highly qualified specialists who have much practical experience in working in military trade, and I have nothing special against them. One thing I will say is that there is not always enough dynamic quality or view into the future. But that is in general and on the whole.

[Ukolov] Viktor Ivanovich, how did you end up in military trade, putting it in the words of a well-known song—"willingly or unwillingly?"

[Tsarkov] Neither. It is the classic pattern—if you as an officer are trusted and offered a higher position, you have no right to refuse it. And if, moreover, the future work is to your liking, you can even consider yourself a lucky person.

[Ukolov] A new, higher position involves new concerns and a chronic shortage of time. Friends, old comrades, and passions are relegated to the background, or...?

[Tsarkov] This always happens. A new position requires complete devotion of effort and time. Our system is throughout Russia, and we must examine everything in the localities in order to make the correct decisions.

I try not to draw back from friends and comrades. As far as passions are concerned, I like books and good music. Both are my rest and relaxation.

[Ukolov] Tell me, what role does your family play in your difficult service today?

[Tsarkov] There is a well-known expression with profound meaning: "A good, strong family is a reliable support." Military people sense and value this like no one else. I am no exception, because I have precisely such strong support.

From the Bibliography:

Viktor Ivanovich Tsarkov was born 8 July 1946 to the family of a white-collar worker in the city of Karaganda. He is Russian. After graduating from secondary school in 1964, he entered the Volsk Higher Rear Services Military School, where he graduated with honors. He graduated from the engineering department of the Military Academy of Rear Services and Transportation in 1974.

He was regimental chief of clothing service from 1967 until he entered the academy. Beginning in 1974, he was in the Far East Military District in positions of chief of clothing service of a large unit, formation, and district. In 1987 he was deputy chief of the orders office of the Central Clothing Directorate. In 1988 he became chief of the office and then deputy chief of this directorate. He has been in his current position since September 1992.

He was promoted to the rank of major-general in April 1993.

His family includes his wife Galina Nikolayevna, daughter Irina, and son Vitaliy.

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Lt-Gen Marchuk Interview on Road Construction Directorate

94UM0158B Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
4 Jan 94 p 2

[Article by KRSNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent Petr Altunin, under the rubric: "Timely Topic": "Roads—For Russia"]

[Text] From the KRSNAYA ZVEZDA Dossier: Lieutenant-General Ivan Dmitriyevich Marchuk was born in 1944. He graduated from Leningrad Military Transport Communications Command School and the Military Academy of Rear Services and Transportation. He passed through all of the levels in the railroad troops from

platoon commander to rail corps deputy commander. From 1988—he was deputy chief of the Central Road Construction Directorate and then its first deputy. He has been chief of the Federal Road Construction Directorate under the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense since December 1992.

He is married. His son is an officer.

In 1988, a state road construction and reconstruction program in the RSFSR Non-Chernozem Zone was adopted. The Central Road Construction Directorate was created at that time. On 8 December 1992, a Russian Federation Presidential Edict reorganized it into the Federal Road Construction Directorate under the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense. And, finally, the Statute that regulates its activities, legal bases, and the obligations of officials was approved by a Russian government decree on 10 August 1993.

The editorial staff asked Lieutenant-General Ivan Marchuk, chief of the Federal Road Construction Directorate under the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense, to discuss the new structure's affairs and plans.

[Marchuk] Based upon the big picture, you can't call our road structure new. The general-wagon master service that consisted of subunits to prepare and maintain the roads needed by the troops had already been created in the era of Peter I. Later, staging troops subordinate to the military communications organs existed for the operation of military roads. And the road service worked along the entire front from the Barents to the Black Seas in the Great Patriotic War. The song "Ek, dorogi..." [Ah, the roads] was certainly about it. As in the infantry, they experienced cold, alerts, and bombing each day. According to a State Committee for Defense decision, dozens of road troops formations were formed at that time and their mission consisted of the restoration of highway lines of communications. After the war, the military road builders turned over to the national economy 5,500 kilometers of restored, very important roads and hundreds of high-water bridges that had been built. Today many people, when they drive along the Moscow-Simferopol, Moscow-Leningrad, and Irkutsk-Ulan-Ude main highways and around Moscow's ring road, do not even suspect that the military road builders made a decisive contribution to their construction.

[Altunin] 1988 was, of course, an event for military road builders?

[Marchuk] Yes, as a matter of fact, a qualitatively new military organization appeared that was directed toward the fulfillment of a purely civilian task. And I think that it was then and is now an extremely important task. There are still no roads in the depth of Russia. After the rain, there is impassable mud and motor vehicles have to ford small rivers. A third of the harvest is lost and agricultural equipment is ruined because of this.

[Altunin] And what have you managed to do in five years?

[Marchuk] Quite a bit. We have built 3,320 kilometers of highways (2,555 under the plan) and also 115 military garrisons, 75 asphalt-concrete plants, 19 rail dead-end sidings and open-pits, and more than 500 cultural and consumer-services facilities. During the first ten months of this year alone, 1,584 million rubles worth of construction-erection work has been completed. I need to say that a kray is transformed after a road is laid. Residents return to previously abandoned villages from the cities and refugees from the CIS countries arrive to bring the earth "back to life".

[Altunin] Ivan Dmitriyevich, how would you sort out your current status? You are not part of the Armed Forces but at the same time you are "under the Ministry of Defense"?

[Marchuk] Yes, we are not part of the army's strength. The Presidential Edict and the Russian Federation Council of Ministers decree state that the Federal Road Building Directorate (FDSU) functions as a state institution. The Ministry of the Economy allocates a separate line of investment to us that is financed at the expense of the Russian Federation budget. And at the same time the Ministry of Defense has been tasked to supply the Federal Road Building Directorate with all types of allowances and services in accordance with and based upon the standards that are in effect in the Russian Federation Armed Forces but for payment. We are guided by presidential edicts, military regulations and minister of defense orders. Units and subunits have both daily routines, details, reveille, taps and liberty. Indeed, weapons are used only to guard facilities.

[Altunin] Right now, what is the geography of the work being conducted by you?

[Marchuk] Previously, we were concentrated in the Non-Chernozem Zone. In Nizhniy Novgorod, Ryazan, Vologda, Kirov, Orel, Perm and other oblasts and in Udmurtiya. We have had "our own people" in these areas for a long time now. Many former 10th-form girls have long ago become the wives of our officers and warrant officers and they have given birth to children... After the formation of the Federal Road Building Directorate, new oblasts—Tula, Tambov, Chita, and Amur oblasts and Khabarovsk Kray—are summoning us to them. Right now we are going there not only according to orders as we did before but while concluding economic contracts beforehand where both the time periods, salaries and the quality of the subcontracted work are stipulated.

Cost-accounting and cost recovery are penetrating into all of our activities. By way of illustration, we are building housing for ourselves, we are selling real estate ourselves during moves, and our salary depends on output.

[Altunin] Incidentally, how much are your road builders paid?

[Marchuk] Everything depends on the fulfillment of standards on the quality of work and even on initiative. For example, in current money, a private road builder receives a minimum of R30,000. But such specialists as excavator and crane operators receive R100,000 each or more. There are also bonuses. Officers receive them when a facility is turned over.

During the time of their service at training combines, soldiers obtain and later reinforce in practice "hard" specialties: Bulldozer operators, electro-gas welders, asphalt layers and others that are highly valued in the civilian sector today. We also have quite a few civilian personnel. We have 4,500 women—skilled specialists. Among them are kindergarten workers, general education and music school teachers, doctors and nurses.

[Altunin] Ivan Dmitriyevich, today officers certainly go unwillingly to their duty locations at the other end of the earth?

[Marchuk] Imagine, the situation is poor with officer cadre manning. It seems to me that even the romantic appeal has not disappeared. Of course, there are difficulties. Approximately 60% of the officers have been provided apartments and the rest are in hotels, in the private sector and, like we in our youth, in trailers... But at the same time there is a change in those areas where it is appropriate and there is a bonus and years served coefficient in the salary. Pensions are the same as for all servicemen. Compulsory service personnel manning is worse. We receive augmentation according to the what's left principle. We hope that the law on alternative service will be adopted. We are also beginning to conclude contracts.

But for the time being—we are looking for manpower. Here are the latest examples. Several months ago, we began construction of the uncompleted 1,200 kilometer sector of the Chita-Khabarovsk-Nakhodka super highway. According to another agreement, Federal Road Building Directorate subunits will participate in the program to conquer Tyumen Oblast's gas-oil producing regions. This is a large mission of state importance and we have a backbone of specialists to resolve it. But we will hire workers locally in those regions. There are civilian personnel and extended service military personnel there.

[Altunin] But what can you say about the military road building equipment that you need? Has it been adapted for construction of "civilian" roads? Is anything being imported?

[Marchuk] We are utilizing our own, domestically-produced, military road building equipment in our formations and units. Of course, it is reliable but, since it was obtained from the military districts after prolonged storage or after major overhaul, it requires large expenditures for maintenance and repair.

As for imported equipment, simply speaking, we don't have any yet. The primary reason is the absence of hard

currency to acquire it. And the need is increasing to equip them with imported equipment with the withdrawal of our formations to the Far East, to the Transbaykal Region and to Tyumen Oblast. The work there is in rocky and frozen ground and at low temperatures. I think that we need to resolve this problem immediately. The end result of our work in these regions is many times more valuable than the expenditures on equipment.

Central Fuel Directorate: Steps to Salvage POL Reserve

94UM0161A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 10 Jan 94 p 2

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Petr Altunin under the rubric "Continuing the Subject": "In the Empty Tank, Billions... But Only A Real Manager Can Extract It From There"]

[Text] It is an indisputable fact, as they say, that the fuel service base in the army and navy has come to a halt in its development. Most of it was built more than 30 years ago, during the missile-fuel boom, when the fuel service provided full support for the launching of missiles into space, the emergence of the navy onto the world ocean and increased motorization of the army. The base has recently become fairly obsolete, however, and since the collapse of the Union it has found itself in an altogether critical state.

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA raised the need to renew this very important material base at the beginning of last year. The report was titled "Where Are We to Get Two and a Half Billion?" Today, in view of the fact that we have not managed to solve the problem and that prices have spiraled to hundreds of times what they were, a trillion would not be enough. Just what can be done?

Necessity, as they say, is the mother of invention. The solution was made easier by the fact that the interests of the fuel service coincided with the nation's economic interests. More precisely, those of the Ministry of Fuel and Energy, which has recently begun experiencing a shortage of containers and pumping equipment, and simply of space. In the armed forces, on the contrary, due to a shortage of fuel and lubricants (caused by inadequate financing), fuel bases and depots are idle, and everything is being off-loaded directly into the military units and onto the ships. Incidentally, empty containers corrode more rapidly.... So why not help the Ministry of Fuel and Energy with the transfer, storage and distribution of petroleum products, and thereby earn some money for improving and renovating the materials and equipment base?

The Central Missile Fuel Directorate came out with an initiative to this effect. And it was supported by the Rear Services of the Armed Forces and the Ministry of Defense, and then by higher authorities. Decree No. 219, "On the Construction of and the Renovation of Operating Petroleum Transshipment Facilities," issued by the government on 14 March 1993, specifically authorized

the Fuel Service of the Armed Forces to take part in this undertaking. In other words, the military bases and depots were given the opportunity to provide services for outside, civilian organizations for a charge and without detriment to the combat training.

In accordance with this decree, the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation issued Order No. 355 on 15 July of last year, with an appendix listing the bases and depots authorized to provide services, and also containing complete regulations on their activities.

What do these documents say? I took this question to Major-General P. Gorupay, chief of the Central Missile Fuel Directorate of the Ministry of Defense.

"These documents are extremely important to us," Pavel Ivanovich said. "They are based on an agreement between the base and an outside organization. They include a list of services, diverse services: The transfer of liquid petroleum products from reinforced concrete tanks to the reservoirs of bases and depots, the unloading of apportioned fuel into storage facilities and at open sites, the chemical analysis of oil, technical assistance with the accounting, the allocation of vehicles for hauling the fuel, the provision of depot sites and containers for storing various materials, and so forth. The charges for the services are open but no lower than the current market prices in the given area. Rigid monitoring is specified to prevent possible violations."

I was told at the Central Directorate that there is rapid development of the fuel service for the Moscow, Volga and Leningrad districts, the Northern and Baltic Fleets. The military fuel base located at Murmansk, for example, concluded a one-year agreement with the Murmansk Maritime Shipping Line on the transferring of petroleum products. Payments under the agreement should amount to more than one million dollars.

For six months now a Baltic Fleet fuel base has been transferring fuel belonging to a large joint enterprise—under an agreement permitting this, of course—with visible results. A major overhaul of the railroad platform and the pipeline have been carried out with the several million dollars earned, several pumping units have been installed with the assistance of the Swedes, and the installation of standing tanks is underway.

Even a service on a lesser scale is profitable. The central base located at Naro-Fominsk has concluded an agreement with one of the enterprises whereby incoming motor transport equipment is off-loaded and stored on the latter's tracks. The amount involved is 600,000 rubles per day. The base at which A. Kustov is chief does not have much space, but it is within the Moscow city limits. He said that an agreement has been reached on the storage of expensive assemblies and devices, for which the charge is considerably greater....

In short, the minister's order has opened up extensive possibilities. Some people have taken it the wrong way, however. Some of them are in no rush to execute it.

There is plenty of time, they say, and have not taken the initiative to look for customers. There have also been overly clever "executives." Colonel V. Basalayev, chief of a fuel dump, conducted operations involving petroleum products for a joint-stock company not at the market price, as should have been the case, but at a preferential price. There would have to be some abuses, of course. This incident was rapidly halted, and all of the fuel services were apprised of it.

Additional problems arose for the fuel service. Additional personnel are needed for organizing the services and for strict, universal monitoring. Financial experts, economists, legal experts and others. This was taken into account in the order issued by the Minister of Defense. A group consisting of three officers and two civilian employees is being added to the T/O of the Central Directorate, to be maintained out of income from the services provided. The group exists only on paper for now, to be sure. It has been impossible thus far to arrange all of the necessary formalities.

Civil Defense Committee Upgraded to Ministry

94UM0161B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
13 Jan 94 p 2

[Report by Ivan Sergeyev: "The GKChS Has Been Upgraded to a Ministry"]

[Text] Under an ukase signed by the President of Russia, "On the Structure of Federal Executive Agencies," the State Committee of the Russian Federation for Civil Defense, Emergencies and Disaster Amelioration has been transformed into a ministry.

At the signing of the ukase the new ministry took over the functions of the abolished State Committee of the Russian Federation for the Social Protection of Citizens and the Rehabilitation of Areas Which Suffered From the Chernobyl and other Radiation Disasters and the Committee for Special-Purpose Underwater Work. The Russian Federal Air and Space Search and Rescue Service is also transferred to the jurisdiction of the new ministry with the status of a state establishment.

PEACEKEEPING FORCES

Col-Gen Pyankov on Collective Peacekeeping Forces

PM2101113194 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 18 Jan 94
pp 1-2

[Interview with Colonel-General Boris Pyankov, commander of the CIS coalition peacekeeping forces in Tajikistan, by unnamed correspondent; date and place of interview not given: "We Are Performing Difficult Service Today. Far From Russia...."—first two paragraphs are introduction]

[Text] Colonel General Boris Pyankov was born in 1935 in Sverdlovsk. He is a Russian. He has been in the armed forces since 1954. He graduated from the Far Eastern

tank school in 1959, the military academy of armored troops in 1969, and the General Staff military academy in 1979. He has commanded an armored platoon, an armored company, an armored battalion, an armored regiment, a motorized rifle division, an army corps, an army, and the Siberian Military District. Since 1991 he has been chief of the USSR Civil Defense and USSR deputy defense minister. Since 6 July 1992 he has been deputy commander in chief of the CIS joint armed forces. Since September 1993 he has been commander of the coalition peacekeeping forces in Tajikistan. He is married with a son and a daughter.

Colonel General Boris Pyankov, commander of the CIS coalition peacekeeping forces in Tajikistan, answers PRAVDA's questions.

[PRAVDA] Boris Yevgenyevich, today many people are naturally asking: Why was it necessary at all to create this armed formation on the territory of an independent state?

[Pyankov] To answer your question objectively one must first of all assess the existing military-political situation in the world. A brief conclusion is that despite the fact that the world community has found the strength in itself to push back the threat of nuclear danger and to consign the Cold War to oblivion, today we have all been faced with a "new generation" of local conflicts and wars caused by national and religious intolerance.

Today we must clearly note that the fact of aggression against sovereign Tajikistan is taking place. Literally every day armed gangs and groups from the Islamic State of Afghanistan try to penetrate its territory in various regions. This has required the CIS to adopt necessary relevant steps to render aid to Tajikistan and to safeguard its state integrity and security.

All peoples of the former USSR are linked not only by firm economic ties. Their friendship, which has deep roots, has been preserved. A large number of citizens of other CIS countries, those whom quite recently we proudly called "the Soviet people," live on Tajikistan's territory. This naturally imposes obligations on the supreme powers of these states to protect human honor and dignity.

There is one more aspect of the problem. If the political power, economic potential, and armed forces have been more or less divided up, dividing up joint security into the security of each individual states has been not only hard but virtually impossible.

I must say that the creation of the collective peacekeeping forces was preceded by lengthy, painstaking work. Favorable prospects for ensuring national and collective security were opened up by the treaty on collective security signed in Tashkent in May 1992 by six states of the CIS. In accordance with this treaty's articles, the 24 September 1993 session of the council of CIS heads in Moscow adopted a decision on the formation of collective peacekeeping forces and the start of their

functioning and also an agreement on the coalition peacekeeping forces and joint measures for their material and technical backup. These documents meet all requirements of the UN Charter.

[PRAVDA] Which CIS countries' military subunits belong directly to the coalition peacekeeping forces and what functions do they really perform?

[Pyankov] The coalition peacekeeping forces include military units from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, the Russian Federation, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan with their arms, military vehicles, and property.

Unfortunately, it must be noted that not all states have fulfilled the terms of the agreement in their entirety. Thus, for instance, the question of the allocation of the Kazakhstan armed forces' efforts and funds to the coalition peacekeeping forces remains open. The Kazakhstan border troops and internal troops units on Tajikistan's territory arrived here under the bilateral May 1993 agreement.

The operational use of one subunit of the Kyrgyz contingent has been complicated. This has been caused by the fact that it is based on its own territory and is a long way from the main regions where the conflicting sides are deployed.

A separate motorized rifle battalion with authorized means of reinforcement has been assigned from the Uzbekistan armed forces. With the arrival of this battalion's last company the tasks set it in its zone of responsibility will be fulfilled in their entirety.

Thus, only Russia and Tajikistan have wholly fulfilled their duties to earmark the necessary number of forces and facilities. Russia has transferred to the coalition peacekeeping forces joint command the 201st motorized rifle division and several other units. We are helping the Republic of Tajikistan Defense Ministry in resolving organizational questions connected with the use of subunits and units of the republican armed forces assigned to the coalition peacekeeping forces.

We are worried by one further problem: Financing the activity of the coalition peacekeeping forces joint command. Because of the lack of a mechanism for settling accounts between the states which have signed the agreement, money has still not been paid into the joint account by Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan.

[PRAVDA] A few words about the coalition peacekeeping forces' tasks in Tajikistan.

[Pyankov] They include an analysis of the military-political situation in the region, the submission of reports to the states involved, collaboration with the management organs of the states involved, participation in the negotiations process, the protection of the humanitarian aid convoys route and participation in the aid's distribution, and also the operational use of forces in combat in the event of dire necessity.

[PRAVDA] Please cite examples of specific actions.

[Pyankov] In late October and early November convoys with necessities and fuel was escorted to Gornyy Badakhshan with the aid of the coalition peacekeeping forces and from there the evacuation of refugees to central regions of the republic was organized. A group of generals and officers were at the same time holding talks with leaders of the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast [GBO] and commanders of field detachments operating on the oblast's territory, which helped to remove tension in this region and improve dialogue between the Gornyy Badakhshan leadership and the central authorities. Now, at the request of the republic's leadership the protection of enterprises producing bread articles and their delivery to the stores has been organized.

I want to note that the joint command is doing everything to ensure that the coalition peacekeeping forces' role consists primarily in conducting preventive diplomatic actions and peacekeeping activity as a whole. This would be helped by granting our coalition forces the status of UN troops with all ensuing consequences. The implementation of this proposal would press the opposition leaders to sit down at the conference table with the central authorities in Dushanbe.

[PRAVDA] As far as we know this question was examined at a CSCE session but the proposal did not get through. Those who voted against it included several representatives of republics of the former USSR, in particular Ukraine, Moldova, and the Baltic states. They explained their position by fear that Russia's imperial ambitions would be strengthened.

[Pyankov] In this case I must draw attention to several important factors. First, we must seriously consider the fact that if the coalition peacekeeping forces leave Tajikistan and open up the borders, the influx of weapons and drugs will be a scourge for many CIS countries. And they could include the above-mentioned countries. Second, because of the destabilization of the situation there will be a mortal danger to citizens of all nationalities living in this region.

As for talk of Russia's imperial ambitions, that is the wrong way of putting the question. That becomes understandable if you study the agreement attentively. Yes, I am a citizen of Russia. But I was appointed to this post by the decision of the council of heads of state. In my activity I am subordinate to the heads and defense ministers of the states which signed the agreement. All planned peacekeeping operations are coordinated with the defense ministers of the signatory countries and are implemented only with their approval. And only in an emergency situation does the commander have the right to make decisions independently on conducting combat operations, subsequently reporting to the heads of state and defense ministers. For the practical organization of collaboration the joint command staff includes one defense ministry representative from each signatory

state with the rights of deputy chief of staff of the coalition peacekeeping forces joint command. Highly professional officers of the republics involved work in all the main directorates and departments of the joint command. Thus our command is a fully coalition one. And one more detail of some importance: Article 13 of the agreement reads that it is open to any CIS country and also to other states which share the agreement's aims.

Russia's interests? Yes, they do exist. Some of them I have already enumerated. In addition even a nonprofessional can understand that the transfer of Russian border troops from the Southern borders to the border with Kazakhstan, which at the same time includes the creation of a completely new system for guarding a border many thousands of kilometers long, will require a colossal investment of material assets. In today's economic situation such expenditure is beyond Russia's means. In addition, the activity of the Islamic fundamentalists will increase in dangerous proximity to Russian territory. It is no accident that a number of Islamic organizations have proclaimed their ultimate goal to be the creation of a single Islamic state including the former Central Asian republics of the USSR and even some regions of Russia!

[PRAVDA] Boris Yevgenyevich, do you believe that the introduction of the coalition peacekeeping forces contingent in Tajikistan has had any positive effect on the stabilization of the situation in the republic and on the Tajik-Afghan border?

[Pyankov] Yes, without any doubt. For that you only have to go out onto the streets of Dushanbe and other cities and talk with the local citizens. The overwhelming majority of the republic's population welcomed our forces' arrival with great enthusiasm and hope. And we shall strive to justify this hope.

As for the border, here the situation is far more complex. Yes, the number of overt armed conflicts has declined somewhat. But that is connected not only with the intensification of the guard on the border but also with factors like the change in the tactics of the opposition armed formations' actions, their transfer to guerrilla warfare methods using the experience of the Afghan mujahedin. That is also confirmed by recent events: The blowing up of the railroad bed on the Termez-Kurgan-Tyube sector, acts of sabotage on highways, and the murder of civilians.

In Tajikistan there is one more distinguishing feature: In winter combat operations usually die down here. Forces are built up, strongholds and arms and food depots are prepared. But with the advent of spring the opposition forces will try to switch to active operation with a view to seizing power.

We are particularly worried by the activity of the well known thug and drugs baron Rezvon, who has been declared by the so-called "government in exile" to be the commander of all the opposition armed forces. Naturally we are losing no time: We are reinforcing our borders, engaging in planned combat training activity, and taking preventive measures.

The visit to Tajikistan by B. Rabbani, the head of the Islamic State of Afghanistan, and the treaties and agreements concluded at interstate level instill some optimism. Unfortunately, the central authorities of that state do not control many of the border regions, which makes it impossible to pin all hopes on the stabilization of the situation in the very near future.

We will use the temporary respite which has been formed to continue dialogue with the opposition and to find joint points of contact and mutual advantage.

[PRAVDA] Boris Yevgenyevich, the meeting of heads of state and defense ministers of the CIS countries ended in Ashgabat recently. Could you share your impression of its results regarding the position of the collective peacekeeping forces in Tajikistan?

[Pyankov] The Ashgabat meeting paid great attention to questions of the consolidation of the Tajik-Afghan border. The heads of state decided on additional measures to stabilize the situation on Tajikistan's border with Afghanistan. In accordance with these decisions, the 22 January 1993 decision of the council of heads of state which we have already mentioned has been extended to the end of 1994.

[PRAVDA] The New Year has arrived. What wishes do you send to the parents of the boys fulfilling their duty far from Russia?

[Pyankov] To the mothers and families of the Russians whose sons and relations are serving on Tajikistan's territory I wish that the need for Russian military units to be here may disappear as soon as possible and that your relations and close ones, having honorably fulfilled their military duty, will return alive and well to the Motherland.

UKRAINE

Officers Union Head Favors Nuclear Status

AU2001072494 Lvov ZA VILNU UKRAYINU in Ukrainian
14 Jan 94 p 3

[Interview with Major General Oleksandr Rol, chairman of Ukraine's Officers Union, SOU, by Mariya Bazelyuk; place and date not given: "The Defense of Ukraine Cannot be Guaranteed by Other States"—first paragraph published in boldface]

[Text] The Fifth Congress of the Ukraine's Officers Union [SOU] held in Kiev on 18 December 1993 elected Major General Oleksandr Rol as the SOU chairman. Rol was born in Kiev, where he completed high school and received training at an aviation club. He studied at the Chernihiv Aviation School and later graduated from the Military Aviation Academy. He was a fighter pilot, a bomber pilot, and also did staff work. For three years, he was adviser to the commander of the Vietnamese Air Force. Even though Rol's military service was almost entirely outside Ukraine, he speaks very good idiomatic Ukrainian and this points to his family's healthy roots.

[Bazelyuk] General, what is, in your opinion, the role of SOU in the state building?

[Rol] The union's main task is to promote the building of the armed forces and, thereby, to strengthen the Ukrainian state, since the army is one of the institutions in charge of its defense. The SOU is a public organization, which unites both officers on active service and those in the reserves and in retirement. The union has lived through difficult times owing to the uncertain attitude toward it on the part of the Defense Ministry. Of course, the leadership of the union did make certain mistakes, for which I am also responsible, since I was within the leadership. One of these mistakes was the excessive preoccupation with political activity, because, after all, the main task of the SOU is the building of the armed forces, and it is hardly expedient to come out with criticisms of the commander in chief in the form of various statements. This, of course, gave rise to a negative reaction on the part of leading figures.

It goes without saying that the SOU does not need any assistance from the armed forces. It even assists the army in its difficult material situation and gives our servicemen moral support. In what way? We find it our duty to indoctrinate the army personnel in the spirit of Ukrainian patriotism and glorious traditions of the Ukrainian Army. It is difficult to overestimate the SOU's activity in this direction, since it has close ties with other public organizations and participants in the national liberation struggle who can have a significant influence upon the training and indoctrination of the personnel.

Yet another aspect of our activity is the social protection of servicemen and their families and the assistance to the command in maintaining strict discipline in military units and subunits.

Today, we must clearly determine and regulate ways for reviving the SOU, and this is precisely the goal of its leadership. On the eve of the last meeting held in 1993, the SOU leadership had a meeting with Lieutenant General Kobzar, chief of the Ministry of Defense's Main Administration for Educational Work and Socio-Psychological Services. In the course of conversation, we found out that our positions regarding the tasks and place of the SOU in the building and strengthening of the Ukrainian Armed Forces coincided. General Kobzar asserted that the Ministry of Defense would support all those organizations that will contribute to raising the combat readiness of the Ukrainian Army and expressed a desire to increase the SOU's role in indoctrinating officers and in introducing the best traditions of the Ukrainian Army. He also drew our attention to the need to establish new traditions. We agreed that it is necessary to have amateur artistic groups, as well as professional actors, perform in the military units more often; meetings with interesting people must also be organized.

In short, we had a constructive conversation with General Kobzar, and he promised to pass its contents on to the minister of defense. I believe that, in the very near future, we will meet [with the defense minister]. The Officers Union must work in close contact with the Ministry of Defense and with all those state structures, which are in charge of defending our state's independence. Both the SOU and the Ministry of Defense are doing the same work for the state.

[Bazelyuk] Did you take part in elaborating the Ukrainian Military Doctrine? What is your opinion about it?

[Rol] It is centered on defense. The doctrine adopted by the Supreme Council in October 1993 has become a state document, which soldiers must adhere to rather than assess.

[Bazelyuk] However, it is written in the doctrine that "Ukraine must become, in the future, a nonnuclear state if other nuclear powers undertake similar actions." After it became a state document, some people in the upper echelons of power rushed to transfer nuclear weapons immediately to Russia. What is your position with regard to our state's nuclear status?

[Rol] Starting from 1991, I made many statements for the press and spoke from various rostrums. I said that Ukraine must have atomic weapons as a means of deterrence. Our state must possess nuclear weapons as long as at least one country, which may become our adversary and lead to a military confrontation, keeps its nuclear weapons. This is my opinion. No matter how big our army is, there is nothing like nuclear potential as a means for defending Ukraine.

The position of our political leadership has led to several negative processes. Back on 24 August 1991, Ukraine, for some reason, proclaimed to the whole world that it was going to become a nonnuclear state. Another example. Why, people are asking, does Ukraine need the Black Sea Fleet, if it declared that it only needs the Fleet

for local needs? This gave rise to the problem of the Black Sea Fleet with all its consequences. It is a pity that we gave away our tactical weapons so quickly; they might defend Ukraine much better than the largest army. It is impossible to guarantee national security without modern weapons.

Ukraine must proceed from the fact that it is impossible to ensure the defense of our state if we only rely upon guarantees offered by other states. In questions of Ukraine's defense capability and national security we may only rely upon our own forces.

Why does the West help Russia in every way? Simply because it has a powerful nuclear potential and is, in this respect, a strong power.

[Bazelyuk] What are Ukraine's real possibilities for maintaining its nuclear status?

[Rol] First and foremost, it is up to our president. We might conduct a nationwide referendum on Ukraine's nuclear or nonnuclear status. You know, I am very annoyed when some state tells us didactically: "You must give up your nuclear weapons." Who would dare make such claims upon China, Great Britain, or France?

[Bazelyuk] How do you assess that the personnel of the 43d Rocket Army has not, to this day, taken the oath of allegiance to Ukraine?

[Rol] I will investigate this situation as chairman of the SOU.

[Bazelyuk] You have been nominated as a candidate as Ukraine's people's deputy. Do you agree to stand for this post and why?

[Rol] I agree, because I have a clear picture of my work in the Ukrainian Parliament.

[Bazelyuk] Thank you for the interview, from which I have become convinced that, despite the enormous pressure exerted upon Ukraine both from the West and from the East, Ukraine will be able to create a reliable defensive shield with all those types of weapons necessary for this.

BALTIC STATES

Latvia, Lithuania, Denmark Sign Military Agreement

94UM0162A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 11 Jan 94 p 3

[Report by Valeriy Gromak under the rubric "Yesterday": "Denmark Expands Military Cooperation With Latvia and Lithuania"]

[Text] Vilnius—On 4 January Latvian Minister of Defense Valdis Pavlovskis and Danish Minister of Defense Hans Haekkerup signed an agreement on cooperation in the military area. The document calls for reciprocal consultations in matters of security, defense

planning and strategy. It calls for the exchange of know-how and information, and visits by officials and officers. The DETA agency reports that the two countries will develop programs for the education and practical training of servicemen and work out other matters jointly.

Denmark is the first NATO country with which Latvia has signed such an agreement, but 32 Lithuanian officers have already begun training in officer courses at a Danish military school. Representatives of the main subdivisions of the national defense service—the field army, state border guard service, naval forces and civil defense department—have been sent to attend the courses.

CAUCASIAN STATES

Azerbaijan's Progress in Establishing 'Regular Army' Viewed

944K0574A Moscow NOVAYA YEZHEDNEVNAYA GAZETA in Russian 4 Jan 94 p 2

[Article by Eldar Zeynalov: "The Partisans Are Coming Down From the Hills: Azerbaijan En Route to a Regular Army"]

[Text] An obligatory attribute of any state laying claim to independence, especially one with hostile neighbors, is a regular army. It has to be acknowledged that Azerbaijan lacks this attribute as yet. Its armed forces are helpless before the sallies of the Karabakh separatists and their allies, who have occupied a good one-fourth of the territory of the republic. And all this despite the fact that the area is not short of resources and that Azerbaijan obtained an entirely sufficient inheritance from the former Soviet Army.

What, then, is the problem? The fact that unlearned lessons of history condemn a society to repeat them. Did not the history of the Bolsheviks show that neither internal sedition nor outside intervention can be overcome with a volunteer, semi-partisan army? Did not the military campaign of 1941 show that only iron discipline turns a mob into an army? Should the future of the state have been endangered for truisms to be put to the test all over again? But the Azerbaijan Popular Front, whose position has in recent years largely determined the political climate in the republic, regarded the army primarily as an instrument of the winning of political power and made efforts to get hold of weapons.

The first appeal for the formation of volunteer squads was heard in Baku at a demonstration in Baku on 13 January 1990, when, in the period of heavy fighting in Khanlarskiy Rayon, the Azerbaijan Popular Front formed the National Defense Committee headed by Elchibey. I recall how in the academy institute where I was working at that time the registration of volunteers, which was earnestly supported by the Communist Party

organization and even the chief of the Special Department (a KGB man, that is), began. This immediately put me on my guard, especially since no one was given weapons, and the lists of the most active and resolute members of the opposition who had registered were not kept secret. The underlying motives for the provocation became clear when, a week later, Soviet forces entered the city under the cover of a furor concerning "thousands of Popular Front combatants."

The volunteer movement subsequently once again made its presence known following Azerbaijan's proclamation of independence in the fall of 1991. Under the conditions of the disintegration of the USSR and the Soviet Army and the Azerbaijan Popular Front's uncompromising campaign to oust the Communists it was a matter of fundamental importance into whose hands the weapons being sold off by the "father-commanders" of the 4th Army would fall. President Ayaz Mutalibov, who recognized this danger, adopted an edict on the depoliticization of the power structures even before the official commencement of the formation of an army and prior to the self-dissolution of the local Communist Party.

Both then and, at times, now also Mutalibov is reproached with being reluctant to form a national army. I believe, however, that he did want to, but by no means just any army. Thus the "Fronter" Fakhmin Gadzhiev, whom he had appointed deputy minister of defense, pulled back one unit from its positions in Karabakh in January 1992 and brought it to Baku—"the boys need to wash, they say." And in March the "Fronter" Ragim Gaziyeu, commandant of Shusha, whom the opposition had strenuously pushed as defense minister, threatened from the parliamentary rostrum, with a portable radio in his hand, that he would bring his fighters from Shusha and arrange a repetition of the Tbilisi events in Baku. The defense measures of the "red" government, weakened by the loss of the "flower" of the presidential team in the helicopter shot down over Karabakh in November 1991, were censured in the opposition press. The exploits of the leaders of the volunteer campaign, among whom the above-mentioned Ragim Gaziyeu (a mathematician by education) had progressed particularly, were simultaneously being lauded to the skies. After all this, is it any wonder that the army of sovereign Azerbaijan officially numbered by the spring of 1992 some 150 fighters—half as many as the members of parliament? The rest of the fighting force consisted of volunteers—members of the Azerbaijan Popular Front or those in sympathy with this organization.

The surrender to the Armenians, scandalous and bordering on treachery and still not thoroughly investigated, of the cities of Khodzhalı—in February 1992 (under Tair Aliyev)—and Shusha and Lachin—in May 1992 (under Ragim Gaziyeu)—occurred at the time of Azerbaijan Popular Front member defense ministers.

Attempting to find the "culprit," the guilty party, the Azerbaijan Popular Front regime took punitive action against many of yesterday's "heroes" of the volunteer

campaign (Gatyr Mamed in Agdam, Mekhraliyev in Agdash, Bakhramov in Dzhalilabad, Alyamshakh in Badra, S. Guseynov in Ganja, and others), simultaneously attempting to do some things in respect to the formation of a regular army. Thus illegal armed formations were banned, and a draft spanning 10 successive draft-year age groups was announced also (reduced to nothing by the corruption of the military registration and recruitment offices).

But time had already been lost, and the growing opposition was scoring points with each new defeat at the front. What was most dangerous was that the army also, in which by the end of their rule the "Fronters" had repressed six out of 10 generals and one-eighth of the officer corps, had slipped out of control. And the Azerbaijan Popular Front then turned once again to the tried-and-tested weapon—volunteer squads, whose formation was announced, with the tacit approval of President Elchibey (and in violation of his edict) at a meeting of the Azerbaijan Popular Front in February 1993 in Baku. A state of emergency was imposed in April, and it was announced that the Azerbaijan Popular Front was "prepared not to shrink from bloodshed." This was demonstrated at the time of the events of June 1993 in Ganja, which culminated, however, unexpectedly for the organizers in the victory of a leader of the volunteer campaign who had suffered repression—Suret Guseynov. The circle was thus closed, and the regime fell apart in a clash with its own creation.

The struggle against the volunteer anarchist chaos was a principal direction of the activity of Geydar Aliyev, who came to power. The unprofessional proteges of the Popular Front were methodically "smoked out" of their positions in the power ministries, approximately 30 battalions, composed of 50 percent "dead souls" and 50 percent former volunteers, were disbanded, and Ragim Gaziyeu and a number of other Azerbaijan Popular Front figures, against whom charges of the negligent discharge of their official duties in the army, theft of property, and such were brought, were arrested. The press was given the "go-ahead" for descriptions of the gangster adventures of a number of "chieftains," which had earlier been shamefully hushed up from patriotic considerations.

At the present time the volunteer squads persist only in the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic, where several areas remain under the control of the Azerbaijan Popular Front. They are headed here by one T. Guseynov, who proposed in August the formation of a Nakhichevan Defense Council to confront possible Armenian aggression against this Azerbaijani autonomy.

The ring around the fugitive ex-President Elchibey is tightening. The detachment of interior forces loyal to him has been disarmed, and 12 officers and the chief himself (lacking, according to the tradition of recent times, special education) have been dismissed from the district police department in his native Ordubadskiy

Rayon. An attempt to seize the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] on 29 October was foiled and led to the arrest of the most active "Fronters." Elchibey's cousin—Ayдын Gasymov, against whom a Turkish fanatic, a "gray wolf," arrested on 1 October testified—was arrested and charged with preparing an act of terrorism.

G. Aliyev has left his predecessor two ways out—to fully disarm (physically and ideologically) and submit to him as president or, relying on the volunteer-combatants, to continue the desperate, but doomed struggle to the end. In the first case Elchibey would be left without even the illusory hope of once again seating himself in the presidential chair. In the second there is a chance that he could escape to friends in Turkey wearing a martyr's crown and even form a "government in exile" from the CIS-devant of his circle.

Whatever the case, it is obvious that Azerbaijan has gotten over the volunteer campaign. Individual squads or terrorists are no longer calling the tune in policy, and the formation of a regular army has been the priority concern of domestic policy and serves as the basis of the mutual understanding in the President Aliyev-Prime Minister Guseynov tandem. Following the punishment of several military commissars, mobilization is finally under way. Deserters are being caught, and military tribunals, who have in the year examined hundreds of cases, are operating. The day when quantity switches to quality is not far off. Especially since following the failure of the efforts of the CSCE and the four UN Security Council resolutions on the liberation of the occupied territories, which have been ignored by the Armenians, the Azerbaijani leadership is left with no choice, evidently.

Risk of Internationalization of Karabakh War Grows

PM1901152794 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
19 Jan 94 p 2

[Lieutenant Colonel Kirill Petrov "Military Review":
"At a Turning Point. The Conflict in Karabakh Could
Escalate into a Large-Scale Regional War"]

[Text] The December-January offensive by Azerbaijani troops is a logical continuation of the events of last summer, as a result of which defense detachments of the NKR [Nagorno-Karabakh Republic] (according to Baku's version, an Armenian expeditionary corps) took several strategically important Azerbaijani population centers outside Nagorno-Karabakh (Agdam, Fizuli, Kubatly), while in Baku the political crisis had reached its peak and subsequently resolved itself in another change of leader in the republic. Back then, even before he had "legalized" his ascent of the Mount Olympus of state power by means of a general election, Geydar Aliyev had promised to resolve the Karabakh problem.

At that time NKR defense detachments had occupied 724 Azerbaijani population centers, and only 215 of

them were on Karabakh territory. Approximately 1 million refugees were homeless....

The "summer campaign" of 1993 in Karabakh ended in total triumph for some and a nightmare rout for others. Never before in five years of war had NKR defense detachments "sunk their teeth" so deep into Azerbaijan: Occupying 25 percent of its territory, they set up several so-called "security zones" around the NKR and took control of a 170-km section of the Azerbaijani-Iranian border.

Never before had the Azerbaijani Army suffered such a crushing defeat as in last year's "summer campaign." Agdam, Fizuli, and Kubatly surrendered virtually without a fight—cities for which, proceeding from strategic considerations, the army should have fought to the last bullet, but it withdrew essentially without firing a single shot, having evacuated the population in advance.

This circumstance gave certain observers grounds for calling the war in Karabakh "strange" and assuming, not without reason, in my view, that at the height of the power crisis the military thus assisted "the departure of Abulfaz Elchibey," then the Azerbaijani president. If this is really so and if precisely this was the strategic task of the Azerbaijani Army, then it should be recognized that it coped with it brilliantly. In any event Elchibey "departed" (true, this also required a thrust from Ganja to Baku by detachments of the rebel Colonel Surret Guseynov, who in the recent past, incidentally, was commander of an Azerbaijani corps in Northern Karabakh), Geydar Aliyev became president, and the army itself, despite claims to the contrary, has not only preserved but also augmented its potential during the four months of the truce. There remained, and remains, just one thing for Geydar Aliyev to do—to carry out his election promise....

If anyone had any hope that the third president of Azerbaijan would reject a strong-arm solution to the problem, it was dispelled in December, with the first shots on the Karabakh front. There is, of course, an explanation for this. It is difficult to hope for success in talks with an opponent who has occupied one-fourth of the country's territory and utterly ruined approximately 1 million of your fellow citizens. Yes, Aliyev, like his predecessors, has gambled on force, but it is appropriate to point out that neither Mutalibov nor Elchibey found themselves in such difficult conditions as he does.

So the guns started up in Karabakh once again in December. Never before had the front line of the Azerbaijani Army's offensive been so broad: from the north to the south of the republic. The fighting was fierce, and there were big losses on both sides. At the time these lines are being written, the Azeris have taken the border settlement of Goradiz near Iran and won back 40 of the 170 km of the border with that state controlled by Karabakhis. According to information from some sources, Azerbaijani detachments are advancing toward the enemy's rear from Iranian territory.

The attackers' strategic plan has become apparent during the recent days of fighting in the zone of conflict: with simultaneous strikes in the north of the NKR's Mardakertskiy Rayon and in the east—against the cities of Askeran, Agdam, and Fizuli—to develop an offensive against Kelbadzhar and Kubatly and cut the Lachin corridor.

In turn it has to be thought that the Karabakh defense detachments will not give up the "security zone" around the NKR just like that. A great deal in the winter campaign will, in my view, depend on whether the Azerbaijani Army has been able to reinstate itself sufficiently to endure a large-scale offensive over the entire front. Will it not become a spent force when drawn into static fighting (the Karabakhis are hurriedly creating a second defense echelon in certain sections of the confrontation)?

However.... The conflict in Karabakh has approached the stage where it is no longer so important who will emerge the winner from the "winter campaign": There is no military solution to the Karabakh problem, and the mechanism of a peaceful settlement has not been worked out. The most the opponents are capable of, even then not without the assistance of intermediaries, is reaching agreement on a truce, which is used, as a rule, under cover of diplomatic maneuvers and blocking of the peace initiatives of those same intermediaries, to restore combat potential and prepare for a counterstrike.

But the more profound the Karabakh impasse, the more likely the threat of the conflict's internationalization. Incidentally, Afghan mojahedin, citizens of Turkey, Syria, and Lebanon, and "volunteers" from CIS countries are already fighting here. But something else is far

more alarming. While war was being waged at a respectable distance from their borders, Tehran and Ankara admitted purely hypothetically the possibility of their direct participation in the conflict. But attitudes toward it have been under revision for some time.

When as many as several tens of thousands of refugees gathered on adjacent territory last summer, Iran held the largest combined-arms exercises involving aircraft on the border for 15 years.

According to data from various sources, during those exercises Iranian Army subunits crossed the border and guarded a reservoir near the village of Goradiz. Several more subunits were ready to cross the border. After this—how tightly everything here is intertwined—Ankara voiced alarm "in connection with the concentration of Iranian subunits near the Azerbaijani border," and on 6 September the head of a Turkish parliamentary delegation spoke in Baku of "his government's readiness to give Azerbaijan military aid in the event of a further escalation of hostilities by Armenia." Turkey's resolve was confirmed in Moscow last fall by Prime Minister Tansu Ciller, and former Premier Bulent Ecevit has called for air strikes against the Armenians.

It would not be out of place to remind you that, in the opinion of experts, the Turkish Army is the strongest in the region. Approximately 1,000 tanks, 1,100 armored vehicles, 2,500 artillery pieces and mortars, 150 combat helicopters, and 300 aircraft of the 2d Tactical Command are concentrated on territory bordering on Armenia. The "North" group of Iranian troops constitutes roughly the same striking force on the border with Azerbaijan.

Whereas just a few months ago movements of Iranian and Turkish units and subunits on the borders could be regarded as a final warning, today....

DEFENSE INDUSTRY

Ongoing Conversion Problems at 'Almaz'

94UM0163B Moscow TRUD in Russian 6 Jan 94 p 4

[Article by Vsevolod Sikelnikov, Yuliya Andrianova, Sergey Knyazkov, and Boris Kudryavtsev: "'Almaz' Almost Invisible"]

[Text] They say that Isaac Newton learned to "evaporate" the diamonds by focusing sunlight on them with a large magnifying glass. When Newton demonstrated his experiment to the English queen, she was immediately stunned: Right before her eyes the diamond grew red hot and disappeared. But then at once she ordered that the destructive experiments be stopped.

It would seem that today the same sort of destructive experiment is being carried out with one of the largest defense enterprises of the fatherland, the "Almaz" [diamond] plant. No one would deny that military expenditures and the defense industry of Russia must be optimized. Unfortunately, we have always lacked a sense of moderation, especially during the "Cold War." But in the years of perestroika and the development of democracy, on the contrary we began to "uproot" the defense sector ruthlessly, as we did with the vintners in the course of the anti-alcoholism campaign. Today, conversion here is a drug for populists in a political struggle, rather than a state program to optimize the restructuring of the defense industry with maximal advantage to Russia. It is too bad that to this point only those who decide nothing understand this. And irreversible processes are taking place in this time, doing enormous harm to the country.

Indisputably each person who works at "Almaz" is a patriot of this enterprise. But this does not at all mean that only corporate interests impel us. "Almaz," which develops air defense systems, is known throughout the world and is the strongest competitor of an American company of similar profile, Raytheon. For decades there was an unpublicized competition between "Almaz" and "Raytheon," and in recent years a publicized one, in developing air defense systems. "Almaz" has never lagged behind its rival, and to a great extent surpassed it, as it does today.

On 1 May 1960, an American U-2 spy plane piloted by the pilot Powers was shot down by an air defense system which was developed by "Almaz." The missile hit the target at an altitude of more than 20 km, a complete surprise to the American military, who were confident of the impunity of these flights. Just this single successful launch then plunged the air forces of the world into extremely high spending to achieve safe flight altitudes close to the ground. Then, when the Americans deemed themselves invulnerable at extremely low altitudes, a new SAM system from "Almaz" dispelled that confidence.

But before that there were long years of other competitions in the air, including combat ones, as in the skies of

Vietnam. The then ultra-modern American Phantoms, B-52s and other planes felt themselves practically untouchable, covering the earth of North Vietnam with "carpet" bombing of unheard-of density. The very first day our SAM systems were used there, the American Air Force suffered enormous losses. In the skies of Vietnam a total of several thousand American planes were shot down, and a large portion of them fell to missiles of our system.

Then the world understood that SAM systems were one of the necessary components of defense, safeguarding the security of the state. They began to be actively purchased, basically from us and from the U.S. The profit amounted to many billions of dollars. And even without detailed calculations, one can say that the "Almaz" paid back the public funds which were invested in the creation of new systems. Incidentally, people remember that time. The money earned by us in the international market was returned to the country in the form of bananas, oranges, lemons, different foods, and scarce consumer items, accessible to all because of their low prices.

And no one could chide "Almaz" that these monies were earned from weapons which brought death and destruction. On the contrary, SAM systems are extremely defensive weapons.

These days SAM systems have become a generally accepted means of defense and have begun to be shown at international exhibitions. It has turned out that modern all-altitude multipurpose SAM systems with a long range of action can be developed only by two countries in the world, Russia and the U.S.

At international exhibitions at Le Bourget (France), Abu-Dhabi (United Arab Emirates), the Zhukovskiy Aerospace Show (Russia) and others, specialists were able to vividly compare the characteristics of the American Patriot air defense system and our S-300 PMU1 and see that the Russian system surpasses the American both in range of action and in minimal altitude of downed targets.

It must be said that here in Russia, too, specialists understand that the S-300 PMU1 system is quite competitive, and that in the current difficult economic situation enormous amounts of money can be earned with it. But what are they doing with "Almaz" today in Russia? Perhaps this is a somewhat subjective opinion, but the impression is that they simply want to destroy us. But you know, "Almaz" is not the property of political figures, but a treasure of the people.

The average pay at "Almaz" today is 30 to 40 thousand rubles. There are world-class specialists: Chiefs of scientific departments and sectors, doctors and candidates of science, and leading specialists receive 50 to 70 thousand rubles a month, while experienced engineers with years of work behind them, just as young specialists, receive 20 to 30 thousand rubles.

One young cooperative owner, earning a half-million a month serving Russian millionaires, burst out laughing when he heard the pay at "Almaz," and then "wisely" noted that probably we just had a collection of loafers, if that was all they could earn. It would be better if they fixed imported audio and video equipment. . . The worst thing is that the young man did not think this up himself, but was only repeating what some ideologues of market relations are saying, believing the market to be a goal in itself.

For now the approach of the state to the fatherland's enterprises, which determines the level of science and technology in the country and the world is surprisingly uniformly destructive: The hammer of high taxes against the forge of miserable wages will leave not a single industrial giant standing. Of course, our state has long been in agony, choking from the shortages of resources. But then, no one besides our leaders is guilty of this. Well fine, one can still understand these difficulties. But when the state itself slows export deliveries of goods permitted for sale, and from what is sold, it gives almost nothing to the enterprises, the impression is that temporary people are making some temporary deals.

"Almaz" did not escape this fate either. It received nothing from recent deliveries from a foreign contract, and even worse, further export deliveries are starting to be slowed under various pretexts. But you know, this amounts to hundreds of millions of dollars, which Russia urgently needs.

"Almaz" itself is being enveloped quite energetically in a web of commercial and banking structures, which judging by their behavior are not at all concerned with developing the science, technology and industry of the fatherland, but are parasitically interested, for example, in acquiring a prestigious building which 20 minutes' drive from the center of Moscow.

Thus "Almaz" finds itself in a trap. The government, using high taxes and pay restrictions, is driving the still-powerful enterprise into the nets of indebtedness set up by commercial structures.

And what of the people at "Almaz"? Yes, our unique specialists, by breaking into consumer goods and commercial activity, can more than feed themselves. And some of them are doing this. But overall the collective continues to work on the main programs and to develop new and extremely complex systems, because "Raytheon" is making such systems, because the world will never give them up.

Of course we understand that this drama is only for those who worry about the state. You see, if matters go on like this, then in a few years the country will begin to pay hard currency for worse systems (no one will ever sell better ones than those of Russia) from foreign companies. And then many bureaucrats and merchants as middlemen will get those profits which they are promised by the destruction of "Almaz." And since nothing comes from nowhere or goes anywhere, the loser will be our

people, who have already expended a lot of manpower and resources on creating high-tech enterprises of the "Almaz" type and, if they are destroyed, will be forced to correct the state's mistakes out of their own pockets.

How can we not recall the English queen here?

Conversion: Trials of Komsomolsk-na-Amure SU-27 Plant

94UM0163A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
13 Jan 93 pp 1-2

[Interview with Anatoliy Mikhaylovich Petrov, general director of the Komsomolsk-na-Amure aviation plant by Aleksandr Andryushkov, place and date not indicated: "We Make the Best Interceptor in the World."]

[Text] Visitor's card: Anatoliy Mikhaylovich Petrov, general director of the Komsomolsk-na-Amure Aviation Production Association [KnAAPO]. Born in 1941 at the Parfin station of the Leningrad oblast. In 1965 he graduated from the Novosibirsk Electrotechnical Institute, and was sent to the aviation plant im. Yu.A. Gagarin at Komsomolsk-na-Amure. Today the Su-27, the pride of Russia, is built there.

He is married and has two children, a daughter who is an aviation engineer, and a son in the tenth grade.

[Andryushkov] Anatoliy Mikhaylovich! It is more than two years since our last talk about the fate of the plant. What has changed in this time, and how goes it with one of the leading giants of the defense industry, which produces the world-renowned multipurpose Su-27 fighter?

[Petrov] How have we been doing these two years? I should say at once that we have not suffered particularly. The plant had orders from the Defense Ministry for some modifications of the Su-27 (naval variant), plus there was the sale of some fighters to China. Owing to the Chinese order, we met our plan last year, and we have the chance to keep on making planes.

Still, in 1993 we were forced to change over to a four-day work week. The reason for this was the lack of a firm state plan for the coming year. The plant could not waste electricity, material, and manpower and there was no assurance that our labor would be utilized. The plant cannot run idly. But this did not have an effect on the pay of our people. With the switch to the four-day work week, we raised their pay rates by 25 percent.

But since everything can change tomorrow, we are looking for untapped reserves, so to speak, in getting out of the crisis.

[Andryushkov] You mean production of consumer goods within the framework of conversion?

[Petrov] Yes. We have contacted the "Lucky Goldstar" which specializes in the production of household electronic items. We purchased an assembly line for the

production of "Goldstar" televisions and the component parts for 25,000 sets. In all we will produce 50,000 televisions with foreign technology. We have already made around 200.

The second direction is the production of electric motors. In Russia today we produce hardly any vacuum cleaners or washing machines. There are no electric motors. We have studied the foreign technology for their production, and it suits us. Electrical steel is scarce in our country, but this technology allows us to make electric motors out of ordinary steel. We are looking for a serious supplier of electrical wire and are opening an assembly shop.

[Andryushkov] I have heard that they have mastered the production of complex medical equipment at your plant.

[Petrov] We are ready to begin production of medical pressure chambers of our own design. Our pressure chamber was rated as one of the best models at a medical exhibition in Novosibirsk.

We are involved in the production of yet another medical device, a Reich's chamber. This makes it possible to protect a person from the action of solar radiation, and has undergone testing at our medical center.

We are forced to struggle for survival under the conditions of conversion and the market. But whatever secondary production we get for the plant, the main product must always be there. It is practically impossible to fully support our plant with orders without producing the Su-27 aircraft. But the directorate of the Defense Ministry from which we get our orders has already warned us that there is no money for a single modification of the Su-27.

[Andryushkov] How will the cruiser "Admiral Kuznetsov" be supplied with carrier planes then?

[Petrov] We have already delivered the first lot of fighters for naval pilots, although it is not much. This was a good job for the plant, and we relied upon it, but who knows what lies ahead? We will try to get a clearer picture from the naval command.

Here is something else that is a heavy burden on the plant. In 1991, the Defense Ministry ordered one lot of Su-27s. A plane, like a human being, takes about a year to be "born." The plant has practically filled the order. The fighters are on its grounds, in various stages of finishing touches. They remain unclaimed. Their prices are still the old ones, the stipulated ones, but this apparently does not interest the client. In order to keep the engines from rusting and to make sure the aggregates did not become unusable, I was forced to issue instruction that they be removed from finished aircraft and be mounted for testing on newly produced ones, those which are being sold to China, for instance. This is not the state approach, but it isn't my fault. Let the Defense Ministry think about how to solve this problem, my job is to preserve the plant.

[Andryushkov] But as a state official, what would you propose as a way out of this situation?

[Petrov] They could have found different ways of paying for the order. For example, by government decision, they could make a 50 percent prepayment without assessing tax from the plant. And the Defense Ministry could pay off the remainder in a year. We would make planes for the army on credit, so to speak. And this would suit the plant. The Russian flyers would have Su-27 fighters in their armament, and the plant would have money for their further production and a carefree existence. And in this way state resources would only be immobilized.

[Andryushkov] Tell me, were many Su-27s sent to the line units in 1993?

[Petrov] This year not a single plane, except for the carrier variant, went to the units. The people at the plant ask in puzzlement: Why are we working, for whom are we accumulating this stockpile of planes? But I know there is a need for new fighters, and even more so for spare parts for them. If the state had decided to disarm in this way, then it would be better to close down our plant all at once.

[Andryushkov] But if planes like these, which any state would be proud to have, are not needed by Russia now, why don't we sell them to other countries? Not only China is interested in acquiring the Su-27.

[Petrov] For me the hardest thing to understand is why the Russian "Oboroneksport" [Defense Export office], with offers from some countries, perhaps non-traditional buyers of our weapons, is not showing any initiative. These countries are prepared to order our planes and to pay immediately. But the solution to this question depends on the impenetrable wall of bureaucrats from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. They offer unconvincing arguments that America objects to the sale of this plane to one country, England objects [to the sale] to another. It is irritating that Russia recently has virtually been living by foreign dictate, and does not have its own opinion. I fear where this might lead, if we are so afraid of breaking our ties with our new "friends."

[Andryushkov] Also, we must remember that if Russia does not take its place in the international aircraft market today, tomorrow will be too late. They won't let anyone else in.

[Petrov] Quite right. You can't escape economic laws in any form, whatever their "ism." For instance, when I talk with American businessmen, this is what I hear from them: "Do you really think we are interested in the Russian worker working, being employed in production? We are interested in the American worker having constant work."

Today, a battle for markets is being fought. And we have to admit that the Americans are driving us out everywhere. For example, I have heard that the U.S. vetoed the sale of the Su-27 aircraft to Libya, although we had already established contacts with it, and the signing of

the contracts would have saved several Russian defense plants from crisis. So Russia is not allowed, and the Americans themselves are holding talks with Libya to provide it with F-16 fighters.

Here is what I think. Since we have reached the market economy mode, we must earn money without a feeling of false shame. The market must be the market. A real one, and not one made from pleasant dreams.

[Andryushkov] Anatoliy Mikhaylovich, your pain for your native fatherland is understandable. It is even more intense when you think about the fate of the plant. Still, while constantly pondering how to survive under current conditions, you still retain optimism and faith in better days. . .

[Petrov] You know, Russians have an inborn capacity to stand up under difficulties. This year, for instance, I took no credits from the state. It is slavery to take credit at 200 or more percent! The plant will soon be stripped naked, excuse the expression. We owe our suppliers a lot of money because of this, and you don't build a machine like the Su-27 without partners.

[Andryushkov] How much freedom of action does the general director have, or does everything still depend on higher authorities?

[Petrov] I would answer that the attitude that the Committee for the Defense Sectors has toward us is quite realistic. Let us say that twenty years ago, the force ministries dictated work conditions to the plant. Today the picture is different. There is a group of central ministries which determine all economic policy, including in the defense industry. The plant is the executor. Relations must be organized like this: Give me an order and I will work. There is no need to tell me how to do it. In the years of perestroika and conversion, we have learned how to get by. The plant itself can organize relations with subcontractors and other republics as well as the bureaucrats from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs can. Today we are successfully working with "Azovstal," Belarusian enterprises, and Tajikistan, and to this point still have ties with Moldova. Thus, the "assistance" of the ministries has been reduced to a minimum.

But here is a problem—a lot of our planes are in Ukraine and Belarus. They sit on the airfields without spare parts. I see potential work for the plant in this, and the air force commands of the republics come to us for assistance. Alas, we are forced to refuse. There is no government permission. I don't think that Ukraine or Belarus will ever use their planes against Russia, but we can't see beyond our own noses.

[Andryushkov] Your production association is also working hard inside the country, and is a member of the Russian "Aviabank." What is the benefit from this?

[Petrov] We have come up against the following problem: When we have money, we don't get it for 2 or

3 months from Moscow, and then the same amount goes back to the capital. But our suppliers say you can't work like that, high and dry.

Knowing that the "Aviabank" had been formed and that all the aviation enterprises of Russia were participating in it, we requested membership. This allowed us to efficiently settle up with the entire western zone of the country: Moscow, St. Petersburg, Samara, and Nizhgorod plants, as well as others.

Besides that, we have very limited credit resources in the Far East. There was a time when we did not have any ready cash at all. Our people did not get paid for three months. In such a situation, the plant goes to the "Aviabank," a plane is sent to Moscow, and within a day or two we have sacks of money. So the benefit is obvious.

[Andryushkov] Recently we have not had the sort of mass media to agitate among the Russians for privatization of anything. Your opinion about this?

[Petrov] A privatization commission has been formed at the plant, to figure out all the pluses and minuses of this measure. My personal opinion is that if there is a stable state order, then a privatized plant would operate smoothly, would make a profit, would share it with all stockholders, and everything would be fine.

But when a plant is on the brink of collapse due to a lack of orders, and if the state simply abandons it to its fate, then privatization would lead to utter collapse of production. Thus, I am very cautious about privatization. I am not against it, for I acknowledge all forms of ownership, but I would not rush headlong into it.

I would proceed like this. I would try out this privatization in small enterprises, say in our "Metallist" plant, where they make cups and spoons and employ around 200 people, rather than several tens of thousands. Accumulate around five years of experience, study the successes and failures, acquaint all the country's enterprises with them, and give them the chance to decide to privatize or not. Those who want to can. But what are we doing now? They're just about driving us into privatization, as they once drove us into the collective farms.

[Andryushkov] Perhaps the government wants to avoid responsibility for the state of the country's economy in this way?

[Petrov] Perhaps. If it works, hurrah. If not, then excuse me, you yourself wanted to privatize. Enough experimenting with the country. Today there is no worker who does not want to work. Life itself forces us to work and earn money, otherwise it's chaos for a person.

[Andryushkov] What is the pay at the plant?

[Petrov] The average is a little more than 100,000 (rubles). This is with allowance for the coefficient and the northern supplements. An experienced specialist earns up to 170,000.

[Andryushkov] Anatoliy Mikhaylovich, what do you see as your most urgent task today?

[Petrov] To supply the plant with work. During my vacation, my first since 1988, I have already flown three times to Moscow to resolve this question. Why did I have to go myself? Because the government for some reason doesn't want to speak with anyone but the head man. So I have turned over the leadership of the plant to my assistants, and I myself am on the go. Luckily, my assistants are able and reliable. I feel the responsibility for the fate of our collective constantly, and for that reason I am firmly resolved to see it through to the end. There can be two outcomes: Either we taste the joy of victory, for which we are struggling today, or we learn the bitterness of defeat. But everyone else will too.

P.S. When the material was prepared for press it was learned that the Amur aircraft builders had decided to reject privatization of the KnAAPO.

Defense Sector a Field of 'Partisan Warfare'

PM2101152794 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 19 Jan 94
pp 1-2

[Interview with Aleksey Shulunov, president of the League of Defense Enterprises, by Anatoliy Pokrovskiy and Igor Saltykov, date and place not given: "Defense Sector Has Become a Partisan Fighter: Acrid Is the Smoke of Financial Conflagrations"—first five paragraphs are introduction]

[Text] It was not until just before dawn that I managed to meet with Aleksey Shulunov, president of the League of Defense Enterprises. That was the only time available. After all, conversion has become disorderly partisan warfare. Not only does it not have a strategy or tactics, it does not even know whether to advance or retreat, trapped in the pincers of the disorder in the state. Acrid is the smoke of financial conflagrations and the doused bonfires of the way stations of the helpless. Is the Russian Government really indifferent to the destruction of the military-industrial complex?

First and foremost we no longer have a military-industrial complex as such, Aleksey Nikolayevich explained. There are only the high-technology sectors left. But so far neither the president's entourage nor the government has found the time to take a look at them. However, their verbal tirades have been simply staggering.

At first the president blithely promised that by the first fall the military industry would keep the people watered and fed with the "harvest" of its conversion projects. But then the drought came, reducing the ruble to worthless scraps of paper. Then last August the government adopted the alleged armament—but really disarmament—program; in November it "adjusted" it; and at the end of December Chernomyrdin ordered a complete review.

The results are shameful. Not even from the very first days but rather the first hours of the new year the

fulfillment of the defense orders for 1994 was on the brink of catastrophe. This is because in the previous two years the collectives of enterprises working on military hardware had suffered damage comparable to that caused by a nuclear strike. The most specialized sections had come to a complete standstill and dropped out of the manufacturing process. To restore them now will take nothing less than heroic efforts surpassing even the labor exploits of the Great Patriotic War. And even then it will take not months or years, but decades.

A gloomy but objective forecast. It is based on the colossal brain drain of top-class people not just from enterprises but also from scientific research institutes and design bureaus. The first wave of extreme poverty swept away the most highly qualified doctors of sciences, the second wave took candidate doctors with it. Today it is the wave of "top specialists." Yet each of them is like Saltykov-Shchedrin's peasant whose labor keeps two generals fed. What you have left are those young kids who detest the idea of running away and those who like everything the way it is.

[PRAVDA] Aleksey Nikolayevich, are Russia's intellectual knights not signing up with subcontractors? Where are they going to beat their swords into plowshares?

[Shulunov] First of all, quite a few foreign firms have absolutely no interest in importing defense staff into their countries. Those people are far more necessary over here because they possess not only military secrets but also purely civilian secrets which are sometimes incomprehensible to foreign entrepreneurs. The most talented design staff are being offered work not in offices but at home. They are being equipped with personal computers, equipment, cars—work at home rather than wasting your time on chaotic public transport. We guarantee personal secrecy and a living wage.

Very many people are joining commercial structures in this country—small but lively and well-equipped firms—they are designing and taking part in the production of and trade in purpose-built instruments, apparatus, technologies, and household goods. It is very good that such activity has started up in our country. After all, just two years ago such an infrastructure did not exist here.

But the bright lights also beckoned our talented defense specialists from abroad. The U.S. Congress and State Department adopted an urgent decision to admit and welcome Russia's best minds, especially those from the military-industrial complex. They set a generous quota: 11,000 people a year. But it was emphasized that they should be from Russia, not Ukraine or Belarus. They can expect very considerable financial assistance to help them adapt, the promise of the accelerated acquisition of American citizenship, and the promise of cost-of-living and "training" allowances. At a time when defense specialists are publicly becoming impoverished—in December the "average" wage was 35,000 rubles [R]—the competition among people wanting to lead at least a normal life was very great.

The demand for the export of rare intellects and talents is growing but will mean an irreparable loss for this country. It is time to understand clearly that some people would really like Russia to cease being a world power with a unique science and a mighty scientific and technical and defense potential and be transformed into a raw-materials appendage of the West, the East, and then Africa, too. There is evidence of this to date: Last year the export of technical output fell to 5-6 percent.

[PRAVDA] The president has published an edict providing for an increase in the level of pay to eight times the minimum wage for fulfillment of the state defense order and 10 times that figure in the nuclear industry.

[Shulunov] This is a two-edged sword. The first is in the budget. After all, we do not have the financial results for 1992 yet. We got through 1993 entirely without a budget, papering over the cracks one department at a time and even taking each event as it came. It is hard to judge what is in store for us now. But the budget is covering at most 65-70 percent of the planned items and areas of expenditure.

And here is the second edge of the financial sword. The payment of defense orders is planned to be at last year's level. But because prices are rising all the time and wages are trying if not to get ahead then at least not to lag behind, the state's military finance coffer is becoming a purse for small change.

Here is a surprising detail which shows that our present authorities are truly in their infancy: No one yet really understands what the state defense order is. There is not even a single interpretation of the terminology itself. For example, we in the defense industry take it to mean the Defense Ministry's order paid for by funds issued to it by the state. And the Defense Ministry shares our view. But the tax inspectorate takes it to mean something completely different. The Finance Ministry has its own interpretation and the Economy Ministry understands it quite differently. Consequently, at the very highest level it is not a financial struggle going on but a war of words. But there is no time for that kind of thing. At the moment the government is merely plugging the financial gaps: First there was the cost of the referendum; then the struggle against the Supreme Soviet and the possession of its territory; finally there was the cost of the parliamentary elections, the ratification of the Constitution, the overhaul of the White House, and the move there. Of course, in view of these daily costs, losses, and political concerns it has no time to worry about providing haubkerks, especially those which still jingle rather than those which are completely rusted through.

[PRAVDA] But the hauberk is a museum piece. Whereas conversion and the fulfillment of the defense orders are already turning into disorderly partisan warfare.

[Shulunov] It may be said that there is financial and economic robbery going on. Here is an example. A characteristic feature of our defense industry was the enterprise which was like a whole city. These enterprises' assets included not just an impressive social base but

also enormous common boiler houses. In midwinter they have been left without fuel because of the colossal rise in the cost of coal and fuel oil. They have had to ask the banks for enormous credits regardless of the interest rate. Meanwhile, they knew in advance that these loans would virtually not be repaid. After all, in the first three weeks of December alone insolvency debts rose from R15 trillion to R19 trillion across the country. At the same time we were owed R700 billion by the military who a year ago were counting on the state budget when they concluded with enterprises what seemed to be modest state defense order contracts calculated down to the last cent. But they ceased to be able to pay in April, when finance became more like a political fiction.

Defense workers are now caught in a vicious circle from which there is no escape. I think that there will be an unprecedented explosion in the second half of January, at the latest. After all, we no longer have the means to pay for the fuel or materials essential to production. And the banks will refuse to grant new credits. A financial cataclysm is looming.

[PRAVDA] Aleksey Nikolayevich, but only a few months ago there were ways for defense industry personnel to make an organized withdrawal from the cycle of financial crises and massacres, by exporting and selling arms on the world market.

[Shulunov] Yes, for two years Russia's most progressive forces worked in harmony on the creation of a new and very flexible structure to ensure the success of arms exports on the market front. The Defense Ministry, the Foreign Ministry, the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations, and the State Committee for the Defense Industry were among our active allies. We all tried to at least restore what had been lost in the potholes of perestroika. Nor did we avoid mistakes either. The Commission for Military-Technical Cooperation was set up to prevent them, and it began working on a regular basis, virtually every week.

But then came a bolt from the blue. In line with the 18 November edict of the president we totally reorganized the existing system without, however, creating a parallel structure, hastily destroying everything that had been tried and tested. De facto, without any analysis, without knowing what other shortcomings were "looming" around the corner, without formulating a new strategy, perestroika was once again undertaken, and in an utterly unqualified and incompetent manner. It is hard even to calculate the tremendous damage. I think 1994 will be a write-off for military-technical cooperation, because we have been driven back to where we started in late 1991 or early 1992. But it's a hopeless lament....

[PRAVDA] Maybe those on high have become aware of the awful experience of abortive conversion and military readaptations [voyennyye perelitsovki] in the world's major powers? And the solution?

[Shulunov] The solution is already known in all its detail. The U.S. military industry conducted the first experiment in conversion in the late seventies-early eighties. It was extremely unsuccessful. But it is thanks to this experiment that the most rational way has been found. When major corporations own the number one or number two-ranked manufacturers of recognized categories of arms, they buy out their weaker competitors and carry out either horizontal or vertical integration, keeping weapons production wholly to themselves. Their former rivals, rid of the burden of competing in military production, acquire civilian firms with the profits they derive from this situation and continue to lead a peaceful, tranquil life.

The result was that both the corporations and the state benefit. The U.S. Defense Department's considerable reduction in arms purchases has not meant a drop in the production of military hardware. And last year 15 percent of the output produced "captured" its own sectors of the world market. In 1995 it is planned to export around 30 percent of the arms produced.

The competition, needless to say, is very tough. But the Russian leadership is, regrettably, somehow too busy to formulate a foreign economic strategy on military-technical matters. We do not yet have the right to dream of an expansionist policy. But it is high time we reconquered those positions we hastily surrendered on our traditional markets.

A start has been made. The thing is that over the past two decades we have exported arms worth \$120 billion. The bulk of them—complex equipment—with a long service life, around 30 years. What is more, there is more Russian military aviation equipment in the world than anyone else's—there are more than 5,000 of our combat aircraft in the arsenals of various countries in the Near East, India, China, and Africa. But, in accordance with past tradition, government licenses were needed for annual repairs and deliveries of expendable material and spare parts. And the government's distraction with domestic affairs made it very hard to organize this. We finally succeeded, quite recently, in winning round our leaders and obtained permission to supply spare parts direct, earning around \$4-5 billion a year. Even at the present crazy ruble-dollar exchange rates, manufacturers will make profits of 300 to 1,000 percent.

Profitable or what! But I don't know how this will develop. We agreed with the former minister of foreign economic relations to abolish altogether as of 1994 fictive taxes on military exports. But it is hard to tell the future now following the 18 November edict.

[PRAVDA] Yet we do also have experience of conversion. After the Great Patriotic War conversion on a Soviet scale was indeed a total affair. And urgent at that! Leningrad's Kirov Plant switched in a matter of months from producing tanks to producing the world's first skidding tractor. The same thing happened at thousands of other enterprises.

[Shulunov] Yes. But, first, you had the powerful state planning system of the time. Today, as well, conversion should be unified and planned. Second, it rested on iron labor discipline, which is now being eroded from above. Third, the stable financial position of the state was strengthening. Despite outside attempts at interference the state increased production year after year and the budget grew steadily, rather than waning as is happening now.

Well, we must go on fighting. This is not, regrettably, the postwar period. The Battle of the Kursk Bulge lies ahead, not just for defense personnel but for all industry. Enough of partisan warfare.

FOREIGN MILITARY AFFAIRS

Use of Artillery in Persian Gulf

94UM0132A Moscow VOYENNY VESTNIK in Russian
No 8, Aug 93 (signed to press 16 Jul 93) pp 52-59

[Article based on foreign military press materials by Colonel Ya. Fesenko, doctor of technical sciences, and Major S. Zhuravlev, under rubric "Foreign Military Affairs": "Artillery in the Persian Gulf"]

[Text] The Persian Gulf war has become the property of history, but interest in features of combat operations in the "Kuwait Desert" is not abating inasmuch as outlines of the "war of new technologies," which will determine the development of military affairs over the next decades to a significant extent, showed up clearly here.

Despite repeated statements abroad about artillery's reduced role in modern war, in the "Kuwait Desert" both sides concentrated such an amount that it conceded nothing to the overall strength level of groupings in a number of the largest World War II operations such as the Balaton Operation of 3rd Ukrainian Front. Even by Pentagon estimates, there was a small quantitative superiority on the side of the international forces directly in the combat operations zone. Technical outfitting was another matter. The difference in it, like the difference in conditions for performing combat missions, turned out to be much more significant.

U.S. 155-mm M109A2 and 203.2-mm CF M110A2 self-propelled [SP] howitzers, M198 and TR 155-mm towed howitzers, and also MLRS multiple-launch rocket systems made up the basis of multinational forces [MNF] artillery. The majority of artillery systems were self-propelled and over 80 percent were armored. U.S. formations also had several models of the ATACMS tactical missile system (based on the MLRS) equipped with a missile with cluster warhead (100 submunitions with hollow charge-fragmentation effect) with a launch range up to 200 km.

Artillery subunits and a considerable number of MNF formations had automated artillery fire control systems

and digital data transmission equipment. AN/USQ-70 survey instruments, the PLRS position finding, identification and data transmission system, and a NAVSTAR space navigation system ground receiver were used for topogeodetic support to combat operations.

OH-58 reconnaissance helicopters and Pioneer drones were employed to collect data on the enemy and terrain along with radar and sound-ranging reconnaissance equipment as well as artillery forward observers' optoelectronic equipment. In addition, MNF formations were outfitted with mobile stations for receiving data from the J-STARS radar system for aerial reconnaissance of ground targets and control of strikes, which gave a good account of itself when tracking the movement of reserves and the maneuver of enemy artillery at ranges exceeding capabilities of formation reconnaissance equipment. In necessary instances artillery could obtain aerial and space reconnaissance data in planning fires.

With respect to Iraq, it had only a limited number of SP armored guns (French-made GCT and Austrian-made GHN-45 155-mm howitzers, 2C3 152-mm howitzers and 2C1 122-mm howitzers). True, this shortcoming was made up to a certain extent by the considerable number of highly mobile MLRS—the BM-21 system and the Brazilian Astros system. Mounted on the base of a vehicle with good cross-country capability, Astros was equipped with transport-launch containers loaded with projectiles of three calibers—127, 180 and 300 mm—with a maximum range of fire of 30, 35 and 60 km respectively. It is noteworthy that the system surpassed the U.S. MLRS in a number of its characteristics. A large number of Iraqi artillery pieces were towed. Approximately half consisted of M-46 130-mm guns, but South African 155-mm guns were also present (G-5 howitzers, which western military specialists placed among the best models of towed systems in the world). The predominance of artillery pieces superior to the majority of similar MNF systems in range of fire (Table 1) permitted the Iraqis to locate firing positions at a considerable distance (10-20 km) from the sides' line of contact while retaining the capability to effectively pressure enemy artillery deployed near the Kuwait border.

At the same time, the great diversity of systems of calibers in Iraqi artillery substantially complicated its combat employment and logistic support. There also was a most negative effect from the outfitting of Iraqi artillery with obsolete communications equipment, the personnel's total inability to use it under communications jamming conditions, and the poor state of supply of automated command and control equipment, especially at echelons above the artillery battalion. Finally, the shortage of radar equipment and absence of aerial and space reconnaissance assets cannot be discounted. In the opinion of western military specialists, Iraqi artillerymen "proved incapable of looking behind the nearest sandhills." The conclusion from what has been said is quite obvious: as a whole, Iraqi artillery was seriously inferior to MNF artillery in its technical level.

Meanwhile, the Iraqi command's defensive concept gave artillery a deciding role in destroying tanks and motorized infantry. The concept of the defense envisaged drawing attackers onto minefields of the "Saddam Hussein line," with their subsequent destruction by massed, concentrated artillery fire from indirect firing positions.

Thus, a serious miscalculation was contained in the very sense of the defense; blindly following the chosen operating tactics and passively waiting for an attack by enemy ground troops could not, of course, bring success.

Let us briefly examine the conditions for mission accomplishment by the sides' artillery. In deploying at firing positions without engineer preparation within range of Iraqi artillery, MNF artillerymen correctly feared its return fire. Therefore at first they changed positions immediately after executing fire missions, but after seeing that as a rule there was no return fire, they subsequently gave up the fire-evasion maneuver.










Division counterbattery fire systems deployed near the state border with Kuwait and operated in a "waiting" mode. The fire of individual batteries against command and control facilities and other important targets on the "Saddam Hussein line" was used widely to uncover the makeup of Iraqi artillery groupings. In case of return fire, the counterbattery fire systems would open up fire for effect.

In raiding operations one artillery battalion most often was attached to battalion task forces for direct fire support and one or two radars and an MLRS platoon were attached for counterbattery activities. Their radios were in the same radio net and, on deploying into combat formation, supported the transmission of data on detected targets directly to the latter's fire control station. This permitted significantly reducing time for preparing return fire.

An MLRS platoon or howitzer artillery battalion usually is used to engage one battery. The MLRS conducted fire for effect with cluster projectiles with submunitions having hollow charge-fragmentation effect, and artillery pieces fired HE-fragmentation projectiles with impact or time fuze.

It must be said that the MNF command regarded Iraqi artillery as a serious threat to operations of its ground troops. It also saw it as the primary means of employing chemical weapons if the Iraqi leadership decided to use them, for Iraqi artillerymen were well trained and it was of no small importance that they had combat experience of eight years of war with Iran. Therefore artillery at positions was included among very important targets. It was engaged by fighter-bombers, A-6 and A-10 attack aircraft, AH-64 Apache combat helicopters and, in the second stage of Operation Desert Storm, by division counterbattery fire systems and ship guns, including 406-mm main battery guns of the battleships Wisconsin and Missouri.

Table 1 - Comparative Range Assessment of MNF and Iraqi Artillery Systems

MNF ARTILLERY	RANGE OF FIRE, KM	IRAQI ARTILLERY
M109K2 155-mm SP gun 	HOWITZER AND GUN ARTILLERY → 34 ← 30	GCT 155-mm SP howitzer 
M110K2 203.2-mm SP howitzer 	→ 29 ← 37,5	G-5 155-mm howitzer 
M198 155-mm howitzer 	→ 30 ← 31,5	GHN-45 155-mm howitzer 
	← 27	M-46 130-mm gun 
	MLRS	
240-mm MLRS 	→ 30 ← 60 (300mm SS-60) ← 35 (180mm SS-40) ← 30 (127mm SS-30)	Astros MLRS 

Aviation employed precision and conventional bombs and combat helicopters employed the Hellfire ATGM. Attempts to use fuel-air explosive munitions, which had given a good account of themselves in engaging large targets, proved insufficiently effective in combating small targets.

During Operation Desert Storm MNF artillery supported the deployment of friendly ground troop formations in operational tasking areas and their redeployment in accordance with the concept of subsequent offensive operations, delivered fires on the "Saddam Hussein line," conducted counterbattery fire, demolished engineer works, carried out fire support to raiding operations of battalion task forces, used fire to cover the breaching of obstacles, and took part in repelling assaults by Iraqi troops.

As a rule, separate artillery battalions were used to perform those missions. Observed targets were registered by battery and battalion volleys. Depending on the size of targets, batteries conducted fire for effect at several range settings and several deflection settings (from one to three), expending two rounds per gun per setting. Engagement was accomplished by brief fire assaults usually not lasting longer than 10 minutes.

As the beginning of Operation Desert Storm approached, the intensity of MNF artillery combat operations increased. Its deployment was completed three days before the beginning of the offensive. The most powerful fire assault was at this time. It was conducted against Iraqi troop positions on 21 February 1991, and over 10 battalions from the UK 1st Armored Division and a number of U.S. units were used for it. In addition to 12 MLRS launchers, 72 artillery pieces took part in the fire assault from the British side. In the assessment of a command representative, the weight of their volley was

50 tonnes, i.e., quadruple that of the 882 guns of the UK 9th Army in the Battle of El Alamein in 1942.

Individual ATACMS missile system launchers were used to engage targets in the depth (SAM and artillery positions, command and control facilities, logistic installations and so on). According to press data, a number of important targets were engaged by single missile strikes.

Shifting to Iraqi artillery operations, it should be noted that they were complicated also by the special desert conditions, where each position and each vehicle was clearly observed from the air with the contrast of daylight illumination. The movement of military columns was visible at great distances due to long dust plumes, which hampered the daytime maneuver of artillery under conditions of absolute superiority of MNF aviation. And at night it became easy prey to aircraft employing bombs with thermal-imaging and infrared homing heads.

Despite the significant extent of maskirovka [lit. "camouflage," however, includes "concealment" and "deception"] measures performed by Iraqi artillerymen, they did not always achieve the goal inasmuch as firing positions were easily detected from the air from the characteristic disposition of guns in a line. One firing position was the absolute copy of another, which facilitated their detection by aerial reconnaissance.

As the epicenter of Operation Desert Storm shifted to troop groupings disposed at the southern border of Kuwait, strikes against Iraqi artillery became more and more fierce, as attested by data of Table 2. While 55 Iraqi guns were knocked out during the first two weeks of the operation, 385 were knocked out right away during the last week. In other words, the intensity of Iraqi artillery losses had increased almost 14 times by the end of Operation Desert Storm.

Table 2 - Dynamics of Iraqi Artillery Losses by Days of Operation Desert Storm

Days of Operation		14th	30th	38th
Amount of losses	Artillery pieces	55	1100	1485
	As a percentage	2	35	48

It is also evident from the table that by the beginning of the ground troop offensive the MNF succeeded in knocking out around half of Iraqi artillery through the comprehensive effect of all weapons. This permitted bringing the artillery force ratio to 2:1 in favor of the MNF. And the ratio turned out to be even greater considering the fact that in attempting to preserve the latest equipment the Iraqi command decided to withdraw G-5 and GHN-45 155-mm howitzers, the Astros MLRS and a number of other artillery pieces to the rear ahead of time.

Significant losses also were inflicted on Iraqi artillery personnel. Survivors ended up considerably demoralized.

Employment of artillery in the battle of Ras Khafji (on the night of 28/29 January 1991), when several tank and

motorized infantry battalions of the 1st and 5th motorized infantry divisions assaulted subunit positions of the U.S. 1st Marine Division and Saudi troops, was the most indicative with respect to the Iraqis. The assault was supported by the fire of several artillery battalions and salvos of Astros MLRS. This probably was the only case of mass employment of Iraqi artillery. Taking advantage of the effect of surprise and the powerful fire support, the attackers took Ras Khafji but were unable to exploit the success achieved without reliable air cover and soon were forced to withdraw to the initial positions.

It also should be noted that Iraqi artillery fire, whose strong psychological effect is beyond doubt, was not very effective since it was conducted not against specific targets, but against presumed disposition areas of MNF subunits.

Thus, MNF artillery was able to perform fire missions without fear of enemy artillery return fire. The technical capabilities for realizing the concept of "fire strike/firing position change" ("shoot and scoot") were not called for.

Operation Desert Sword began with a powerful fire assault against Iraqi troop positions, reserves, command and control facilities and weapons; and with electronic jamming. The length of fire preparation of the assault in regiments [and] of formation operations varied. It did not exceed 20 minutes in Marine divisions, but it was 45 minutes in the UK 4th Armored Brigade. MNF artillery managed to inflict telling personnel and equipment losses on the enemy during fire preparation of the assault.

During the offensive MNF artillery supported the friendly troop assault, supported the landing and operations of helicopter and amphibious assault forces, supported operations of attackers in taking Al Kuwait, took part in repelling counterattacks by Iraqi troops and in consolidating captured lines and objectives, and continued counterbattery activities. In operating as part of an enveloping grouping, organic and attached artillery (from three to seven artillery battalions) of formations moved at the head of main body columns in readiness for immediate deployment. An assault on Republican Guard positions near Basra was preceded by a 30-minute fire preparation, which facilitated MNF formations' capture of crossings over the Euphrates River.

When individual Iraqi batteries and battalions attempted to prevent the attackers' advance, they immediately came under bombardment. Thus, one MLRS subunit and two 203.2-mm howitzer battalions destroyed 97 out of 100 artillery pieces of one Iraqi division with their fire, i.e., the fire of artillery and especially of MLRS proved more effective than air strikes.

Persian Gulf war experience confirmed that under present conditions the role of aerial reconnaissance operating in support of the delivery of fires is growing considerably. The possibility of using the J-STARs system for planning MNF field artillery fire substantially increased the latter's capabilities of engaging highly mobile, unobserved targets, and this contributed to no small extent to its success in opposing Iraqi artillery.

Division counterbattery fire systems demonstrated high combat capabilities dictated by the deep integration of reconnaissance assets, command and control assets and weapons. Centralized use of radars of the Firefinder radar system, which permitted creating a radar field with overlapping of two to four times in areas of enemy artillery firing positions and maintaining it for the entire battle and which provided reliable detection of enemy firing batteries, proved justified. Automated processing and transmission of data to weapon fire control stations using the TACFIRE automated command and control system (which has a high degree of automation of fire

preparation processes and short volley duration) permitted substantially reducing systems' reaction time to the detection of targets.

Iraqi artillery could win the fight with counterbattery fire systems only with adequate technical outfitting, which it did not have. That which fully justified itself in the Iran-Iraq military conflict proved unsuitable in the "war of new technologies." Slow-moving subunits of towed pieces became easy prey for modern automated systems, which managed to open fire for effect before the shells of detected enemy batteries burst.

The effectiveness of counterbattery fire systems was determined to a considerable extent by good performance characteristics of the MLRS. Along with a high degree of automation, its important feature was canister loading. The use of transport-launch canisters noticeably accelerated the loading of launchers and permitted considerably increasing their readiness for performing fire missions in the course of battle.

According to prisoners' statements, surprise MLRS salvos were a very effective means of engaging Iraqi towed artillery. This was determined both by the high destructive capacity of hollow charge-fragmentation submunitions and by the stunning effect of salvo fire on the personnel's minds. With the missile warhead filled with 644 (according to other data 688) submunitions, the salvo of one combat vehicle numbered around 8,000 submunitions dispersing in a 400x400 m area. According to assessments of foreign military specialists, achieving a similar effect required using 22 M109 155-mm howitzers for firing with an expenditure of four rounds per piece. It was no accident that MLRS salvos were nicknamed "steel rain" by the Iraqis. Over 10,000 missiles with cluster warheads and 30 ATACMS missiles were expended during combat operations.

Along with this, it is impossible not to recognize that the Iraqi artillery command underestimated the importance of counterbattery fire in our time, had nothing with which to counter U.S. tactics of conducting it, and did not promptly make necessary changes in methods by which artillery performed fire missions. It also must be recognized that successful operations of artillery are impossible today without reliable air cover. Persian Gulf war experience shows that its absence is fraught with serious human and material losses.

Outfitting troops with NAVSTAR space navigation system ground equipment considerably simplified topogeodetic support to their combat operations on terrain that was poor in contour points (reference points). Its wide use accelerated the determination of firing position coordinates during deployment in unsurveyed areas. It played a role of no less importance in the course of the multikilometer desert march by MNF troops in executing an enveloping maneuver.

At the same time, the experience of employing the above equipment in artillery combat operations showed that its potential capabilities can be realized to the full extent if

each battery and the battalion staff are outfitted with two sets of navigation system receivers at the very least. This will enable determining not only rectangular coordinates and the absolute height of artillery combat formation elements, but also grid azimuths of directions of orientation, which will ensure high autonomy of each artillery subunit, including when realizing the "shoot and scoot" concept.

The M190A2 SP and M198 towed 155-mm howitzers earned a differing evaluation. The former showed high mobility in the course of marches of many hours over rugged and often difficult terrain. Like other equipment on a wheeled base, the latter demanded special attention. In addition to tire pressure adjustment, ensuring its successful movement in the desert required advance distribution of repair, overhaul and rebuilding assets along movement routes, especially in places where it was possible to expect a delay in column movement.

Nevertheless, U.S. military specialists admit that both the M190A2 and M110A2 SP howitzers are considerably obsolete. The former in particular was substantially inferior to the French GCT 155-mm howitzer. This piece, mounted on the AMK-30 tank chassis and with a barrel 40 calibers long, is capable of firing rocket-assisted projectiles to ranges up to 30 km. It also considerably surpasses the U.S. howitzer in rate of fire (thanks to an automatic loader) and in the number of rounds in battle stowage.

In the process of the howitzer's projected modernization, it is planned to install the M2284 long-barrel gun, which will permit increasing the maximum range of fire from 23.5 km to 30 km. It is also proposed to outfit the gun with a more advanced fire control system, a more advanced night sight, new communications equipment and a system for protection against mass destruction weapons.

It is characteristic that as a result of the brevity of fire preparation of the assault on axes of operations of some MNF formations, Operation Desert Sword essentially began immediately with fire support. This evidently is explained by the fact that it was preceded by the lengthy period of the "electronic-fire" phase of the war, during which considerable damage was done to the enemy, command and control was disorganized, and his will to resist was undermined.

In the course of fire support, the system of its coordination adopted in the U.S. Army gave a positive account of itself on the whole. Fire support coordination elements at all command and control echelons down to and including the infantry (tank) company, artillery forward observers in platoons, and high personnel training ensured close coordination of field artillery with combined arms units and subunits in the course of the offensive and timely requests for fire against newly detected targets; and the presence of forward air controllers and shore parties for spotting ship gunfire in the fire support coordination teams of motorized infantry (tank)

companies ensured precise coordination of the fire of field artillery and ship guns with air strikes.

In the course of combat operations, however, the insufficient technical outfitting of artillery forward observers and imperfection of the accepted scheme for passing their fire support requests were revealed. The increased range of effective fire of combined arms subunit weapons, above all tanks and ATGM systems, considerably increased their capabilities to destroy observed targets, i.e., targets which previously were engaged based on requests of artillery forward observers. The forward observers themselves, moving in combat formations of motorized infantry platoons, were not always able to be disposed in places where a special threat to combined arms subunits was possible. At the same time the number and importance of weapons taking part in close combat but unobserved from ground observation posts (mortars, FOG ATGM systems and so on) sharply increased. Consequently, in the course of combat operations a contradiction was revealed between the increased number of targets determining the course and outcome of close combat and the capabilities of artillery forward observers to detect them.

In the opinion of foreign military specialists, its solution should be sought on the one hand along paths of improving the outfitting of artillery forward observers, particularly the creation of devices with variable observation height and disposed on telescopic masts (or underground platforms), and on the other hand in a change in the procedure for passing fire support requests from artillery forward observers. In a number of cases in the course of Operation Desert Sword the requests did not go directly to weapon fire control stations or to company fire support coordination teams as required by U.S. Field Manual FM 6-20, but to fire support coordination officers in battalions. This enabled determining the priority of requests based on interests not of the platoon (company), but of the battalion as a whole, and using the entire arsenal of weapons at its commander's disposal for fulfilling them. The latter evidently is the main thing inasmuch as it reflects a general trend manifested during the Persian Gulf war—using the maximum number of weapons for performing fire delivery missions that arise suddenly. This permits not only performing unscheduled missions in the shortest time and thereby freeing up weapons faster for performing other fire missions, but also making maximum use of the psychological effect of concentrated fire on personnel.

It also is impossible to ignore the conclusion drawn by western specialists based on a generalization of artillery combat employment in the Persian Gulf. Despite the fact that formation commanders had a considerable amount of general support assets, which if necessary were capable of having a decisive effect on the course of combat operations, commanders of subunits participating in the battle must have a sufficient amount of artillery for direct fire support. Only this gives them necessary tactical mobility and independence in performing combat missions.

Consequently, the serious results achieved by MNF aviation during Operation Desert Storm did not shake the joint command's views on the role and importance of artillery in performing missions of direct fire support to troop combat operations.

Meanwhile, as shown by experience of MNF artillery combat operations, there was nothing new that appeared in their organization and conduct which would have differed substantially from known provisions of field manuals of countries which participated in the Persian Gulf war. Moreover, in the course of combat operations numerous deviations were allowed from demands of field manuals: firing subunits conducted fire from one and the same firing positions for a long time, artillery pieces at positions were disposed in the open and not camouflaged, field artillery radars as a rule operated in a continuous mode and so on. With an adequate enemy reaction, such violations could have led to serious personnel and equipment losses.

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New Chinese ICBM Noted

94UM0162B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
12 Jan 94 p 3

[Article: "China Is Creating a New ICBM"]

[Text] The Japanese newspaper SANKEI SHIMBUN states that China is producing its first intercontinental ballistic missile capable of reaching the USA. According to American military sources, its Washington correspondent reported today that last year's testing of a nuclear device in the PRC was directly linked to this work being carried out by Chinese missile experts, which has allegedly entered the final stage.

The experts believe that the Soviet-built SS-24 and SS-25 strategic missiles, which have an operating range on the order 10,000 kilometers, served as the prototype for a new type of delivery vehicle. It is their opinion that the nuclear device exploded at the Chinese test range near Lob Nor lake in October 1993 was nothing other than one of the warheads which make up the missile's multiple reentry vehicle, and that it had a force on the order of 90 kilotons. The newspaper reports that the product of the Chinese missile experts may be capable of carrying 8-10 nuclear warheads aimed at various targets.

SECURITY SERVICES

Creation of Russian Federation Border Service

94UM0158A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
31 Dec 93 p 1

[Article by Russian Federation Border Troops Press Bureau: "A Federal Border Service Has Been Created"]

[Text] As a result of the abolition of the Russian Federation Ministry of Security and to ensure continuity of leadership

of the Russian Border Troops, Russian Federation President Boris Yeltsin signed the Edict "On the Creation of the Federal Border Service—Russian Federation Border Troops High Command" on 30 December 1993.

In accordance with this edict, the new structure that is functioning in the capacity of a federal ministry is directly subordinate to the Russian Federation President and Government.

Colonel-General Andrey Ivanovich Nikolayev has been appointed Russian Federation Border Troops Commander-in-Chief.

The President's Edict will permit the Russian Border Troops to carry out their missions for the protection of the State Border with maximum effectiveness under current conditions.

Commander-in-Chief of Border Guards Nikolayev Interviewed

Role of Border Guards in CIS Context Viewed

PM1401113594 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
13 Jan 94 First Edition p 5

[Interview with Colonel General Andrey Nikolayev, commander in chief of Border Guards, by Boris Vinogradov; place, date not given: "Russians in Green Service Caps Will Guard Their Neighbors. Cost To Be Split Equally"—first three paragraphs are introduction]

[Text] Russia is the only state which considers it necessary to guard its boundaries hundreds and thousands of kilometers away from its own territory. Russian border guards are guarding the borders of other independent states as well as their own.

The actual length of Russia's land borders is 22,125 km. Bearing in mind that Russia keeps border detachments in some CIS countries, it turns out that Russia has been obliged to ensure the security of another 3,600 km of border. Meanwhile, the number of border guards remains unchanged.

Under an edict issued by Boris Yeltsin, the border guards have been transferred from the disbanded Ministry of Security to a special federal service, which basically means an increase in status to ministry level. Colonel General Andrey Nikolayev, commander in chief of the Border Guards, who replaced Vladimir Shlyakhtin in this post after the tragic events on the Tajik-Afghan border in summer 1993, answers IZVESTIYA's questions:

[Vinogradov] Why send our border guards to serve at other states' border posts, states that are friendly but nevertheless independent? After all, they do not send us their soldiers to guard Russia's borders with China or Finland, for example.

[Nikolayev] Russia and the former USSR republics are separated by a state border. But Commonwealth states

cannot successfully resolve their border problems separately from one another. This is at odds with our economic interests and our national security. Russian units and subunits are guarding the borders of Armenia, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan on contractual terms. Appropriate documents have also been signed with Turkmenistan. The service performed by our border guards in these places is also to Russia's benefit. Belarus, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan are guarding their own borders. But Russia believes it has a duty to help them build border installations and train cadres.

[Vinogradov] The Russian Federation border currently runs along the symbolic line which used to separate the RSFSR from the other union republics. In most cases it is not monitored. Uninvited guests can easily enter Russia via CIS countries. What might the consequences of this situation be?

[Nikolayev] Could we erect an unbroken fence, for example, along our border with Kazakhstan, Belarus, and Ukraine...? But the sections of the new border which, if left open, could pose a serious threat to Russia's security have been or are being covered by our troops. Take our border with the Baltic countries: Last year we prevented the export from Russia of many thousands of tonnes of nonferrous and rare earth metals, fuel and lubricants, and other contraband worth over 2 billion rubles.

[Vinogradov] A memorandum has been signed in Ashgabat on cooperation in guarding the external borders of the CIS in Central Asia. On what terms will this cooperation be implemented? Who will pay and how much? What will be the status of the Russian border guards?

[Nikolayev] The memorandum states that guarding external borders is a joint concern and should be implemented through joint efforts. The terms for cooperation are being defined by multilateral and bilateral agreements which should be concluded within three months. The status of Russian servicemen performing their military service in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan has already been defined. Our border guards' rights have been protected in legal terms.

With regard to costs, we favor sharing the burden. Our approach is to split costs down the middle. The sum involved is immeasurably less than the amount it would cost the taxpayer to equip a new border with CIS states.

[Vinogradov] An insuperable craving for economic integration coexists with a desire for full independence. Will it not be the case that in 5-10 years' time Russia will be guarding neighboring states' borders while leaving its own unsupervised?

[Nikolayev] The ties that bind us are too numerous to permit us to fence ourselves off from each other with barbed wire. I am sure that none of these countries will object to open borders with their Commonwealth neighbors if nothing threatens their sovereignty and national

security. Among other things, this is ensured by reliable guarding of the Commonwealth's external borders. Surely Russia, by guarding its border with Finland, is thereby ensuring Ukrainian national security? On the other hand, are not Ukrainian border guards protecting Russia's economic interests by foiling smugglers' activities on the Ukrainian-Polish border?

[Vinogradov] Azerbaijan recently insisted that Russian border guards should quit its territory. They left Nakhichevan, for example, leaving behind all their property and weapons. Geydar Aliyev is now complaining that 170 km of the border with Iran has been seized by Armenian troops, and all the indications are that he will not object to inviting the Russians back. What response will Russia make to this invitation?

[Nikolayev] Russian Federation border troops do not intend to intervene in the internal affairs of any state or assume the role of peacekeeper in regional conflicts. I visited Azerbaijan at the beginning of January. We need to find mutually acceptable forms of cooperation for guarding Azerbaijan's border with Iran and Turkey. The units withdrawn from Azerbaijan are now guarding the border on Russia's new boundaries. They are monitoring international routes in the Makhachkala region, keeping the shores of the Caspian under observation, and guarding the high mountainous section of the border with Georgia.

Minister Nikolayev on Border Forces Reform

PM2001163594 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 20 Jan 94 First Edition pp 1-2

[Interview with Colonel General Andrey Ivanovich Nikolayev, newly appointed minister and commander-in-chief of the Border Forces, by military observer Vladimir Klimov; date, place not given: "We Are All Border Workers"—first paragraph is ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA introduction]

[Text] The new minister, Colonel General Andrey Ivanovich Nikolayev, commander in chief of the Border Forces, is a third-generation soldier who has passed through all the trials of service to achieve the big stars on his shoulder boards: From being a platoon commander, he proceeded up each rung of the command ladder. Industriousness and efficiency, knowledge and an unconventional way of thinking—resulting in not just reprimands, but early promotions and two academies behind him. He accepted as his destiny the move from the General Staff to the Border Forces. A new stage in the border guards' life began with the presidential Edict on the Creation of the Federal Border Service (FBS). We offer for your attention an interview by our military observer Vladimir Klimov with Col. Gen. A. Nikolayev.

How To Equip the Border

[Klimov] What is fundamentally new in the Border Forces' tasks and functions?

[Nikolayev] First and foremost the separation of the Border Forces into an independent structure with the rights of a ministry can in no way be regarded as a repetition of the story of the creation of the Committee for the Protection of State Borders, which left the KGB. The amorphousness of that committee and the fact that it belonged to everyone and no one predetermined its failure. The subordination of the present FBS is clear—it is subordinate to the president and the government. The Border Forces are henceforth implementers of Russian foreign policy. In subordinating a number of structures in the state security system to himself and introducing the post of assistant for national security, the Russian Federation president is creating a well-integrated system for safeguarding the country's security in which each of the structures has a clearly prescribed role.

This not only raises the border forces' status. We are moving away, as it were, from the notion that we are purely military people. From an international viewpoint this is a very important fact. The edict encapsulates the reality dictated by life. The future may possibly be different. But today we have a clear awareness of our role and place in the country's security system.

[Klimov] Protecting the border remains one of the main tasks. Andrey Ivanovich, when will the Russian border be equipped, and how?

[Nikolayev] Our border with Kazakhstan, for example, stretches for 7,500 km. If we started equipping it we would spend so much money that we would be left not only without jackets on our backs, but even without pants. Why should the Russian people be deprived of shoes if we are in a position to safeguard their interests in not only political but purely practical border-protection terms on Turkmenistan's border with Iran, Kyrgyzstan's border with China, and so forth. It is along these borders that Russia's strategic interests lie. Politicians in the Commonwealth countries have now come close to understanding that the border of their state is the border of the entire CIS. That is the first point. The second is that it is economically much more advantageous to protect the former Union borders: Russia's share of the cost is 50-50 in terms of money and 50-50 in terms of personnel.

It is a different matter if some people in the CIS disagree with our approach or if Russia is not confident about the safeguarding of its security or the protection of its interests. This would spark a counter-reaction, and Russia would get involved in equipping the border. At the first stage this would mean border checks, at the second stage—searches, at the third stage—protection involving troops. But we will not be the initiators of this kind of approach. Our states' peoples wish to move freely around the territory of the Commonwealth. If we build fences on our national borders there can be no question of such free movement.

[Klimov] Andrey Ivanovich, you were in Azerbaijan recently. You cannot talk about a reliably protected border there. Mojahedin are coming in via Iran and

participating in the fighting against Armenian troops. Arms and drugs come from there, and our border with Azerbaijan is transparent. How is this?

[Nikolayev] We have a special approach to the Caucasus region. Border protection in the Caucasus is built along two boundaries. The first, the former USSR border, coincides with CIS countries' borders with Iran and Turkey. The second is the line of the Russian state border. It is necessary to guard this border and at the same time to create a protection system and build housing for officers, barracks, parks, stables, and so forth.

By no means everything has gone smoothly. A particularly difficult situation developed in the Dagestan sector and on the territory of Karachayevo-Cherkessia on the border with Georgia. The arrival of border troop units here met with active resistance both from certain local residents and also from power structures. Around 150 criminal acts have been committed against North Caucasus District border troops on Georgian territory alone; three border troopers have been killed and over 20 wounded.

However I can say that on the second border we are ensuring the protection of our interests. Let me cite a few figures. Around 700 intruders were detained and dozens of weapons and large quantities of ammunition were confiscated on Russia's border with Georgia and Azerbaijan last year.

In Azerbaijan we said: If Russia can be confident that its interests are reliably protected on the Azerbaijan-Iran and Azerbaijan-Turkey borders, protection of Russia's borders in the Dagestan sector can be carried out jointly—that is, the border posts are all in one line and Russians and Azerbaijanis serve together. This represents a special degree of trust.

We have the same approach with Belarus and Ukraine. They and Russia are three independent states, but they cannot be divided by a border. Therefore we are proposing to Ukraine, for example: We will operate in the Bryansk sector and Ukrainian border troopers will operate in the Kursk sector. This is a fundamentally new attitude stemming from Russian foreign policy.

Border Post Lessons

[Klimov] Your first trip as head of the Border Forces, Andrey Ivanovich, was to the Tajik-Afghan border. What lessons have been learned from the fighting in that distant border post sector, where Russian border troopers have died?

[Nikolayev] The Tajik-Afghan border is an acid test of the Commonwealth's solidity. The fighting on the border marked the beginning of efforts by the Commonwealth countries to safeguard their security. This is most probably the main lesson of that fighting in the border post sector.

On the other hand, there is no problem with the border there. What we have there is bandits who break through the border. There is no military solution to the problems

of the Tajik-Afghan border. Its stability can be safeguarded only by peaceful means involving negotiations between the country's leadership and the opposition.

[Klimov] In times past the border sometimes "spawned" new weapons. The Damanskiy island incident was followed by the appearance of automatic grenade launchers among the troops. Is the experience of hostilities in border post sectors still heeded now?

[Nikolayev] The Border Forces have specific weapons, of course. Our aircraft and helicopters differ from military ones and carry the identifier "P." There is also other combat equipment intended solely for border protection. Nevertheless the Border Forces need to change. Not to copy the Armed Forces but to be powerful and capable enough, when required, to fulfill a task involving the use of weapons.

What we should be is the subject of great research. The next two or maybe three years will be a period of transition for the creation of virtually new Russian border forces. As we determine the Border Forces' role and place in the country's security system we are also determining its specific operational methods. Combat equipment and weapons must be produced to suit these methods.

Dispensing Apartments With a Lordly Gesture

[Klimov] Border Force officers have a difficult, nomadic life. What is being done for their social protection, Andrey Ivanovich? Have you personally helped any border trooper's family?

[Nikolayev] In terms of "personally" I'm not going to answer. If I say "no," you won't believe me. If I say "yes," you'll demand that I give their name. But why is this necessary? I get many letters asking for help with an apartment. This is probably best kept quiet, but let me say that never in my life have I personally tried to solve a housing issue. Although many people have approached me both now and when I was serving with the troops. The conversation would start: "Comrade commander, you are such a good commander to us...." And it would end: "Give me an apartment."

I know some commanders have responded to blandishments and indulged their charges: "There, have one." But I am neither lord nor king. I cannot hand out apartments with a lordly gesture. We have a system that provides people with housing. If I see someone who is really in need, I can instruct the housing commission to examine the matter. It is up to the commission what it decides. Any other approach would destroy the entire system of social justice.

We have 7,000 people without accommodation at the moment. We will be building 2,200 apartments this year. In the next three-four years we can provide housing for all. But only with specific support from state structures. It is time it was recognized that the servicemen should not have to face a housing problem.

I believe too that incentives in service must only be given for specific deeds. And what do we do: Holiday coming up—draw up a detail. An unhealthy approach that has corrupted us all. If a man does something good, say to him: "Well done." If you cannot decorate him, give him 10,000 rubles [R]. Not much money, but a concrete incentive that works. Write about the soldier in the district newspaper and he will remember it the rest of his life. Because all of us—from commander in chief to common soldier—are normal people with normal reactions.

I once asked our officers: What do you get more of in a border unit—military or family ethos? I must say that many found it an incredible question. In the Army the barracks are the model, the motorized rifle company in which everything is by the book. But you have a quite different, family atmosphere in a border unit. The commander is not figuratively, but literally like a father. He is always there for his charges to see and can instill in them only what he himself exemplifies.

And they do not want to rely on directives from Moscow. We have around 1,000 border units and no two are the same. How can someone in Moscow decide how one is to work with people in a border unit. All that is rubbish. We have made a mess of this work so far. Many people are scratching their heads now and wondering how to rectify matters.

We have lost our points of reference, they say. Hang on, did a state leader ever say that patriotism was obsolete? Or that internationalism does not exist? We are not building ethnic Russian border forces, we are building the Border Forces of Russia. If I were in charge, I would abolish paragraph five on nationality [in Russian passports] today. What is needed is citizenship, not nationality. We are the people of Russia, the most multinational people. We will destroy Russia if we do not raise internationalists.

Col-Gen Nikolayev Meets with Aliyev

PM2101180194 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian
21 Jan 94 p 2

[Aleksandr Rybakov article under the "Geopolitics" rubric: "Andrey Nikolayev, Commander-in-Chief of Russia's Border Troops: We Strengthen Economic Union by Opening Up Internal Borders"]

[Text] Azerbaijan is still opposed to the use of Russian Border Troops to protect the external borders of the CIS. But the meeting between Colonel-General Andrey Nikolayev, Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Border Troops, and Azerbaijani President Geydar Aliyev introduced some new nuances.

When we were driving into Kaspiysk I read the following slogan in a prominent place: "The friendship of the USSR's peoples is inviolable!" And nearby, in a tourist center, the 41st Makhachkala Border Detachment was settling in.

That's a sign of the times, G. Gerykhanov, the detachment's Acting Deputy Commander, sighed; we used to guard the border with Turkey and Iran in Nakhichevan,

but the local branch of the Azerbaijani People's Front [APF] made our job intolerable. Bloodshed was just a step away—officers were barely able to restrain their subordinates in the face of the constant threats and insults directed at them. In October 1992 the detachment was withdrawn from there, but without hardware and ammunition, with just its uniforms. The APF members did not even allow the Border Troops to conduct a military ritual, that is, leave with a color platoon. "Take your flag and beat it," they were told. Now the border with Turkey and Iran is virtually open here.

Nor did other regions treat the Russian Border Troops with excessive consideration during the sovereignty bandwagon. Last February a border detachment was withdrawn from Lenkoran to Vladikavkaz. Again with just their passports, you know. But let us go back to the Makhachkala detachment. There is no heating at the tourist center and it is damp. The local population gave the strangers in green a cool reception. That may be why there is still less than half the full complement of officers here. The Lezgins' "Sadval" national-patriotic movement is campaigning to set up an independent state of Lezgistan in the area of Dagestan where they have compact communities and opposes the erection of internal borders between Russia and Azerbaijan. Recently a sentry was killed right at his post in the detachment. I saw from conversations with the Border Troops that they are impatient for a final political decision from Moscow on whether there should or should not be an internal border. However, that decision cannot be adopted without the sides' mutual participation.

Col-Gen Andrey Nikolayev, Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Federation Border Troops, met with Azerbaijani President Geydar Aliyev in Baku on 3 January. He spoke briefly about the results of the meeting:

"For two years there had been no serious contacts with the Azerbaijani leadership on border issues. Today the other side takes an understanding view of these issues and agrees to consider our proposals. I think that we will reach agreement...."

And agreement is needed. The external border with Turkey and Iran is guarded worse now that it was under the Russian Border Troops owing to poor technical equipment and inadequate cadre training. The upshot is that drugs, contraband, and weapons are being smuggled across the border. If you consider that Turks can enter this friendly republic without visas and then "pass" into Russia, there is no option but to put up a barrier. But who benefits from this?

Today Azerbaijani leader Geydar Aliyev enjoys great prestige among his own people. He is above all respected for his commonsense approach to politics. The state's entry into the CIS is evidence of that.

He is also respected for his firmness. When mass desertion from the army began, it is said that the shooting of two deserters and a promise not to punish those who

voluntarily returned to their troop units made people see sense—lines formed up outside military commissariats to return to bases.

People in the Republic are now saying that the two power ministries—the Defense Ministry and the National Security Committee [NSC]—are opposing Aliyev. It is said that the President is not that young and it is time to share power. And a struggle for power has developed between the Defense Ministry and the NSC. Their methods include the following: They claim that the introduction of Russian Border troops on the external border marks a threat to Azerbaijan's sovereignty. The card of the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict is also played.

During conversations with ordinary Baku people I often heard the following: There is nothing for us to share with Armenia, no one wants the war (the surprising thing is that Azerbaijan and Armenia have not declared war on one another and are members of the CIS and the Commonwealth collective security system), it is those people who are fighting for power who want it. And one young Azerbaijani officer accompanying us admitted frankly that he is still meeting an Armenian girl living in Baku.

What about the Russian Border Troops? Should they be in Azerbaijan? If so, what kind of presence should it be? Only time will provide the answers to these questions. But in our view, the role of the Border Troops has sharply increased since the Russian Ministry of Security was abolished. Along with guarding borders, the Russian Federal Border Service has begun implementing Russia's foreign policy in nearby foreign countries.

"Russia is the place to which integration forces are looking today," Andrey Nikolayev told your ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI correspondent.

"You might say that the turning point was last September, when the CIS economic union was formed. We want to strengthen the Commonwealth of Independent States—states with equal rights and duties. By closing external borders, the Border troops are helping to open up internal borders for the development of economic ties within the CIS."

Asked what the Russian Federation will spend on guarding external CIS borders, A. Nikolayev replied:

"In Armenia, Georgia, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan Russian Border Troops operate in conjunction with these states' subunits under the combined command of the Russian Federation Border Troops. Expenditure is split equally. In Turkmenistan expenditure will depend on the extent to which Russian Border Troops participate in guarding the border. We will cooperate with Kazakhstan and Belarus in providing troops with technical equipment and training cadres. The Russian Federation's national interests will not be infringed. We espouse the idea that there are CIS external borders which must be guarded together.

"We must move on from a system of mutual rights to a system of mutual obligations."

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11 MAR 1994